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Analytical Jurisprudence and the Concept of
Commercial Law
John Linarelli*
Commercial lawyers working across borders know that
globalization has changed commercial law. To think of commercial law
as only the law of states is to have an inadequate understanding of the
norms governing commercial transactions. Legal comparativists have
argued unpersuasively for a transnational conception of commercial law
based on common content among national legal systems. Some have
argued for a transnational conception of commercial law, but their
grounds of justification have been unpersuasive, often grounded on
claims about the common content among national legal systems. Legal
positivism is a rich literature on the concept of a legal system and the
validity conditions for rules in legal systems, but it has not been used to
understand legal order outside or beyond the state. This article aims to
use legal positivism to conceptualize a transnational commercial law
order. Prevailing positivist accounts at least implicitly condition legal
order on state sovereignty. This article offers a cosmopolitan conception
of legal positivism, in which the state is no longer an enabling condition
for law. The cosmopolitan conception provides the means by which to
adequately describe a transnational commercial law order. There are
limits to the conceptual analysis this article provides, one of which is
that it does not purport to evaluate the justice or morality of
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transnational legal order. But the cosmopolitan conception of legal
positivism elucidated in this article stands on its own as a way of
understanding a number of transnational legal orders other than
commercial law. The attractiveness of the account is that it describes
law as a human social practice even when it is not solely the product of
the state, so that we do not have to rely on natural law theories to
understand legal rules that states do not maintain.
[T]he dense thicket of rules that sustain our life together . . . includes
some of the most mundane things imaginable: postal and telephone
conventions, airline safety and navigation standards, the law of
international trade, the practices that define the convertibility of
currencies, transnational banking arrangements, weights and
measures, time zones, international quarantine arrangements, and so
on. Philosophers and political theorists are not much interested in
these unexciting issues. We have nothing to say on currency rates,
bills of sale, the maintenance of sea lanes, cell-phone standards, or
the Warsaw Convention governing the liability of airlines to their
passengers. We don’t like commerce (because we are largely
ignorant of it), and we would prefer not to have to write about it.
1

Jeremy Waldron

There is no real jurisprudence of commercial law. We are presently
prisoners of the conception that commercial law embodies the law
merchant and that the Uniform Commercial Code merely furnishes
businessmen with a clear statement of their rules.
Hal Scott2

1. Jeremy Waldron, Cosmopolitan Norms, in SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER
COSMOPOLITANISM 83 (2006).
2. Hal S. Scott, The Risk Fixers, 91 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1978).
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INTRODUCTION
H.L.A. Hart spent his career rethinking legal positivism around a set
of claims understandable to analytical philosophers, dealing with
substantial questions on the relationship between law and morality, and
examining the deep structure of tort and criminal law, as well as serving,
towards the end of his career, as Principal of Oxford’s Brasenose
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College.3 Never did he concern himself with a subject as mundane as
commercial law. Many view Hart as the greatest legal philosopher of the
twentieth century in the analytical tradition.4 To borrow without any
suggestion of precision from the philosophy of science literature, Hart’s
contribution could be described in Thomas Kuhn’s terminology as a
paradigm shift in the way philosophy of law is done.5 He made the first
move in analytical legal philosophy from law’s authority coming from
the force of the state, accounts of his predecessors Bentham and Austin,6
to a theory based on rules and social acceptance of legal obligation. His
account is more suitable to understanding the relationship of citizens in
contemporary democracies to their legal systems. Though their aims and
accounts differed substantially, Hart’s approach is as paradigmatic in the
twentieth century as Rousseau’s was in the eighteenth. Hart’s concept of
law is reminiscent of Rousseau’s discrediting of force as a source of
political morality, that “might does not make right.”7 To put Hart in
more contemporary terms, claiming that force is the source of authority
for a legal system is to fail to understand the distinction between
authority and force, between standing to claim and power to dictate. To
Hart, being obliged to obey the command of a terrorist holding a gun to
one’s head differs from having an obligation to obey the law.8
3. See NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE
DREAM 2 (2004).
4. For example, Brian Leiter, characterizing Hart as “the giant of 20th century
jurisprudence,” explains that Hart brought jurisprudence “into the mainstream of Englishspeaking philosophy.” BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 2 (2007).
5. See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2nd
ed. 1962).
6. See JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL (H.L.A. Hart ed., Athlone Press
1970); JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1998).
7. Rousseau said in the Social Contract:
The strongest is never strong enough to be the master forever unless he
transforms his force into right and his obedience into duty. This leads to the
right of the strongest, a right that is apparently taken ironically and in principle
really established. But won’t anyone ever explain this word to us? Force is a
physical power. I do not see what morality can result from its effects. Yielding
to force is an act of necessity, not of will. At most, it is an act of prudence. It
what sense could it be a duty? . . . Let us agree that might does not make right,
and that one is only obligated to obey legitimate powers.
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 48-49 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith
R. Masters trans., St. Martin’s Press 1978). A similar discussion is in Plato’s Republic,
in which Socrates and Thrasymachus debate the nature of justice. See generally 1 PLATO,
REPUBLIC in PLATO COMPLETE WORKS (John M. Cooper ed., 1997).
8. Hart said:
The plausibility of the claim that the gunman situation displays the meaning of
obligation lies in the fact that it is certainly one in which we would say that [the
victim], if he obeyed, was “obliged” to hand over his money. It is, however,
equally certain that we should misdescribe the situation if we said, on these
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From Hart sprung the contemporary analytical jurisprudence
canon.9 Hart argued that the practical authority of law comes from other
rules, in particular, from the systemic relationship of primary rules
imposing legal obligations on persons to secondary rules of recognition,
change, and adjudication.10 Hart said nothing about the need for a state
or sovereign to back law’s authority. State law could be said to be at best
a central case of the sort of institutional normative order Hart identifies.11
Hart’s concern was in producing an understanding of the concept of law,
but he did not claim that law is the only institutional normative order
complying with his description. Hart’s description of the union or
primary and secondary rules describes other “non-legal” institutionalized
normative systems, such as those of sporting organizations, clubs,
universities, churches and business firms.12 Some scholars have claimed
that the requirement of the state is in Hart’s account and that it is a
requirement of legal positivism generally; others have claimed to the
contrary.13 Some of the critical literature is more in the nature of
facts, that [the victim] “had an obligation” or “duty” to hand over the money.
So from the start it is clear that we need something else for an understanding of
the idea of obligation. There is a difference . . . between the assertion that
someone was obliged to do something and the assertion that he had an
obligation to do it.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 82 (2nd ed. 1997).
9. It is not feasible here to recount that substantial literature. For surveys, see
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Jules Coleman, Scott J.
Shapiro, & Kenneth E. Himma eds. 2002); A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY (Dennis Patterson ed. 1999); Leslie Green, Legal Positivism, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/ (last
visited June 20, 2009).
10. Philosophers call the kind of authority a legal rule or moral principle has over us
practical authority. Practical authority issues a reason for action. It is action guiding.
Legal philosophy asks questions about why the law is binding on us. Practical authority
is to be distinguished from theoretical authority, which issues reasons to believe. The
concept of practical authority does not require any special citation in a philosophical
work. To see the concept in action in a recent influential work of moral philosophy, see
STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 11 (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 2006). The question of
the practical authority of law has been one of the central questions of legal positivism.
How are we to understand the claim to obedience that law makes on persons? See Leslie
Green, Legal Obligation and Authority, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-obligation/#2 (last visited June 20, 2009).
11. NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 34, 136 (Stanford: Stanford University Press
2007).
12. Id., at 21; JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 123-48 (1990).
13. See, e.g., A. CLAIR CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY:
TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 7, 60-67, 74-76 (2003) (legal
positivism under stress); Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State?:
Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 527 (2006) (limited
discussion of why there is “no good reason” why a rule of recognition or other
grundnorm requires a state). Gunther Teubner’s work in legal pluralism and law as an
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assertion than justification. But the critics are on to something that
seems to threaten the core of legal positivism. What else, in a positivist
account of the law, would posit law for the norm users in a legal system
other than the state and its government? It seems a reasonable
conclusion to draw that the existence of a state is an enabling condition
for law in the positivist account.14 Joseph Raz, perhaps the most
influential of the Oxford analytical philosophers after Hart, seems to at
least implicitly agree in his work, but he also, like Hart, does not
explicitly specify the need for a state.15 It could just be that the
requirement of the state is such an obvious background condition for
legal positivism that it does not need to be articulated as an express
condition. In this article I give legal positivism the benefit of the doubt
to see where it leads.
While analytical jurisprudence developed into an intricate set of
claims in its own literature, another literature, grounded in commercial
law and comparative law, made its way through journals in this country
and globally, on the nature of commercial law and whether non-state
actors have a role in the production of a contemporary law merchant.16
This is the literature on the notion of transnational commercial law. It
contains substantial and seemingly interminable discussions between
commercial law nationalists and commercial law cosmopolitans.
Lawyers, judges, famous international commercial arbitrators, and legal
scholars have been going back and forth for decades on whether the law
merchant exists and if so, what it is comprised of, what kind of respect it
deserves, and how should it come into play in commercial disputes.17
autopoietic system states generalizations about how the law merchant meets Hart’s
conditions for a legal system, but his work is not analytical philosophy and might be seen
as a critique of Hart’s work as too nationalist. Gunther Teubner, “Global Bukowina:”
Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 8 (Gunther
Teubner ed. 1997); Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal
and Social Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 149 (1997). William Twining can be read as
broadly sympathetic to Hart, but he is a legal pluralist and skeptical about legal
positivism. See WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY (2000).
14. I borrow the enabling condition concept from Thomas Nagel’s Storrs Lecture at
Yale Law School. Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB.
AFFAIRS 113 (2005). Nagel uses the concept to identify what he calls a political
conception of justice, in which states, governments and sovereignty are enabling
conditions for justice. He contrasts the political conception of justice with the
cosmopolitan conception of justice.
15. To require a state for a legal system might contradict the purported political
neutrality of legal positivism. Why analytical jurisprudence resists this concession is
puzzling. Justice theorists have not. See generally JOHN RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES
(2001).
16. Rather than try to cite that voluminous literature here, I note for the reader that it
is cited throughout the article.
17. For discussions of the controversial aspects of claims that a modern law
merchant exists, see infra notes 145-287 and accompanying text. YVES DEZALAY &
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The substantial disagreement over this question has no end in sight.18
Lord Mustill, a British Law Lord and an accomplished international
commercial arbitrator, and also outspoken critic of the idea that a law
merchant exists, has asked:
What is the jurisprudential basis of the lex? It is remarkable that
given the volume of academic writing on the topic—a volume which
considerably exceeds that of the [arbitral] awards which purport to
put the doctrine into practice—there is even now no consensus on the
intellectual basis of the doctrine. Is the lex a law, properly so called,
or is it a body of rules which the parties choose (expressly or
impliedly) to apply to their individual contract? If it is a law, from
where does it draw its normative force?19

To my knowledge, no one has answered Lord Mustill’s question about
the jurisprudential basis or normative force of the law merchant.
The aim of this article is to assess whether analytical jurisprudence
can provide an adequate descriptive account of a transnational
conception of commercial law, which includes the law merchant as well
as state-based sources of law. This is the first account of the analytical
jurisprudence of commercial law.20 To my knowledge, no one has used
analytical jurisprudence to develop insights about either commercial law

BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 39-48 (1996); Jan H. Dalhuisen,
Legal Orders and Their Manifestation: The Operation of the International Commercial
and Financial Legal Order and its Lex Mercatoria, 24 BERKELEY J. INTL L. 129 (2006);
Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 13.
18. Ralf Michaels explains:
For some time, positions on the question of whether an anational law merchant
existed or exists were matters of faith rather than academic rigor, and some
participants in the debate seemed driven more by the wish to defend their own
fields than by a disinterested search for adequate theories. Scholars and
especially practitioners in the debate seemed driven more by the wish to defend
their own fields than by a disinterested search for adequate theories. Scholars
and especially practitioners in commercial and arbitration law promoted lex
mercatoria not least because their fields seemed to benefit from it. Scholars of
conflict of laws, by contrast, abhorred the idea of a non-state law demanding
recognition, not least because they feared for central tenets of their field.
Empirical issues mattered surprisingly little in this debate.
See Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 INDIANA J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 448-49 (2007).
19. Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Michael Mustill, Contemporary Problems in International
Commercial Arbitration: A Response, 17 INT’L BUS. LAW. 161-63 (1989); see also Rt.
Hon. Lord Justice Michael Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-Five
Years, in LIBER AMERICORUM FOR THE RT. HON. LORD WILBERFORCE (Maarten Bos & Ian
Brownlie eds. 1987).
20. A limited attempt to identify principles underlying commercial law can be found
in Roy Goode, The Codification of Commercial Law, 14 MONASH. U. L. REV. 135 (1988),
a very different project from mine.
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or the law merchant.21 There has been limited brief discussion of Hart’s
work in the literature, but no philosophical account centering on it.22
21. Commercial law involves both contract and property; areas such as sales are
based in contract but are means to transfer property and areas such as secured credit and
negotiable instruments are based in property but are created by contract. A significant
literature provides philosophical accounts of contract and property. These do not extend
to offer a satisfactory philosophy of commercial law. Private law categories of contract,
property, tort, and restitution serve as a base for many commercial law concepts, just as
equity and fiduciary duty does for corporations, but the fields can be conceptualized as
entirely distinct, and have been so conceptualized in Europe. Failing to make the
distinctions often leads to errors, as, for example, in thinking of commercial law as an
extension of contract law, and not understanding that a substantial part of commercial law
is about personal property. For a survey on the philosophy of contract law, see Jody S.
Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 9, at 687. Kraus contends: “As in private law
scholarship generally, economic analysis is the dominant paradigm in contemporary
contracts scholarship. But alongside the vast body of economic contracts scholarship
produced over the last thirty years, a core body of philosophical contracts scholarship has
steadily developed in relative obscurity.” Id. at 687. For a selective sample of
contemporary literature see, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Contract Theory, in THE BLACKWELL
GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 138 (Martin Golding & William
A. Edmundson eds., 2005); STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY (2004); THE THEORY
OF CONTRACT LAW (Peter Benson ed., 2001); LARRY A. DIMATTEO, EQUITABLE LAW OF
CONTRACTS: STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES (2001); MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1993); JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF
MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (1991); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A
THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1982); Larry A. DiMatteo, The History of
Natural Law Theory: Transforming Embedded Influences into a Fuller Understanding of
Modern Contract Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 839 (1998); Peter Benson, Abstract Right and
the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary
Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077 (1989); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory
of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986). Philosophical accounts of property have
mainly to do with the justification of private property. For a survey, see Peter Benson,
Philosophy of Property Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 9, at 752; see also NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY (Stephen R. Munzer ed. 2001); JEREMY WALDRON, THE
RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1991); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY
(1990).
22. For mentions of Hart in connection with the law merchant, see Michaels &
Jensen, supra note 13; Stephen Perry, Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law:
Liberating the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1184 (2006). To Perry,
the “rules of the old law merchant,” by which I assume he means the medieval law
merchant, were “a borderline case of a legal system” in which “all the primary rules
identified as valid by a rule of recognition might consist of preexisting customary rules
that hold among . . . some segment of the population.” He notes that the law merchant
served as both legal and social rules among merchants. His discussion of the law
merchant is incidental; Joanna Jemielniak, Legitimization Arguments in the Lex
Mercatoria Cases, 18 INT’L J. FOR THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW 175 (2005); Robert Cooter,
Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating
the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1654 (1996) for an economic take on
Hart’s concept of a legal system; Abdul F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and
International Contracts: A Challenge for International Commercial Arbitration?, 14 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV. 657, 699 (1998), in which the author says that “[i]t is beyond the scope
of this present paper to examine the status of the lex mercatoria as a legal order or legal
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Commercial lawyers and analytical legal philosophers are very different
sorts, working in divergent traditions. The traditional work of the
commercial lawyer has been in doctrinal analysis. Commercial law
doctrinalists do important work, which needs to be respected, though it
may have influenced lawyers to focus on an incomplete set of sources for
commercial law, making them too reliant on national law and national
projects of unification as the sole or main sources of commercial law.
Newer commercial law scholarship is based predominantly in law and
economics, and is increasingly empirical.23 The legal pluralism literature
offers substantial insights on the law merchant.24 Apart from the legal
pluralism literature, which can be classified as law and society
scholarship, the law and society movement has been influential on the
margins of commercial law scholarship,25 and some of the economic
research, particularly that which relies on qualitative data and is in the
new institutional economics tradition, shares affinities with sociological
methods.26

system in the light of contemporary analytical theories of legal systems propounded by
such noted theorists such as Kelsen, Hart and Dworkin,” but then concludes that “[f]or
our present purpose, it will suffice to say that lex mercatoria, in the Austinian positivistic
perspective, does not entirely conform to some important features of a legal system,
namely the characteristics of institutionalization and coerciveness, though it qualifies for
the normative character.” (footnotes omitted). Why the author bothers with Austin,
whose philosophy is only of historical interest, he does not say; Raj Bhala, Applying
Equilibrium Theory and the FICAS Model: A Case Study of Capital Adequacy and
Currency Trading, 41 ST. LOUIS L. J. 125, 202 (1996). Bhala concludes that Hart is to be
distinguished from Austin because he makes “room for law to be created without formal
enactment of a sovereign, and many laws confer power on private parties to engage in
self-regulation.” Bhala refers to the law merchant as an example. His aim is not
philosophical justification, so he offers none. As explained supra note 13 Teubner offers
generalizations about how the law merchant meets Hart’s conditions for a legal system,
but his work is not analytical philosophy and might be seen as a critique of Hart’s work
as too nationalist. Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 13; Teubner, Breaking Frames,
supra note 13.
23. See, e.g., Bernstein, infra note 184 and the work of Ronald Mann as perhaps
early pioneering work in the new wave of empirical commercial law scholarship working
broadly within the law and economics approach. http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/
Ronald_Mann (last visited December 24, 2008).
24. See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007)
(summarizing the legal pluralism literature, providing ways of addressing conflicts
among norms, and describing legal practices that manage legal pluralism); Teubner,
Global Bukowina, supra note 13; Teubner, Breaking Frames, supra note 13;
BONAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARDS A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE (2nd ed.
2003); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCEITY 125-27
(2001); Michaels & Jensen, supra note 13; Michaels, supra note 18.
25. But see Garth & Dezalay, supra note 17, which suggests an important role for
law and society methods in commercial law scholarship, at least for transnational
conceptions of commercial law.
26. See supra note 23.
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Legal scholars have relinquished the task of “jurisprudential”
thought about commercial law to law and economics. A significant
addition to the literature on commercial law theory in the past five or so
years bears the title, The Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate and
Commercial Law.27 It contains an excellent set of primarily law and
economics papers, but the use of the words “jurisprudential foundations”
is misleading, unless we are willing to concede that economics is almost
all there is to commercial law.28 One of the major gaps in the philosophy
of law canon is the near total absence of a philosophical account for
commercial law. This article aims to fill that gap.
I should be clear at the outset that I am not convinced that legal
positivism can do the job. This article is partly an exercise in
understanding the limits of prevailing accounts in analytical philosophy
and how they may fail to offer adequate descriptions of law in
globalizing contexts.
Putting the two subjects of transnational
commercial law and legal positivism together creates tension. Though
positivism claims not to rely on the political concepts of state and
sovereignty, I test to see how far I can use it to conceptualize an area of
law that has globalized to a pervasive degree. Positivism claims to be
descriptive but risks no longer being adequate if it cannot describe the
spread of norms outside of state control and their relationship to norms
within state control. The field of inquiry that may better perform that
task is legal pluralism.29 I may refer tangentially to some descriptive
claims by legal pluralists, but this article is not scholarship in legal
pluralism.
Part I is a brief introduction to what legal philosophers do when
they do conceptual analysis. This article is pitched not only to legal
philosophers, but also to commercial lawyers and to scholars working on
commercial law and the law merchant in other disciplines. Part I is
needed because there has been some expression of skepticism of the
relevance of philosophy and conceptual analysis to the law. Obviously,
Part I deals with substantial questions with roots deep within the
discipline of philosophy, and it can offer only a sketch of these questions
and their answers.
Part II identifies the plausible sources of commercial law. These
sources provide the primary rules in Hart’s legal positivism. In
providing that identification, we must identify the law merchant as a
27. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW
(Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds.2007).
28. The first sentence of the Kraus and Walt book states: “Efficiency is the dominant
theoretical paradigm in contemporary corporate and commercial law scholarship.” Id. at
1.
29. See supra notes 13, 24 and accompanying text.
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possible source of commercial law. Part II examines competing claims
about the law merchant. It is needed to stipulate the potential scope of
the question of how we are to understand what commercial law is.
Lawyers and legal scholars have spilled quite a bit of ink on a number of
issues about the law merchant. These include whether there is anything
to commercial law other than official state law; if the law merchant does
exist, then what falls within its scope; whether the law merchant has a
connection to the medieval lex mercatoria, whether the law merchant
should govern as norms that private actors prefer to govern their private
relationships and in what circumstances; whether courts have
incorporated the law merchant into the common law; whether the law
merchant should be incorporated into state law, and so on. Part II
introduces these and other claims. A point that comes out of Part II is
that prevailing accounts of the law merchant proponents, who are the
leading proponents to date of a transnational commercial law order,
cannot succeed on their own terms in showing that the law merchant is a
valid source of law in a transnational commercial law order. The law
merchant proponents confuse analogous content of legal norms with the
validity of those norms in a legal system.
Part III elucidates the central claims of my account. In Part III I
ask, using the teachings of legal positivism, whether a system of
transnational commercial law exists.30 In trying to answer that question,
I examine the role of the plausible commercial law sources identified in
Part II. Part III is an attempt to elucidate a transnational commercial law
order. To do this, Part III first identifies two conceptions of legal
positivism, one a political conception in which states are supreme, and
the other a cosmopolitan conception in which states coordinate with

30. I prefer to use “transnational” rather than “international” because the latter
carries with it the notion of the law governing states. In 1956, Philip Jessup made
prominent the term “transnational law,” which he defined as “all law which regulates
actions or events that transcend national frontiers.” PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL
LAW 2 (1956), quoted in Gralf-Peter Calliess, The Making of Transnational Contract
Law, 14 INDIANA J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 469 (2008). A distinction is to be made,
however, between the concept of transnational law and the concept of the law merchant.
Transnational law includes all law, regardless of source, regulating conduct that crosses
national borders. I have tried in Part II to clarify the concept of the law merchant to
comprise only a part of transnational law, as commercial law that is not produced by
states. The law merchant is thus only one source of transnational law. See Norbert Horn,
The Use of Transnational Law in the Contract Law of International Trade and Finance,
in THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 67 (Klaus Peter Berger ed. 2001) (suggesting
similar definitions). For an example of the interchangeable use of the terms
“transnational commercial law” and “new law merchant,” see Christopher R. Drahozal,
Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical Look at the New Law Merchant, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523 (2005).
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other institutional normative orders.31 My account of a cosmopolitan
conception of legal positivism tries to dissolve the notion of the state as
an implicit enabling condition for the law. A cosmopolitan conception of
legal positivism, one which removes the state as an enabling condition32
for a legal system, requires that any candidate for the designation of a
legal system meet five conditions: (1) acceptance by the participants in
the legal system, the norm users,33 of the rules of the order as valid,
binding, and authoritative; (2) systemic qualities of normative
consequence within the putative legal system that make the normative
order the system represents intelligible or comprehensible to the
participants; (3) secondary rules and secondary rule officials, though they
can be distributed across different state and non-state hierarchies;
(4) shared agency between secondary rule officials demonstrating
sufficient mutual responsiveness and joint commitment for a legal
system; and (5) primary rules dealing with issues that legal systems
usually deal with, such as property, contract, and dispute resolution.
Part III elucidates a transnational commercial legal order around
these conditions. I think reasonable arguments can be made that these
conditions are met for commercial law, but that some considerable
objections become evident. The first condition has to do with acceptance
of a transnational legal order by merchants or professionals. Merchants
certainly do accept the rules produced by state and non-state institutions,
but whether they accept these rules as comprising a transnational system
of commercial law is doubtful. The second condition is possibly met
because there do seem to be some systemic connections in the production
of state and non-state rules to make commercial law a sensible system for
the regulation of commercial activity. Those systemic connections are in
the complementary ways in which state and non-state institutions
produce complementary rules that one set of institutions does not make,
and the other fills the gaps. The third condition seems to be met.
Secondary rules and secondary rule officials exist in abundance, in both
state and non-state institutions to produce a variety of important
commercial law rules. As to the fourth condition, Michael Bratman’s
descriptions of shared agency, in particular his notion of a shared
intentional activity,34 help answer whether the fourth condition informs
us of a transnational commercial law order. There seems to be some
31. I adapt these two conceptions of legal positivism from Nagel’s description of
two competing conceptions of justice, one political and the other cosmopolitan. Nagel,
supra note 14.
32. Nagel uses similar terminology for different purposes. Nagel, supra note 14.
33. The “norm users” terminology is from NEIL MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF
LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY 20-22 (2007).
34. See infra notes 329-36 and accompanying text.
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mutual responsiveness and joint commitment of secondary rule officials,
though, I conclude, some judges and other secondary rule officials tend
to not remain steadfast nationalists. The fifth condition is met because
the primary rules of commercial law deal with social practices that legal
systems regulate.
As Part III explains, in addition to the problems a transnational
conception of a commercial legal order has in meeting all of the five
conditions, the case is weakened by at least two objections. One
objection, the limited domain objection, is that legal systems have not
been understood as covering a limited sphere of social activity, in
particular here, commercial life.
Surely no legal system is
comprehensive in the sense of regulating all human action. Legal
systems do not (or should not?) regulate action relating to what liberals
might call the private side of morality, for example.35 But the limitation
of a legal system to that of commercial law may go too far; it leaves
untouched by the law vast areas of human action that legal systems
almost always regulate. To limit scope to just commercial law may be
too implausible. A second objection, the unity objection, is that it seems
more plausible to claim that transnational commercial law is better
understood as a distribution of multiple normative communities across
state borders that are independent but which coordinate, but to claim that
they form a unified whole may go too far.
In the end, while we may encounter obstacles in conceptualizing a
unified system of transnational commercial law, conceptual analysis is
about getting clear on our concepts, and in that process of clarification
we come to improve our understanding of the ways commercial law
operates on a transnational scale.
I.

THE SO WHAT QUESTION

Some legal scholars have raised worries about whether philosophy
can deliver the goods. The main worry is whether philosophy can be
prescriptive.36 Law professors, particularly in the U.S., want to know
35. John Rawls makes similar arguments with his notion of public reason. JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1995).
36. Philosophers have no difficulties with lack of prescription. Kwame Anthony
Appiah can get away with saying in the preface of his influential book on the ethics of
identity:
My last and most forceful disclaimer . . . is addressed to those who are looking
for practical guidance, for specific recommendations about precisely what laws
and institutions will best heal our social and political ills. Alas, I am a poor
physician: I’m interested in diagnosis—in etiology and nosology—but not in
cures. If an agenda, a set of action items is what you’re after, my one bit of
practical advice is that you look elsewhere.
KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY xvii (2005).
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how a particular theory or approach tells us about whether the law is
satisfactory, good, right, should be changed, and so on. Philosophers
would likely call this task social critique, and some might have the
opposite worry of the legal scholar—whether philosophers should
engage in it.37 Brian Bix has expressed frustration with his colleagues’
obsession with public policy prescriptions:
It is important to note the inclination, quite strong among American
legal academics—less so among theorists from continental
Europe . . . to want always to know the normative (“bottom line”)
consequences for any theory they consider. They find analytical
legal philosophy . . . deeply frustrating because of its refusal to offer
prescriptions based on its theoretical claims.
The response one often finds when presenting an analytical legal
philosophy paper is something along the lines of, “If your theory has
no consequences for what we do, for how we practice law, what good
is it, and what is the point of doing such work?” In general, I have
little sympathy for the normative fixation of American legal scholars.
Of course, critique and prescription are extremely important, but
there is ample room for knowledge for its own sake—in legal history
and the history of ideas, for example; and in metaphysics—even if no
38
immediate pragmatic use of that knowledge is forthcoming.

Bix uses the word “normative” to distinguish between normative and
conceptual analysis of the law.39 Normative analysis is analysis to
understand what law’s content is or should be. When philosophers do
37. For a summary of the views of several moral philosophers, see T.M. Scanlon,
The Aims and Authority of Moral Theory, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1992).
38. Brian Bix, Joseph Raz and Conceptual Analysis, APA NEWSL. ON PHIL. AND L. 1,
3 (2007).
39. I bracket the claim that the normative can be separated from the conceptual or
the descriptive. The fact-value distinction has been the subject of a considerable
philosophical literature. Hannah Pitkin, for example, provides a Wittgensteinian take on
the problems with the distinction. HANNAH F. PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE 177178, 219-231 (Berkeley: University of California Press 1993). Any time one examines
rules, or reasons for action, the untenability of the distinction is particularly problematic.
A rule is a description of how one ought to do something. See id. at 228. Another way to
access the critique of the fact-value distinction is through hermeneutics. For general
discussions of these issues, see ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
(2nd ed. 1995); MARTIN HOLLIS, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION
(1994). So, for example, arguments that judges should “say what the law is rather than
what it should be” are hopelessly confused, because the very pronouncement of what “is”
pronounces what “ought to be.” The problems with inserting the fact-value distinction
into the judicial process or any sort of adjudicatory process are many. Hart and other
legal positivists, going back to Bentham, accept the distinction between what the law is
and what it ought to be. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,
71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958). It is beyond the scope of this article to take on these
substantial questions.
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normative jurisprudence, they inquire whether the law’s content meets or
should meet some normative criterion fixed by theories of justice,
deontological ethics, or consequentialist theories such as utilitarianism.
An economic theorist claiming that the law should be efficient is doing
normative economics, usually normative welfare economics. When
philosophers do analytical jurisprudence, they are not doing normative
analysis, but conceptual analysis. When philosophers do conceptual
analysis, however, they look for law’s normativity, but in a different
way. They want to describe how that normativity works in the legal
system. They look for it in the existence of conditions that makes law
what it is, and not in its content. So, philosophers look to why law
makes a claim of obedience on persons, not on what the content of that
claim of obedience is or should be.
What is conceptual analysis? Ludwig Wittgenstein, one of the most
influential figures in twentieth century analytical philosophy, said that
philosophy is an “activity of clarification.”40 According to Joseph Raz,
“conceptual analysis concerns the logical features of concepts.”41 To
combine Wittgenstein’s and Raz’s insights, we use conceptual analysis to
get clear on the meaning of concepts.42 The idea is that we should strive
to understand the meaning of, say, legal obligation, right, duty, justice,
and so on to the humans who actually use the concepts in their everyday
speaking of a public language. But as Raz explains, we must not be
“slaves of words.”43 Language reveals beliefs and attitudes.44 In
conceptual analysis, we want to get to the propositional content of those
beliefs and attitudes in the way the speakers of a language use the
language. Analytical philosophy, at least in the way it is done here, is
not concerned with the discovery of external entities or properties
independent of human existence.
“Obligation,” legal, moral or
otherwise, is not some metaphysically real thing, furniture of the
universe.45 It is what it means to us, and we access what it means to us
40. P.M.S. HACKER, INSIGHT AND ILLUSION 151 (Rev. ed. 1986); MARIE MCGINN,
WITTGENSTEIN AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 12-16 (1997).
41. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 12, at 10.
42. The suggestion here is not that Wittgenstein and Raz agree on the task of
philosophy. Wittgentein raised doubts about whether conceptual analysis was worth
doing. Brian Leiter, Introduction in THE FUTURE FOR PHILOSOPHY 3 (Brian Leiter ed.,
2003). Raz, on the other hand, is one of the most preeminent of analytical legal
philosophers who use conceptual analysis.
43. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 41
(1979).
44. Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual
Analysis, in BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 123-25 (2007).
45. The phrase “furniture of the universe” is often attributed to J.L MACKIE, ETHICS:
INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1990), though it does not appear in the book. It is
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through the analysis of concepts we use in ordinary speech. To continue
with the example of the concept of obligation, Hart used conceptual
analysis to distinguish between being obliged and having an obligation.46
I want to go back to what I will call Bix’s point, because I have to
convince the skeptical legal scholar that this article is worth reading.
Bix’s point centers on the “so what” question. The question lawyers are
prone to ask about philosophy of law is “so what.” So what does
philosophy tell us about commercial law that we do not already know?
What is the point of having a philosophy of commercial law? After all,
isn’t commercial law all about economics, since it concerns interactions
that are inherently economic in character? Philosophy can tell us a great
deal about commercial law.
If some legal scholars lose patience with philosophical analysis,
then it is up to those of us who do it to show why our work deserves
respect, though I concede the point that in the interdisciplinary world in
which American law professors are situated, that is difficult. Those who
work in legal philosophy are in a good position to use their skills to
engage in wide reflective equilibrium and take into account all
considered judgments, economic, doctrinal, ethical, critical, and so on, in
reaching conclusions about the law.47
commonly used to refer to approaches to practical philosophy in which concepts are
understood as metaphysically real.
46. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 8, at 82-84; WILLIAM LUCY,
PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE LAW 4 (2007).
47. Legal philosophers working in the Rawlsian tradition talk of “working out”
claims and justifications using what Rawls described as reflective equilibrium. Rawls
distinguished between narrow and wide reflective equilibrium. When we engage in
narrow reflective equilibrium, we work back and forth between moral judgments about
particular situations and general reasons and principles. We attempt to link moral
judgments to the general reasons and principles. So, two considered moral (legal,
political) judgments might be that “people have a right to avoid a contract procured
through fraud” and “banks should not honor checks they know to have been altered
through forgery.” These particular judgments are linked to general principles like “all
persons have the right to be treated fairly and honestly by other persons,” with the
concepts of fairness and honesty having working out understandings, which in turn link
to more abstract principles such as “the state should secure for its citizens all purpose
means to achieve whatever good life they happen to choose.” When we engage in wide
reflective equilibrium, we probe and question our general reasons and principles, and do
not accept them as givens. In wide reflective equilibrium, we “widen the circle of
justificatory beliefs.” NORMAN DANIELS, JUSTICE AND JUSTIFICATION: REFLECTIVE
EQUILIBRIUM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 1 (1996). It is “the process of bringing to bear the
broadest evidence and critical scrutiny one can, drawing on all the different moral and
non-moral beliefs and theories that arguably are relevant to our selection of principles or
adherence to our moral judgments.” Id. at 1-2. “The key idea underlying the method of
[wide] reflective equilibrium is that we ‘test’ various parts of our system of moral beliefs
against other beliefs we hold, seeking coherence among the widest set of moral and nonmoral beliefs by revising and refining them at all levels.” Id. In wide reflective
equilibrium we can consider not only moral theories but social science theories and
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Bix is right: prescription need not always be the end product of all
inquiries about the law. For example, an approach to doing doctrinal
analysis is to defer to the policy choices of courts, legislatures, and other
official sources, and to seek to clarify the law, while carefully avoiding
any effort to prescribe what is beyond what is intended by official
sources to be the meaning of the law in question.48 The aim of empirical
studies of the law is often ground clearing and clarifying, designed to
reveal how our folk intuitions about the effects of the law or about social
problems are wrong. More generally, conceptual analysis shares with
science the aim of discovery of truth. Some important empirical work in
commercial law fulfills precisely such descriptive or truth-seeking
purpose, though prescription inevitably follows from description,
because the description has found something wrong. If a bankruptcy
scholar concludes that the Bankruptcy Code is not doing what it is
supposed to be doing, with the “supposed to be doing” previously
decided under some pre-existing normative framework, then a proposal
for changing the law inexorably follows.49
Conceptual analysis need not, as a matter of necessity, only produce
knowledge for its own sake and lack prescriptive significance in all
cases. It can be prescriptive, in the sense that it requires us to consider
new perspectives, new ways of seeing what has always been there and
always been familiar and obvious. Wittgenstein tells us that philosophy
provides us with “observations which no one has doubted, but which
have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes.”50
So, it has always been an obvious feature of commercial life that norms
empirical findings. Id. at 6. We thus can use economics. So, in our examples above, we
might want to determine whether our considered moral judgments about fraud and
forgery cohere with efficiency, least cost avoider arguments, and so on.
48. If normativity is as pervasive as I suggest, neutrality as to the meaning of the law
seems implausible. But consider the discussion in a research colloquium at the
University of East Anglia Law School some years ago. The colloquium was on Jill
Morgan’s article on whether the UK Human Rights Act applies to the registered social
landlords in the UK. Registered social landlords are quasi-public entities that are
managing the increasingly privatized public housing stock in the UK. Jill Morgan, The
Alchemists’ Search for the Philosophers’ Stone: The Status of Registered Social
Landlords under the Human Rights Act, 66 MOD. L. REV. 700 (2003). In the workshop, I
asked whether the Act should apply to these public authorities. The answer I got back
expressed some doubt about whether such questions are within the scope of legal
analysis. To an American legal academic, the answer might seem non-responsive. The
answer, however, is acceptable to many legal scholars outside of the United States, who
engage in the sort of rigorous doctrinal analysis underlying Morgan’s answer. This is not
meant as a criticism of that approach.
49. See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME
TRAP (2004); TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK,
THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000).
50. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS ¶ 415 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 2001).
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come from outside of official, nation-state dominated legal sources, but it
has been difficult for lawyers to recognize the full implications of such
norms and how they might work in commercial dispute resolution.
Conceptual analysis might shed light and lead to prescription. It has the
potential to offer important insights about commercial law, and these
insights have the potential to change the way we “do” commercial law as
an activity in the world. A positivist account of a domestic legal order
that no one disputes exists at a mature level of development might offer
few new insights, but when we use analytical jurisprudence to discover
whether a legal order exists in the first place, from sources we always
knew existed but which present themselves to us in a new light once we
apply philosophical techniques to them, then we might learn a great deal,
enough so that prescriptions may indeed follow inevitably from our new
insights.51 When we elucidate the concept of commercial law in a
transnational context, we have the potential to make a significant
contribution to the discussion of whether the law merchant is law, a
question that has puzzled lawyers across the globe for a long time.
Gunther Teubner, who has written some of the most theoretically rich
and sophisticated work on the status of the law merchant as law, explains
that “[t]he debate on lex mercatoria is one of the rare cases in which
practical legal decision-making becomes directly dependent on legal
theory.”52 Our new insights could change the way we understand
commercial law.
That this chapter provides a conceptual analysis of the concept of
commercial law does not mean that no empirical propositions enter into
the analysis. What is to follow has elements of what has become known
as applied philosophy. The work that is to be done might eventually
become what is known as social theory.53 To get clear on what
commercial law is, we shall have to understand institutions that produce
commercial law. To understand these institutions we need to dig deep
into what philosophers call social practices. When we seek to describe
51. A potentially fruitful line of inquiry would be to use analytical jurisprudence to
promote understanding of legal orders in developing countries. This line of inquiry has
not been pursued, likely because legal philosophers and law and development scholars
work in divergent fields of legal scholarship.
52. Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 13, at 8; see also Michaels, The True Lex
Mercatoria, supra note 18, at 449-52 (discussing Teubner’s theory). Teubner uses
systems theory and autopoiesis to understand the lex mercatoria and the globalization of
law generally. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (WileyBlackwell 1993).
53. The sociologist Anthony Giddens characterizes social theory as an umbrella: “It
is a body of theory shared in common by all the disciplines concerned with the behaviour
of human beings. It concerns not only sociology, therefore, but anthropology,
economics, politics, human geography, psychology—the whole range of the social
sciences.” ANTHONY GIDDENS, PROFILES AND CRITIQUES IN SOCIAL THEORY 5 (1982).
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social practices, we cannot deny that we are uncovering facts, which may
then be classified as empirical work, though it is nothing more than what
lawyers might do when they describe and evaluate legal institutions.
When we inquire of the social practices of our putative legal orders, we
want to understand what commercial law is; is it only the declarations of
government officials who work for nation-states, or is it something else
or more?
II.

COMMERCIAL LAW SOURCES AND COMPETING CLAIMS ABOUT THE
LAW MERCHANT

This part identifies, in a Hartian conception of legal rules, the
primary rules of commercial law. At least a plausible claim can be made
that to limit oneself to considering only the municipal law of nationstates, with extensions of that law based on treaties and conventions
entered into by states, as the only possible sources of commercial law,
can lead to a serious misunderstanding of the nature of commercial law.
I make the case here for identification only of plausible sources. I do not
want to beg the question of what commercial law is, as that question
would have to be conceptually justified, which is the subject of Part III.
What would be the reasons for a municipal law restriction? It would
seem to be in the nature of an arbitrary stipulation, unrelated to the law
and its structure, but instead based on historical artifact, politics, and
nationalism.
States are arbitrary and involuntary associations.54
Domestic legal systems exist within what Gunther Teubner calls a “high
degree of institutional insulation”55 and that insulation is the product of a
political conception of the law centering on nation-states. Says Teubner,
“[f]or nation-building in the past, unity of the law was one of the main
political assets—a symbol of national identity. . . .”56 These claims are
not unique to Teubner,57 though he makes them in the context of
54. Nagel, supra note 14, at 128, 133, 146.
55. Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 13, at 3, 8.
56. Id.
57. Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 13, at 3. The connection of law and
codification to national identity is not unique to Teubner. See, e.g., MICHAEL JOHN,
POLITICS AND LAW IN LATE NINETEENTH-CENTURY GERMANY: THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL
CODE 6-7 (1989) (“Codification was . . . widely regarded as an integral part of the process
of state formation. . . . From the start of the nineteenth century, codification was linked
to nationalism.”); R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, EUROPEAN LAW IN THE PAST AND THE FUTURE:
UNITY AND DIVERSITY OVER TWO MILLENNIA 94 (2002), in the context of Germany:
No matter how strongly scholars disagreed about the merits of native vs.
Roman law, their contest would not have been so dramatic if other, i.e.,
political, considerations had not been involved. The quarrel was so violent
because it concerned political feelings. It was all about the very touchy issue of
national against foreign law: what could have been more burning in the young,
proud nation state? National pride, the ethnic interpretation of history and the
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supporting his claim that the law merchant is part of what he calls global
law without a state.58 Teubner seems to be making a point about the
historical conditions for unifying European law in the nineteenth century
using the great civil codes of the time,59 but his points are sufficiently
universal so that they can be reasonably applied to the American
experience.
Related to the problem of arbitrary association is incompleteness: If
we only consider domestic and state-created international sources for
commercial law, a plausible argument could be made that we have a
seriously incomplete picture of what commercial law consists in, and our
answers to legal problems might be wrong. Indeed, norms that non-state
actors create might be more important to commercial actors than statecreated norms.60 The incompleteness point should be obvious to lawyers
but I hope to make it clearer below.
Think of commercial law from the standpoint of the actors in the
world who use it. Firms are increasingly multinational. This chapter is
not the place to discuss law and globalization in a comprehensive way,
but let’s think of these questions from the interests of the sorts of clients
our law graduates may represent. For firms to rely solely on U.S.
markets is a risky strategy. A recent report in the Wall Street Journal of
Hershey’s exposure to the risk of being only in the domestic market
illustrates the problem of a “domestic only” strategy.61 The business
community saw Hershey’s strategy as so unusual that it is news reported
in the Wall Street Journal. Hershey is aware of its problems and is
trying to expand to global markets through a potential business
combination with Cadbury PLC, but that will be difficult because
Hershey, relying only on U.S. markets, cannot finance such a
combination and still retain control. Hershey’s market, the U.S. market,
is the largest domestic economy in the world by far, but still, to rely only
on a domestic market for sales is risky. Hershey’s competitors generate
substantial revenues in markets globally, which they use to finance their
operations.
Global business is such a common phenomenon today that MBA
programs often require MBA students to complete a course in global

romantic Volkgeist theory formed a potent current from the late eighteenth
century onwards.
58. Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 13; Teubner, Breaking Frames, supra
note 13.
59. See JOHN, supra note 57.
60. Berman, supra note 24, at 1177-78.
61. Julie Jargon, Can Hershey Survive Candy Wars? Trust’s “No Sale” Leaves
Company Relying on U.S. as a Global Giant Looms, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2008, at B1.
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strategic management.62 As one of the core readings in such courses,
written in 1989, explains to first year MBAs:
Many forces are driving companies around the world to globalize by
expanding their participation in foreign markets. Almost every
product market in the major world economies—computers, fast food,
nuts and bolts—has foreign competitors. Trade barriers are also
falling. . . . Japan is gradually opening up its long barricaded
markets. Maturity in domestic markets is also driving companies to
seek international expansion. This is particularly true of U.S.
companies that, nourished by the huge domestic market, have
typically lagged behind their European and Japanese rivals in
63
internationalization.

Firms are way ahead of law reformers and governments in
understanding the need for thinking of commercial law transnationally.
While Teubner tells us of the problem of institutional insulation, Hershey
illustrates for us the problem of economic insulation. Karl Llewellyn and
Grant Gilmore, the legal realists who were the prime movers of the UCC
at its inception, with their emphasis on facts and context, would be
international (or transnational!) lawyers in the twenty-first century.
What has been said so far in justification of a cosmopolitan
perspective on commercial law comes only from North American or
“large market” perspective. We can leave aside our biases and examine
the issue from the standpoint of “small market” countries, be they a
developing country, such as Uganda, or an industrialized country, such
as Ireland.64 The conclusion is the same, but the facts make it all the
more inevitable. These countries do not have the luxury of institutional
or economic isolation. For a small market industrialized country,
international transacting is a necessity; the country does not produce
sufficient goods and services to maintain economic autonomy, and the
country likely depends on exports to generate wealth for its citizens,
since its domestic market is too small to do so. A developing country

62. See, e.g., Wharton Business School’s curriculum, in particular its Global
Strategic Management course. Core Curriculum, MBA Resource Guide, The Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania, http://www.wharton.upenn.edu/mbaresource/
curriculum/core/index.cfm#mgmt655 (last visited July 3, 2008).
63. George S. Yip, Global Strategy . . . In a World of Nations?, 31 SLOAN MGMT.
REV. 29 (1989). This article is required reading in Professor Stephen J. Kobrin’s Global
Strategic Management course at Wharton. http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/
OLD%20WEB/CourseScreens/Syllabi/Spring2005/655_Kobrin_Spring05.pdf
(last
visited July 3, 2008).
64. Angelo Forte, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods: Reason and Unreason in the United Kingdom, 26 BALT. L. REV. 50, 58
(1997) (Scottish and English interests diverge on the ratification of the Vienna
Convention on the International Sale of Goods or CISG).
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faces similar issues, but we must add to the mix its institutional
deficiencies. Developing countries often lack adequate judicial, law
enforcement, and regulatory institutions. Purchase a book on Ugandan
contract law, and it is likely that the book is full of English case law.65
Legal systems of many developing countries are simply too undeveloped
to have generated a body of principles over the course of time, and
lawyers in the country must be versed in the laws of other countries,
usually that of the country’s old colonial ruler. Public procurement
officers for developing country governments must be well versed in
international sale of goods law and other areas of international
commercial law because supplies and services of any good or service of
even a modicum of complexity or value have to be imported.
Construction contracting is a substantial series of international legal
events in developing countries.
Commercial lawyers, regardless of national origin, thus should have
a thoroughly cosmopolitan perspective. If I am right, no rigid
distinctions exist between the domestic and the international when
conceptualizing commercial law as a legal category, though in the sphere
of application to discrete legal problems for clients, certainly some
problems will be wholly domestic in scope.
If we are to consider all possible sources for commercial law
regardless of state borders, then at least eleven possible sources of
commercial law exist: (1) municipal or domestic commercial legislation;
(2) judgments by municipal courts interpreting domestic legislation;
(3) municipal case law; (4) commercial treaties or conventions between
and among states; (5) interpretations of international commercial treaties
or conventions by municipal courts; (6) law merchant that private
legislatures or rule-making bodies create, for either domestic or
transnational transactions, which I call legislated law merchant;
(7) interpretations of legislated law merchant by municipal courts;
(8) interpretations of legislated law merchant by arbitrators;
(9) “unwritten” law merchant or custom, which evolves but is not
promulgated in a discrete rule-making event. I call this form of law
merchant “evolved” or “customary” law merchant to distinguish it from
legislated law merchant. As with the legislated version of the law
merchant, the evolved version of the law merchant may be for wholly
domestic markets or for transnational markets, though my examples
below relate only to transnational markets; (10) interpretation and
creation of evolved or customary law merchant by courts and arbitrators;
and (11) general or fundamental principles of law. All of these need
more explanation and clarification, particularly the law merchant
65. DAVID J. BAKIBINGA, LAW OF CONTRACT IN UGANDA (2001).
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categories, which may not be self-evident. At this point, the list is
stipulative and broad in the sense that it contains possible sources. And,
given the breadth of the list, the discussion to follow can only be an
incomplete sketch of the sources. One sense in which it is stipulative is
its segregation of similar concepts, such as municipal case law and
evolved law merchant, and municipal legislation and legislated law
merchant. These segregations are designed to achieve clarity, and to
avoid making assumptions about what requires conceptual justification.
As well, the identification is conservative, staying close to the traditional
conception of legal categories as they are understood in municipal legal
systems. In addition, the discussion to follow merges some of these
categories when they relate to each other.
Some of what I am about to say about the noncontroversial
categories of commercial law may seem basic, but I want to lay out each
of the categories, to make clear distinctions between them. This is
necessary because the literature on the law merchant is often lacking in
the sort of clarity strived for in analytical philosophy, and some writers
have conceptualized the law merchant in loose and contradictory ways.66
As a result, the use of the phrase “law merchant” might be very different
as between different lawyers, arbitrators, and legal scholars.
A.

Domestic Commercial Legislation

First and most obviously is domestic legislation. The Uniform
Commercial Code is an example of domestic legislation. The American
commercial law codification movement began in earnest in 1892 with the
creation by the American Bar Association, at the urgings of the New
York Legislature, of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).67 Of course, the need for codification
in the United States was obvious. M.D. Chalmers, one of the prime
movers of English commercial law codification, said in 1903: “In the
United States, the case for codifying mercantile law is stronger than in
England. I am told that an American lawyer who wishes to keep abreast
of the current of judicial decision has to take in some fifty-eight volumes
of Law Reports ever year.”68 Two waves of legislation69 culminated in
66. See infra notes 329-36 and accompanying text.
67. Uniform Law Commission: The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=0&
tabid=11 (last visited July 3, 2008); see Mitchell Franklin, On the Legal Method of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 16 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 330 (1951).
68. M.D. Chalmers, Codification of Commercial Law, 19 L. Q. REV. 10, 17 (1903). I
trust the reader sees why Chalmer’s quote may be amusing to lawyers today!
69. See Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code,
58 COLUM. L. REV. 798 (1958).
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the Uniform Commercial Code, the definitive version of which appeared
first in 1957 and then with minor changes in 1958 and 1962.70
English law went through a codification movement in the nineteenth
century similar to the movement that occurred in the United States, but
unlike in the United States, which opted for wholesale reform through
the Uniform Commercial Code, many of the English commercial
statutes, with some piecemeal modification, remain in force today.71
Countries in the civil law tradition also have commercial codes.
France’s is the Code de Commerce of 1807, redrafted in 2000 and the
Germany’s is the Handelsgesetzbuch of 1900.72 Some countries, such as
Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, have abolished commercial
codes and regulate commercial transactions through their civil codes.73
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the differences in
codification as between common law and civil law countries. Significant
differences cut across several levels. A code in a civil law country is a
very different institution from a code in a common law country. In
addition, a commercial code in a civil law country exists within an
established hierarchy in which it is subservient to the civil code in the
event the two codes are inconsistent.74 The UCC differs substantially
from a commercial code in a civil law country.
Covered here are only the potential sources of commercial law, but
nothing has been said about scope. The question of scope identifies even
more differences as between civil law and common law
conceptualizations of commercial law. What activity does the notion of
commercial law cover? The question becomes important when we
attempt to compare commercial law notions in common law and civil
law traditions. The civilians use the general criterion of commerciality to
determine what gets classified as commercial law.75 Because the notion
of commerciality governs what gets classified as commercial law,

70. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 3-5 (5th
ed. 2000).
71. ROBERT BRADGATE, COMMERCIAL LAW 10 (3d ed. 2000).
72. JAN H. DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL AND TRADE LAW 17 (3d ed. 2007).
73. Id. at 22.
74. Tomes have been so written. For an introductory treatment, see JOHN HENRY
MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF
WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 26-33 (2d ed. 1985).
75. DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL
AND TRADE LAW, supra note 72, at 16-22; Jim C. Chen, Code, Custom, and Contract:
The Uniform Commercial Code as Law Merchant, 27 TEX. INT’L L. J. 91, 94 (1992) (“The
UCC is not a code in the Continental sense. Short of a ‘preemptive, systematic, and
comprehensive enactment of a whole field of law,’ the UCC deviates from the
Continental model of a strictly commercial code with special procedures and rules
tailored for merchants.”) (citations omitted).
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commercial codes in civil law countries cover only the transactions of
merchants and professionals. Common law countries do not rely on such
over-arching ideas unconnected to solving a particular problem for a
client, and with no conceptual difficulty classify transactions involving
consumers, even when consumers are on both sides of the transaction, as
commercial law. Indeed, a common law lawyer might find time spent
trying to understand these demarcation issues as a waste of time because
it is not action guiding in the context of solving a particular legal
problem. In the United States, consumer bankruptcy is a core
commercial law subject, but in a civil law country, it would not be so
classified. The UCC is full of provisions relevant to consumer
transactions and whether those provisions provide adequate protection to
consumers is a question of considerable debate.76 As well, a substantial
and primarily federal legislation protects consumers, and American law
professors have no qualms about the inclusion of this legislation within
the commercial law curriculum.77 The American commercial lawyer
might spend much of her time inquiring about the effects of the law on
consumers and still call herself a commercial lawyer.78 In the United
States, commercial law scholars see as alien to their work divisions that
would put consumers in a different legal category on their own. Still that
does not mean that consumers are treated the same as merchants, and
American lawyers tend to classify consumer issues for special coverage
both inside and outside of the Uniform Commercial Code.79 The Article
76. See, e.g., Charles W. Mooney Jr., The Consumer Compromise in Revised U.C.C.
Article 9: The Shame of it All, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 215 (2007); Caroline Edwards, Article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code and Consumer Protection: The Refusal to Experiment,
78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 663 (2004).
77. The federal legislation and implementing federal regulation by the Federal Trade
Commission, where applicable, includes the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301-2312, and implementing regulations, 16 C.F.R. Parts 700-03; the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r and the Unfair Credit Practices
Regulations, 16 C.F.R. §§ 444.1-.5. The Consumer Credit Protection Act includes the
Truth in Lending Act (Title I), the Fair Credit Reporting Act (Title VI), the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (Title VIII), and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (Title IX);
see, e.g., Donald F. Clifford, Non-UCC Statutory Provisions Affecting Warranty
Disclaimers and Remedies in Sales of Goods, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1011 (1993).
78. Bankruptcy and consumer debt have been the subject of a substantial literature.
Bankruptcy law has been the focus of particular attention in recent years. This is not the
place for an exhaustive survey. For a sample of the bankruptcy literature, see CHARLES J.
TABB, BANKRUPTCY ANTHOLOGY (2002). The 2008 financial crisis will prompt an even
more intense consumer focus. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making
Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649 (2009).
79. Francis J. Facciolo, Father Knows Best: Revised Article 8 and the Individual
Investor, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 615 (2000); Marion W. Benfield, Consumer Provisions in
Revised Article 9, 74 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1255 (1999); Jean Braucher, Deadlock:
Consumer Transactions Under Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 83 (1999); Fred
Miller, Consumers and the Code: The Search for the Proper Formula, 75 WASH. U. L. Q.
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2B project failed largely because it was seen as treating consumers
unfairly.80 Even in English law, commercial and consumer law tend to
be seen as distinct fields of inquiry; English statutes might not break out
quite as clearly as they do in on the continent, but generally English law
more clearly demarcates between the law governing merchants and the
law protecting consumers than in the United States, at least as academic
lawyers conceptualize the field.81
B.

Municipal Court Decisions Interpreting Domestic Commercial
Legislation

The second possible source of commercial law is domestic court
decisions interpreting domestic legislation. These cases may or may not
be decided within legal systems that recognize the concept of
precedent.82 For courts that do not create precedent, still, their decisions
may be influential for other reasons having to do with ensuring
consistency and uniformity in the law.83 That the holdings of these
187 (1997); Kathleen Patchel & Amelia H. Boss, Consumer Transactions and the Code:
Some Considerations, 51 BUS. LAW. 1343 (1996).
80. See Jean Braucher, The Failed Promise of the UCITA Mass-Market Concept and
its Lessons for Policing of Standard Form Contracts, 7 SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 393
(2003); Jean Braucher, Briefing Paper for the National Conference of State Legislatures,
March 2001, http://www ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/CIPCOMM/braucher0301 htm (last
visited July 4, 2008); Michael Rustad, Making UCITA More Consumer-Friendly, 18 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 547 (1999).
81. It is not unusual for British law professors to hold chairs in consumer protection
law alone.
An example of the demarcation is secured transactions law, which in English law is
known as credit and security law. In English law, there are two registries for security
interests, one for security interests in property owned by individuals and the other for
security interests in property owned by companies. Bills of Sales Act 1878; Bills of Sales
(Amendment) Act 1882, as amended; Companies Act 1985 §§395, 396; Bradgate, supra
note 71, at 495-500.
82. I avoid the simplistic notion that common law jurisdictions recognize the
concept of precedent while civil law jurisdictions do not. These sorts of broad
generalizations are often inaccurate because they fail to capture the nature of judicial
decision-making. These concerns are well beyond the scope of this article. For a
discussion of these issues by a German law professor, see Katja Funken, The Best of Both
Worlds—The Trend Towards Convergence of the Civil Law and the Common Law System
(July 2003). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=476461 (last visited July 4,
2008).
83. Following a previous court decision because it is precedent is a different reason
for following it because it is a well decided, just, fair, efficient, promotes consistency or
uniformity in the law, and so on. To follow a decision because it is precedent means that
“[t[he previous treatment of occurrence X in manner Y constitutes, solely because of its
historical pedigree, a reason for treating X in manner Y if and when X again occurs.”
Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 572 (1987). The elucidation of the
concept of precedent could go further by further specifying what it means to have a
reason to treat X in manner Y. If precedent is to have a mandatory feature, it must be
more than a reason, it must be an overriding reason, something in the nature of a reason
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decisions serve as independent sources of the law is undisputed in
common law countries and certainly plausible in civil law countries.
An example of how a court operating under this second category
both “interprets” and “makes” commercial law is the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court decision in Maine Family Credit Union v. Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Canada.84 The principal issue in that case was whether
a credit union that accepted for deposit fraudulently indorsed checks was
a holder in due course and therefore not subject to defenses of the
drawer, an insurance company that issued the checks to beneficiaries
defrauded by the credit union’s customers. A holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument is someone who takes the instrument for value,
without “apparent evidence of forgery or alteration,” in good faith, and
without notice of claims and defenses specified in UCC § 3-302(a).85
The Credit Union’s holder in due course status depended on whether it
met the good faith requirement. In 1990, the NCCUSL and the ALI
revised Article 3 to reflect an objective good faith standard.86 Section 3103(a)(6) of the UCC now requires holders to prove good faith by
showing “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing.”87 The second part of the standard—
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing—adds the
objective element.88 The prior definition only required the holder to
prove “honesty in fact,” a subjective standard, to show good faith.89 In
interpreting the Code before the revision, with few exceptions courts
that at least in ordinary cases trumps all other reasons. Elaboration of these points is well
beyond our scope here.
84. Me. Family Credit Union v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 727 A.2d 335 (Me.
1999).
85. UCC § 3-302(a); see also Any Kind Checks Cashed v. Talcott, 830 So.2d 160
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
86. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 70, at 522.
87. UCC § 3-103(a)(6).
88. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 70, at 522.
89. In the early days of the UCC, the drafters disputed whether the test for good faith
in UCC Article 3 should be objective or subjective. The subjective test prevailed until
the latest revision in 1990. The apparent source of the difficulty is a nineteenth century
English case, Gill v. Cubitt, 3 B. & C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (K.B. 1824), which
applied an objective test of good faith. The 1945 UCC Permanent Editorial Board
Recommendations expressly rejected Gill’s approach. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note
70, at 522. Though U.S. lawyers have had difficulty with this case, English lawyers have
not. Gill is not even cited in Roy Goode’s foundational English Commercial law text,
and subjective good faith is summarily stated to be the English law on the subject without
any equivocation. See ROY GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW 602 (1995). Here is not the place
for extended discussion, but English law has historically had difficulties with the notion
of good faith. Id. at 100-01. For an example of how practitioners might advise clients
unfamiliar with English law, see Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, English Law—
Potential Hazards—Briefing (April 2006), www freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2006/
14422.pdf (last visited June 3, 2009).

146

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 114:1

refused to incorporate an objective element into the good-faith
standard.90 But the addition of more words and standards to a statute
does not necessarily mean that the statute becomes clearer or more
certain. As the Maine Supreme Judicial Court explained in Maine
Family Federal Credit Union, “The new objective standard . . . is not a
model of drafting clarity.”91 The Code does not furnish a standard for
“fair dealing” but the UCC Official Comments distinguish fair dealing,
which is part of the good faith standard, from careful dealing, which is
not.92 It is up to courts to supply a standard. Maine Family Federal
Credit Union provides the following:
The factfinder must . . . determine, first, whether the conduct of the
holder comported with industry or “commercial” standards applicable
to the transaction, and, second, whether those standards were
reasonable standards intended to result in fair dealing. Each of those
determinations must be made in the context of the specific transaction
at hand. If the factfinder’s conclusion on each point is “yes,” the
holder will be determined to have acted in good faith even if, in the
individual transaction at issue, the result appears unreasonable. Thus
a holder may be accorded holder in due course status where it acts
pursuant to those reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing—
even if it is negligent—but may lose that status, even where it
complies with commercial standards, if those standards are not
93
reasonably related to achieving fair dealing.

The case was on appeal from a jury verdict against the credit
union.94 Applying this standard, the court in Maine Family Federal
Credit Union held that a jury could have found that the failure of the
credit union to place a hold on uncollected funds exceeding $120,000
drawn on an out-of-state bank fails to comply with the fair dealing
requirement.95
C.

Domestic Common Law

The third possible source of commercial law is domestic common
law unconnected to statutes. UCC Section 1-103(b) provides: “Unless
displaced by the particular provisions of [the Uniform Commercial
Code], the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and
the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel,
90. See Maine Family Fed. Credit Union v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 727 A.2d 335,
340-41 (Me. 1999).
91. Id. at 342.
92. See id. at 342-43.
93. Id. at 343.
94. Id. at 338.
95. Id. at 343-44.
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fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and
other validating or invalidating cause supplement its provisions.”96
White and Summers explain that “[i]t is neither possible nor desirable to
put all (or even nearly all) commercial law into a code.”97 Despite
nationwide codification in the United States, a significant common law
of commercial law still exists. Lender liability cases are a good
example,98 as are cases involving marshaling of assets.99 The emerging
unjust enrichment cases in which unsecured creditors have a claim in
restitution against secured creditors upon which they have conferred
benefits offer examples of the tension between a rigid Article 9 that
preempts the field and the need for courts to achieve justice.100 Agency
law can be understood as commercial law, and it is almost entirely the
product of court decisions.
If we examine jurisdictions with codification not as preemptive as
the UCC, we find even more case law. In English law there is a more
frequent use of trusts in commercial contexts. The Quistclose trust is an
example.101 In a Quistclose trust, funds lent for a specific purpose are
held in trust for the lender, who in effect takes a security in the funds
through the trust. With a trust in place, the lender’s remedies are what in
English law are known as proprietary remedies for the trust funds, as
opposed to personal remedies for damages for breach of loan covenants.
This is not the place for an extended discussion of how the Quistclose
transaction would be structured in the United States. In the United
States, the trust would likely be a security interest, and a creditor not
pursuing Article 9 secured creditor status would bear significant risk of

96. UCC § 1-103(b).
97. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 70, at 21.
98. See GERALD L. BLANCHARD, LENDER LIABILITY: LAW, PRACTICE AND
PREVENTION (2nd ed. 2008).
99. See, e.g., In re Jack Green’s Fashions for Men—Big and Tall, Inc., 597 F.2d 130
(8th Cir. 1979); In re Robert E. Derektor of Rhode Island, Inc., 150 B.R. 296 (Bankr. D.
R.I. 1993); cf. In re The Computer Room, Inc., 24 B.R. 732 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982); In
re Corso Stein Enterprises, Inc., 79 B.R. 584 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1987).
100. See, e.g., Ninth Dist. Production Credit Ass’n v. Ed Duggan, Inc., 821 P.2d 788
(Colo. 1991); In re Win-Vent, Inc., 217 B.R. 803 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997); Commerce
Bank, N.A. v. Tifton Aluminum Co., Inc., 217 B.R. 798 (W.D. Mo. 1997); Knox v.
Phoenix Leasing Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Daniels-Sheridan Fed.
Credit Union v. Bellanger, 36 P.3d 397 (Mont. 2001).
101. See Barclays Bank Ltd. v. Quistclose Investments, Ltd. (sub nom Quistclose
Investments v. Rolls Razor) [1970] A.C. 567 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.);
Twinsectra Ltd. v. Yardley [1999] Lloyd’s Rep. 438 (Eng. C.A.); THE QUISTCLOSE TRUST:
CRITICAL ESSAYS (William Swadling ed. 2004). For a discussion from the perspective of
English law of the role of equity in commerce, see Peter J. Millett, Equity’s Place in the
Role of Commerce, 114 LAW Q. REV. 214 (1998).
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loss in the event of the debtor’s default or bankruptcy.102 On the other
hand, the closest American transaction to the Quistclose trust just might
be one that is an exception to the Article 9 filing requirement, that of
control over a deposit account under UCC Section 9-104.103 Under
Section 9-104, control of the collateral by the secured creditor substitutes
for filing.104 But here we can see what a code can do. Moving the fund
into a deposit account removes the trust concept from the discussion and
radically alters the nature of the security.
D.

International Conventions

Treaties are an obvious source of commercial law that nations enter
to govern commerce. These treaties have a variety of labels. One such
label is “international conventions” when they deal with transactional
law, such as the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of
Goods.105 In contrast, another label is “agreements” when they deal with
the regulatory side of international trade, as in the free trade agreements,
such as the WTO agreements.106 For purposes of simplification, I refer
to the former simply as conventions.107
Nations have entered into many multilateral and regional
conventions governing a wide range of commercial activity, from sale of
goods to security interests in mobile equipment.108 Has anyone counted?
There are so many. No doubt many a law professor who teaches basic
international commercial law courses, such as international business
transactions, have had the experience of a student coming to him or her,

102. Michael Bridge, The Quistclose Trust in a World of Secured Transactions, 12
O.J.L.S. 333, 345 (1992); Robert Stevens, Insolvency, in THE QUISTCLOSE TRUST:
CRITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 101, at 153, 166.
103. UCC § 9-104.
104. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 70, at 775.
105. The Vienna Convention, also known as the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), can be found at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG html (last visited
June 7, 2009).
106. For the legal texts of the World Trade Organization agreements, see
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/docs_e htm (last visited June 7, 2009).
107. The notion of convention as used above is a very different use of the phrase
“social convention” by philosophers to refer to a regularity groups of agents observe,
such as holding cutlery a certain way. Michael Rescorla, Convention, THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zelta ed., 2008), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/convention/ (last visited June 7, 2009).
108. One of the more recent commercial law conventions is the UNIDROIT
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, known as the Cape Town
Convention, which was signed in 2001 and came into force in January 2006.
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-equipment/main.htm (last visited
June 7, 2009).
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and saying, “I had no idea there were so many laws and institutions
working at the international level.”
International conventions are state-created law.
Some
commentators, including Jan Dalhuisen, Ole Lando, and Clive
Schmitthoff,109 classify international conventions as part of the law
merchant. As explained below, I stipulate the law merchant as rules,
principles, standards, or more generically, norms, if any, that come to
exist entirely outside of the nation-state lawmaking apparatus.110 Such a
source-based classification might be seen to contradict the uses of the
phrase in the practices of arbitrators. Another criticism I anticipate is
that I am engaging in “sources thinking,” an often stated but unfounded
complaint about legal positivism.
First, as to the question of meaning as used by arbitrators, the
purpose of the classification is to get clear on the actual practices of how
some commercial norms are actually produced. We need a way of
understanding how states produce some norms and how non-state actors
produce others. I do not think I am departing from actual use here. I am
trying to clarify what I think has been made a mess by some
commentators, a point addressed below.111
Second, as to the criticism of “sources thinking,” if we are to
understand the nature of commercial law at the transnational level, we
must explore the features of institutions and governance structures
relevant to commercial law. Source is not the focus, but institutional
structure is. How commercial law is made is an important characteristic
of commercial law, since commercial law has the potential to come from
a diversity of sources, both within and outside nation-states, and from
state and non-state norm making institutions. We could not make sense
of commercial law without understanding these institutions.
As to identifying institutions, conventions are state-created law, and
as such they are not created by so-called “private” legislatures. The use
of the word “private” in the literature is confusing.112 If the term
109. DALHUISEN, supra note 72, at 146-96; Dalhuisen, Legal Orders and their
Manifestation, supra note 17; Ole Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in International
Commercial Arbitration, 34 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 747 (1985); Clive M. Schmitthoff, The
Unification of the Law of International Trade, in CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF’S SELECT
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 170 (Clive M. Schmitthoff & Jiarui Cheng eds.
1988).
110. See infra notes 145-85 and accompanying text.
111. See infra part II.F.1.
112. There is an extensive law and economics literature on private legislatures. See,
e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995) (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws/American Law Institute in UCC context); Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of of
Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743
(1999) (intergovernmental organizations and other international organizations), cf. John
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“private” is used to designate a rule-creating body whose membership is
comprised wholly of private actors with no state-sponsorship, then
international conventions clearly are not the product of private
legislatures. The main producers of commercial law conventions are
UNCITRAL, the Hague Conference on International Law, and
UNIDROIT.113 States dominate the membership of all of these
organizations.
In fact only states can be members of these
organizations.114 The terminology often used to describe them is

Linarelli, The Economics of Uniform Laws and Uniform Law Making, 48 WAYNE L. REV.
1387 (2003).
113. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, http://www.uncitral.org
(last visited June 10, 2009); International Institute for the Unification of Private Law,
http://www.unidroit.org (last visited June 10, 2009); Hague Conference on Private
International Law, http://www hcch net/index_en.php (last visited June 10, 2009).
114. The United Nations General Assembly created UNCITRAL in Resolution
2205(XXI) of December 17, 2006. G.A. Res. 2205(XXI) (Dec. 17, 2006). The
Resolution provides for membership by sixty states who are General Assembly members.
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin.html (last visited June 10, 2009). Article
20 of the UNIDROIT Statute provides for membership by “governments.” UNIDROIT
Statute art. 20 (March 23, 1993). The UNIDROIT Web site explains that membership is
“restricted to States acceding to the UNIDROIT Statute.” http://www.unidroit.org/
english/members/main htm (last visited June 10, 2009). Article 2 of the Statute of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law provides in relevant part:
1. Members of the Hague Conference on Private International Law are the
States which have already participated in one or more Sessions of the
Conference and which accept the present Statute.
2. Any other State, the participation of which is from a juridical point of view
of importance for the work of the Conference, may become a Member. The
admission of new Member States shall be decided upon by the Governments of
the participating States, upon the proposal of one or more of them, by a
majority of the votes cast, within a period of six months from the date on which
that proposal is submitted to the Governments.
Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, art. 2 (July 15, 1955),
available at http://www hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=29 (last
visited June 10, 2009) [hereinafter Hague Statute].
Article 3 of the Hague Statute provides that a “Regional Economic International
Organisation” comprised solely of states may also be members of the Hague Conference.
Hague Statute, art. 3. Article 3(1) provides that “Member States of the Conference
may . . . decide to admit also as a Member any Regional Economic Integration
Organisation which has submitted an application for membership to the Secretary
General.” Hague Statute, art. 3(1). As for eligibility requirements, Article 3(2) provides
that a Regional Economic Integration Organisation “must be one constituted solely by
sovereign States, and to which its Member States have transferred competence over a
range of matters within the purview of the Conference, including the authority to make
decisions binding on its Member States in respect of those matters.” Hague Statute, art.
3(2). Article 3(9) defines a Regional Economic Integration Organisation” as “an
international organisation that is constituted solely by sovereign States, and to which its
Member States have transferred competence over a range of matters, including the
authority to make decisions binding on its Member States in respect of those matters.”
Hague Statute, art. 3(9). The Statute also contains a number of provisions to police the
ongoing eligibility of these organizations for membership. Hague Statute, arts. 3(4)-(8).
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intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), to distinguish them from
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In IGOs, the states call the
shots. Rule-making institutions that have no state participation, such as
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), are NGOs when they
participate as observers in the rulemaking within UNCITRAL, the main
producer of international conventions. NGOs have observer status in
UNCITRAL deliberations. In fact even states that are not UNCITRAL
members have observer status.115 UNCITRAL’s practice, however, is to
admit representatives to working groups with full rights of participation,
regardless of whether they represent UNCITRAL member states, but
most represent states, as either members or observers. The ICC has had
a privileged “consultative status” with the U.N. almost since the U.N.
came into existence.116 But while the ICC is the most prominent private
industry group involved in transnational lawmaking,117 it has no power to
produce conventions on its own.118 It must participate in an IGO’s
process, something like prominent lobbyists participating in lawmaking
in national capitals.
For those democratic states that are members of commercial
lawmaking IGOs, the IGOs could be said to be indirectly democratic.
That these IGOs are indirectly democratic is hardly fatal to the claim that
they are public and not private legislatures. An executive branch agency,
such as the U.S. Department of State Attorney Advisor for Private
International Law, appoints IGO delegates for the United States, and
other countries have similar arrangements. These delegates work in
deliberating sessions to produce conventions that must be acceptable to
the domestic body that delegated authority to them, and ultimately to a
domestic legislature or some other domestic lawmaking body that must

The Statute is obviously designed to accommodate membership of supranational
organizations, such as the European Union.
115. See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/methods_faq html (last visited
June 10, 2009).
116. International Chamber of Commerce: Policy and Business Practices,
http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/id3237/index html (last visited June 10, 2009); Guillermo
Jiménez, The International Chamber of Commerce: Supplier of Standards and
Instruments for International Trade, 2 UNIFORM L. REV. 284, 286, 292 (1996) (“The ICC
has class 1 (top-level) consultative status with the United Nations, where it puts forward
the views of business in industrialized and developing countries . . . ICC permanent
representatives at the U.N. in New York and Geneva monitor developments affecting
business within the U.N. and its specialized agencies. . . . “), quoted in ROY GOODE,
HERBERT KRONKE, EWAN MCKENDRICK, & JEFFREY WOOL,TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
LAW 356-57 (2007).
117. GOODE, KRONKE & MCKENDRICK, supra note 114, at 352.
118. But it does have authority to make other sources of law on its own and its
instruments are sometimes more successful than those made through official state
channels. See infra notes 181-95 and accompanying text.
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ratify the convention for it to become the law of the country.119 States in
effect delegate a limited form of law making power to IGOs, and the
IGOs produce a convention that has no effect for a state until accepted in
the state’s constitutionally mandated ratification process.
Commercial lawmaking IGOs serve important state functions.
Despite criticisms,120 the conventions they produce are often superior to
the alternative of private international law approaches to handling legal
problems that cross borders. In fact one could say that conflicts
approaches are being undermined by the proliferation of conventions and
the law merchant as I stipulatively define it below.
A convention goes into force when a specified number of
signatories ratify it. The terms of when it goes into force are defined
within the Convention itself. A convention is in force only for states that
ratify it, unless its provisions become so accepted by the community of
states that they become customary international law.121
In U.S. law, most and perhaps even all commercial law conventions
are self-executing, which means that they become law once ratified by
the U.S. Senate, without the need for any domestic implementing
legislation.122 The distinction is significant. If a convention is not selfexecuting, then it is the law of the land, but only as between states. If not
self-executing, there must be the further step of Congress passing
implementing legislation, and it is the implementing legislation, and not
the convention, that courts apply in disputes involving private parties.123
If a commercial law convention is self-executing, then once ratified, it is
as much a part of domestic law as any federal statute, and as a federal
statute, may even preempt state law, such as the UCC.124
119. The ratification terminology may be inaccurate for some countries. The
emphasis in the text is on the U.S. terminology, though I have tried to explain as
generically as possible, e.g., discussing how ratification has to be by a legislature or other
law making body. In the specific case of the United States, it would be the U.S. Senate.
U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, ¶2.
120. Citations to this critical literature as of about 2003 can be found at Linarelli,
supra note 112, at 1409.
121. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 24, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
conventions/1_1_1969.pdf; see MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 835 (5th ed.
2003) (“It is quite clear that a treaty cannot impose obligations upon third states. . . .
There is, however, one major exception to this and that is where the provisions of the
treaty in question have entered into customary law.”) (footnotes omitted).
122. “The field of commercial law represents one of the most prominent examples of
the influence of self-executing treaties.” Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law
in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892, 922 (2004), quoted in Amelia H. Boss,
The Future of the Uniform Commercial Code Process in an Increasingly International
World, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 349, 362 (2007).
123. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 111 (1987).
124. See Van Alstine, supra note 122, at 905-06.
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Commercial law conventions should be distinguished from model
laws and legislative guides.126 A model law is not a formal agreement
between countries in the form of a convention. Nor is it a legislative
guide. They both require, however, substantive agreement as to content;
otherwise they would not be approved in the IGO rulemaking process.
They do not go through the ratification process of a convention. Rather,
the model law is something for municipal legislatures to consider for
enactment as municipal legislation, and a legislative guide is just that—a
guide for municipal legislatures to use in drafting their own legislation.
Ministries responsible for participating in international lawmaking for
their governments often prefer model laws and legislative guides because
these documents do not have to go through ratification processes and
there is no worry about entry into force. Most model laws and legislative
guides produced today are produced for consideration by developing
countries in need of improving their legal institutions.
125

E.

Judicial Interpretations of Conventions

Commercial law conventions are subject to interpretation just like
domestic codes. The same concepts identified in Part II.B above apply
mutatis mutandis here. It is by now well accepted that uniformity in the
law is not achieved simply by promulgating a code or convention.
Courts interpret conventions to decide cases, and interpretation in
different state traditions has the potential to bring about divergences in
interpretation. Divergence can occur even in the municipal courts of a
single state.
Some conventions contain provisions like that of CISG Article 7(1),
which provides that “[i]n the interpretation of this Convention, regard is
125. The laws of one country may be used as models for reform in other countries. It
is still done to some extent, as, for example, the English commonwealth countries of
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have adopted UCC Article 9-like secured credit
statutes, and England and Wales have considered doing the same thing. GERALD
MCCORMACK, SECURED CREDIT UNDER ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW (2004). English
commercial law statutes were used as models for the drafting of the first American
uniform commercial law statutes. Williston explains that as for international standards
on sales law, the English Sale of Goods Act was “the recognized statement of the
common law, as distinguished from the civil law.” Samuel Williston, The Law of Sales
in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REV. 561, 564 (1950). The
American Uniform Sales Act was “identical in most respects with the British Act.” Id. at
563. It “followed the English statute both in substance and in the use of identical words.”
Id. at 564. See also Karl N. Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV.
558, 558-59 (1940); Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty, Quality, and Society I, 36 COLUM.
L. REV. 699 (1936).
126. A recent example of a legislative guide is the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on
Secured Transactions, published in 2008.
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/payments/Guide_securedtrans html (last visited June 10, 2009).
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to be had to its international character and to the need to promote
uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in
international trade.”127 Other conventions contain substantially similar
language.128 Further, CISG Article 7(2) provides, at least by implication,
that courts should not rely on domestic law to interpret the CISG:
Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are
not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the
general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such
principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the
rules of private international law.129

Some refer to interpretations of an international character as autonomous
interpretations, meaning that they are independent of domestic law.130 It
is beyond the scope of this article to explore these issues in detail.131 But
127. CISG art. 7(1), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/e-text07 html (last visited June 11, 2009).
128. See, e.g., UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring, art. 4(1) (May 28,
1998), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1988factoring/main htm
(last visited June 11, 2009) (“In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had
to its object and purpose as set forth in the preamble, to its international character and to
the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in
international trade.”); UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial Leasing, art.
6(1) (May 28, 1998), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1988
leasing/main htm (last visited June 11, 2009) (“In the interpretation of this Convention,
regard is to be had to its object and purpose as set forth in the preamble, to its
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the
observance of good faith in international trade.”); UN Convention on Independent
Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit, art. 5 (Dec. 11, 1995), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/payments/1995Convention_guarantees
_credit html (last visited June 11, 2009) (“In the interpretation of this Convention, regard
is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its
application and the observance of good faith in the international practice of independent
guarantees and stand-by letters of credit.”).
129. CISG art. 7(2), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/e-text07 html (last visited June 11, 2009).
130. See Franco Ferrari, The CISG’s Uniform Interpretation by Courts—An Update, 9
VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 233, 239-40 (2005).
131. Others have done so. See, e.g., LARRY A. DIMATTEO, LUCIEN J. DHOOGE,
STEPHANIE GREENE, VIRGINIA G. MAURER, & MARISA ANNE PAGNATTARO,
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CISG JURISPRUDENCE (2005);
Karen Halverson Cross, Parol Evidence Under the CISG: The “Homeward Trend”
Reconsidered, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 133 (2007); Ferrari, supra note 130; Francesco G.
Mazzotta, Why Do Some American Courts Fail to Get it Right?, 3 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L.
REV. 85 (2005); Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized
System: Observations on Translations, Reservations and Other Challenges to the
Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J. L. & COM. 187 (1998); John E. Murray, Jr., The
Neglect of CISG: A Workable Solution, 17 J. L. & COM. 365 (1998); Anthony S. Winer,
The CISG Convention and Thomas Franck’s Theory of Legitimacy, 19 NW. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 1 (1998); Franco Ferrari, The Relationship Between the UCC and the CISG and the
Construction of Uniform Law, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021 (1996); Lisa M. Ryan, The
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a sketch of the issues will help us to identify the nature of autonomous
interpretation.
The issue is not whether a court may simply ignore a convention in
favor of domestic law. There must first be a need for a judge to interpret
a convention. Moreover, that interpretation must be inconclusively
resolved by resort to the convention language alone. In some cases the
issue is whether the court should then rely on domestic law to fill the gap
in the convention or on foreign court interpretations of the convention.132
An example of a court refusing to rely on domestic law is MCC-Marble
Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, S.P.A., in which
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the parol evidence rule
found in UCC Article 2-202 does not apply to sales contracts to which
the CISG applies.133 It is doubtful that the Court in MCC-Marble had to
engage in any interpretative exercise, as CISG Article 8(3) seems to
advise that the CISG does not contain a parol evidence rule.134 MCCMarble may be contrasted with Beijing Metals & Minerals
Import/Export Corp. v. American Business Center, Inc., in which the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in dictum that the parol evidence
rule found in Texas law applied regardless of whether the CISG
applied.135 In neither of these cases, nor in many other American cases,
do courts look to foreign court judgments on the CISG for solutions.
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Divergent Interpretations,
4 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99 (1995); R.J.C. Munday, The Uniform Interpretation of
International Conventions, 27 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 450 (1978).
132. Readily accessible English language sources for abstracts and digests of judicial
decisions from other countries are now available, at least for the CISG. UNCITRAL
publishes CLOUT, Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts, a collection of abstracts of court
decisions on any UNCITRAL text. UNCITRAL has also prepared a Digest of the CISG
case law. The Center for Comparative and Foreign Law Studies in Rome has prepared
UNILEX, a collection of case law and a bibliography for the CISG. Ferrari, The CISG’s
Uniform Interpretation, supra note 130, at 242-44. Various web sites are very helpful, in
particular Al Kritzer’s CISG Database sponsored by Pace University School of Law.
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ (last visited June 11, 2009). Still, almost all of the
translated material has to do with the CISG, and not much else. The CISG is, however,
perhaps the more successful of the UNCITRAL conventions in terms of widespread
ratification or accession.
133. MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, S.P.A., 144
F.3d 1384 (11th Cir. 1998).
134. CISG Article 8(3) provides: “In determining the intent of a party or the
understanding a reasonable person would have had, due consideration is to be given to all
relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the
parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the
parties.” CISG art. 8(3), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/e-text08 html (last visited June 11, 2009).
135. Beijing Metals & Minerals Imp./Exp. Corp. v. Am. Bus. Ctr., Inc., 993 F.2d
1178, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1993) (dicta). The contrast is suggested by DANIEL C. K. CHOW
& THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS,
CASES, AND MATERIALS 207-08 (New York: Aspen 2005).
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CISG Article 7 seems to advise that foreign judgments are even more
“relevant” than UCC Article 2 or domestic contract law, in the sense that
they might serve as persuasive authority or at least as information on
how to interpret the CISG. Some scholars have even argued for a strict
doctrine of precedent for foreign judgments deciding CISG issues.136
British courts have perhaps been more consistent cosmopolitans than
their U.S. counterparts, at least in interpreting conventions. In Stag Line,
Ltd. v. Foscolo Mango & Co., Ltd.,137 Lord Atkin explained that the
Carriage at Goods by Sea Act 1924, which implements the Hague-Visby
Rules in the United Kingdom, “is not intended to codify the English law,
but is the result (as expressed in the Act) of an international conference
intended to unify certain rules relating to bills of lading. It will be
remembered that the Act applies only to contracts of carriage of goods
outwards from ports of the United Kingdom, and the rules will often
have to be interpreted in the courts of the foreign consignees.”138 Lord
Atkin, however, went on to express the need to focus on the language of
the Act, a common law method of statutory interpretation.139 In
Corocraft Ltd. v. Pan American Airways Inc.,140 Lord Denning said of
the Warsaw Convention: “[E]ven if I disagreed, I would follow [the
decisions of foreign courts] in a manner which is of international
concern. The courts of all countries should interpret [the Warsaw
Convention] in the same way.”141
The CISG scholar John Honnold invented the phrase “homeward
trend” to describe how courts interpret the CISG to defeat uniformity in
international sales law.142 Legal scholars have used the phrase
imprecisely. If it makes a hermeneutical claim that judges cannot help
but work in their own national traditions, then it states a truism that
would apply beyond the CISG context.143 Whether a threat to uniformity
136. DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 131, at 2.
137. Stag Line, Ltd v. Foscolo Mango & Co., Ltd. [1932] A.C. 328 (H.L. 1931)
(appeal taken from Eng. (U.K.).
138. Id. at 342 (opinion of Atkin, L.).
139. Id. at 342-43.
140. Corocraft Ltd. v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., [1969] 1 Q.B. 616, 655 (C.A.).
141. Id. at 655 (opinion of Denning, M.R.), quoted in INDIRA CARR & PETER STONE,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 72, 235-236 (3rd ed. 2005).
142. Cross, supra note 131, at 136-37 (quoting JOHN O. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE STUDIES,
DELIBERATIONS, AND DECISIONS THAT LED TO THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
WITH INTRODUCTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 1 (1999)). John Murray uses the phrase
“domestic legal lens.” Murray, supra note 131, at 367, quoted in CARR & STONE, supra
note 138, at 72.
143. This seems to be Honnold’s use of the phrase. Honnold says:
The Convention, faute de mieux, will often be applied by tribunals . . . who will
be intimately familiar with only their own domestic law. These tribunals,
regardless of their merit, will be subject to a natural tendency to read the
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results is an empirical question. Not all judges are susceptible to it, as
explained above. Another meaning of the phrase is that legal texts alone
cannot produce uniformity.144 A uniform application of the text does not
necessarily follow from the uniformity of the text. But this is true for
any legislative or regulatory enactment, from legislated law merchant to
domestic codes. It has no uniqueness for conventions, except perhaps
that in the domestic context, judges work in the same national tradition,
and hence the possibility of uniformity is greater. Another meaning of
the phrases is that when judges are confronted with an opportunity to fill
a gap in the CISG, they tend to fill it with their own domestic law.
Another meaning of the phrase is that judges ignore CISG Article 7. Yet
another meaning: judges are reluctant to use foreign court judgments.
Finally, another meaning is that uniformity will be defeated unless
judges consult court judgments of other countries.145 We can continue to
digress on the question of what “homeward trend” means. Its meaning
likely will combine several of these possibilities.
F.

Law Merchant

A good deal of confusion persists as to what the law merchant
actually is, if it exists at all. In this section, I attempt to clarify the field.
Section 1 examines the ways in which commentators have
conceptualized the law merchant. In section 1, I identify the sources of
the confusion. Sections 2 through 4 provide my own elaboration of
possible law merchant categories.
1.

Competing Definitions

No settled definitions of the contemporary law merchant exist. To
the contrary, a diversity of conceptions dominates the literature. In their
influential book on International Chamber of Commerce arbitration, W.
Laurence Craig, William Park, and Jan Paulsson suggest three possible
meanings:
First, the most ambitious concept of lex mercatoria is that of an
autonomous legal order, created spontaneously by parties involved in

international rules in light of the legal ideas that have been embedded at the
core of the intellectual formation. The mind sees what the mind has means of
seeing.
HONNOLD, supra note 141, at 1, quoted in Cross, supra note 131, at 136-37.
144. Many have said this. Ferrari calls it “common knowledge.” Ferrari, The CISG’s
Uniform Interpretation, supra note 130, at 233.
145. Vikki M. Rogers & Albert H. Kritzer, A Uniform International Sales Law
Terminology, 13 www.jus.uio no/sisu/a_uniform_international_sales_terminology.vikki_
rogers.and.albert_kritzer/portrait.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2008).
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international economic relations and existing independently of
national legal orders. Second, lex mercatoria has been viewed as a
body of rules sufficient to decide a dispute, operating as an
alternative to an otherwise applicable national law. Third, it may be
considered as a complement to otherwise applicable law, viewed as
nothing more than the gradual consolidation of usage and settled
expectations in international trade.146

Klaus Peter Berger also suggests three possible meanings, which differ in
some respects from Craig, Park, and Paulsson’s:
Some authors use the term to denote a mere “legal mass” of rules and
principles without any internal consistency or systematic quality. It
merely serves as a complement to the otherwise applicable domestic
law. . . . . A second view regards the lex mercatoria as the totality of
trade usages that are refined according to the needs of international
commerce and constitute a “factual jus commune. . . . A third view
regards the lex mercatoria as an independent, supra-national legal
system which derives its justification and validity from its
autonomous existence or through the principle of party autonomy as a
147
meta-legal rule.

Berthold Goldman, one of the most influential proponents of the
existence of a contemporary law merchant, suggests that the different
views as to the law merchant can be understood as either a wide view of
the law merchant or a narrow view.148 The wide view is that of Ole
Lando, Clive Schmitthoff, and others, in which the law merchant
includes law from official government sources, as well as from trade and
professional sources.149 The law merchant, under the wide view,
includes public international law, conventions, general principles of law,
“rules of international organizations,” such as UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts150 and the Principles of European
Contract Law produced by the Commission on European Contract

146. W. LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK, & JAN PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 633 (3d ed. 2001), quoted in Christopher R.
Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical Look at the New Law
Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 529 (1997).
147. KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MERCATORIA 40
(1999).
148. Berthold Goldman, Lex Mercatoria, 3 F. INTERNATIONALE 4-7 (1983).
149. Lando, supra note 109; Schmitthoff, supra note 109. The above list is modified
from Lando.
150. UNIDROIT Principles of International Conmmercial Contracts (2004),
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main htm (last visited Aug. 16,
2008).
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Law,151 customs and usages, standard form contracts, and reports of
arbitral awards, even though many of these are confidential and not
publicized. The wide view drains the idea of the law merchant of any
significance. When we classify all commercial law sources as within the
law merchant, we remove any meaning from the law merchant as a
distinctive concept. Goldman, however, supports the narrow view of the
law merchant. He contends that one cannot define the law merchant by
the “object of its constituent sources,”152 but rather, one must also look to
its origin, which he says is in its customary and spontaneous nature.153
He also requires frequent use. Goldman says that standard form
contracts are not law merchant unless they achieve the status of custom
by frequent use.154
We could go on and look at the other many attempts at stipulating
definitions of the law merchant, but the problems with all of these
definitions are common to them all. I will spend little time on the
difficulties with these definitions because they do not advance the project
of this article, but just a few obvious points. First, the requirement or
characteristic of spontaneity is highly suspect. Spontaneity is at best
contingently a feature of the law merchant. It may give rise to norms in a
narrow set of conditions, in particular, when the conditions for infinitely
repeating games are present.155 Moreover, spontaneity does not
necessarily result in rules about which people have what Hart calls a
critical reflective attitude towards compliance and violation.156
Spontaneity more likely advises us on externally observed statistical
regularities, such as habits.157 People do not care about deviations from
statistical regularities unless they become rules associated with a critical
reflective attitude. Spontaneity can likely fully explain a habit but not a
rule. To explain a rule, we need something more, some account of the
beliefs and attitudes of the norm users, which spontaneity cannot explain.
I may not have a critical reflective attitude about putting my right shoe
on first every day. Spontaneity might explain that habit. But spontaneity
cannot explain why I wear dress shoes with a suit and sneakers with

151. The Principles of European Contract Law, (rev. ed. 1998), http://www.jus.
uio no/lm/eu.contract.principles.1998/doc.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2008).
152. Goldman, supra note 148, at 5.
153. Others also make the spontaneity point. See Dalhuisen, Legal Orders and their
Manifestation, supra note 17, at 129-30; Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of
Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J. 644, 644-45 (1989).
154. Goldman, supra note 148, at 6-7.
155. See Paul Milgrom, Douglass C. North, & Barry Weingast, The Role of
Institutions in the Revival of Trade: the Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the
Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POLITICS 1 (1990).
156. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 8, at 57.
157. What follows is my variation on Hart. Id. at 57-58.
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jeans, and why I would find it odd to see large numbers of people doing
otherwise. Shoe wearing etiquette likely reflects a set of social rules
about which people have formed a critical reflective attitude.
Spontaneity, moreover, explain normativity because it is too unstable.
What is spontaneous today will not be spontaneous tomorrow. And what
truly is spontaneous in any event? The proponents of spontaneity as a
feature of the law merchant fail to give definitions and examples.
Spontaneity must be ruled out as a plausible basis for the existence and
the authority of the law merchant.
Perhaps the way to cure these problems with spontaneity is
Goldman’s requirement of frequent use, which would work something
like Hart’s and Raz’s requirement that a legal system be “in force,”
meaning that many people in the normative community in question
generally but not always comply with the law merchant.158 So, the
argument would go, spontaneity plus frequent use or the fact that norms
are in force results in the law merchant. But these two features cannot
support the idea of a system of norms that law merchant theorists
advocate. What is missing is an institutional infrastructure in the nature
of secondary rules, a subject discussed in Part III.159
Most commentators on the law merchant are comparativists or are
trained in comparative law methods. They conflate the notion of content
convergence with authority. Their strategy is to argue a content
convergence thesis.160 The result is a never-ending circular discussion of

158. See infra notes 291-93 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 279-364 and accompanying text.
160. Emmanuel Gaillard, Transnational Law: A Legal System or a Method of
Decision-Making?, in BERGER, THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, supra note 30, at
53. Gaillard’s work is a classic example of a failure to properly identify the conditions for
the law merchant’s status as law. Gaillard says that the “primary debate” in the past was
on “the very existence and legitimacy of resorting to rules other than those of a given
legal system.” Id. at 55. He says the debate is now on (1) sources or content and
(2) whether the law merchant should be restricted to a list or understood as a method.
These are ill-formed questions. Galliard is of the view that the law merchant is defined
by content and that it can derive itself from content of national law. Id. at 58. The list
versus method issue is subsidiary to first issue, because it is about content too. Gaillard
contends that method is important, and his method is traditional comparative law analysis
of comparing rules and trying as best one can with lawyer’s methods to understand these
rules in context. On the issue of whether the law merchant is a “distinct legal system,”
Gaillard identifies four necessary features of a “genuine” legal system, which come down
to his initial point that if you understand the law merchant from the standpoint of the
comparative law methods he espouses, you will find a legal system. Id. at 59-65. For the
reasons explained above, this cannot be so. Gaillard relies on domestic validity for
transnational validity and confuses analogous content with validity.
Berger does something similar to Gaillard. His CENTRAL project is about the
search for existence of a “third” legal system empirically, through repeated use of
contract clauses and “reliance in mutual adherence” to them. Berger’s work is rich with
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the legitimacy of the law merchant. Their inability to produce an
adequate account is at least an indirect form of support for the positivist
strategy employed here.161 They use the methods of comparative law to
claim that the content of the law is converging across municipal legal
systems, is the subject of increasing harmonization through conventions,
and that harmonization has occurred as well through the law merchant.
From this content convergence they argue that there must be a
transnational commercial legal order. The comparative method leads
them in some cases to argue that they are looking for the “common core”
of legal systems.162 To clarify this argument, we can give it a more
formal presentation. The content convergence thesis is as follows:
(1) The law of w jurisdictions on subject x contain the similar valid
rule y.
(2) The law of z international instruments (or other sources) also
contain valid rule y.
(3) Therefore, there must be a valid rule y, existing independently
of the w jurisdictions and the z international instruments.
This is poor logic. The conclusion does not follow from the premises. It
is question begging.
Content convergence proponents may argue that I have performed a
sleight of hand because I have converted their inductive claim into a
deductive claim. They are attempting an inference to the best
explanation, in which the conclusion is not “guaranteed” by the
premises.163 So, their argument is one based on the best available
evidence, with a probabilistic conclusion. Converting the reasoning into
inductive form does not solve the problems with content convergence, as
institutional detail, but fails to establish a legal system. His project, like Gaillard’s is
content convergence. BERGER, CREEPING CODIFICATION, supra note 146.
Clive Schmitthoff argues that the law merchant “comes from” comparative law. He
uses the phrase “common core” to describe the search for the law merchant. His account,
too, is about content convergence. Schmitthoff, supra note 107.
161. Some law merchant theorists have criticized legal positivism as unable to explain
the law merchant or transnational legal order. BERGER, CREEPING CODIFICATION, supra
note 146, at 91, 103. Burman and Dresser pose the question as one between
“autonomists” and “positivists,’ and erroneously argue that to a positivist only national
law is the source of law. Harold J. Burman & Felix J. Dresser, The “New” Law
Merchant and the “Old” Sources: Content and Legitimacy, in LEX MERCATORIA AND
ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT 60 (Thomas Carbonneau ed.
rev. ed. 1998).
162. The apparent influences are the “common core” comparativists. See, e.g., Mauro
Bussani & Ugo Mattei, The Common Core Approach to European Private Law, 12
COLUM. J. EUR. LAW 339, 339-40 (1997).
163. See LARRY WRIGHT, PRACTICAL REASONING 57-58 (1988); Larry Wright,
Induction and Explanation, 4 PHIL. INQUIRY 1 (1982).

162

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 114:1

their premises still fail support their inference. They still require some
additional element explaining why content convergence leads to a new
valid legal rule in a new legal system. Content convergence fails from
the basic standpoint of logical coherence.
Content convergence fails because it confuses analogous content
with validity. Many normative systems have analogous content, but that
does not mean they are the same normative system. Law and morality,
for example, may reflect the same or similar content, and one may
influence the content of the other, but the conclusion does not follow that
law is morality or morality is law. Morality may profoundly influence
the content of the law, but the question of the validity of the law is not a
question about whether the law is moral.164
Finally, the views of arbitrators for and against a law merchant are
contradictory.165 European arbitrators, who tend to be academics, the
“grand old men” of the profession, tend to support the idea of a law
merchant.166 They come from a civil law tradition in which legal
analysis is reasoned inquiry from the top to the bottom, from the general
to the specific, in search of immanent legal principles. Their civil law
backgrounds hardly explain their attitudes toward the law merchant.
With the civil law tradition comes a strong connection of the law to
national identity, and the values of reason, universalism, coherence, and
completeness of an ordered and codified system.167 Though civilians use
their styles of legal analysis to engage in teleological interpretation of
code provisions that look general to the common law lawyer, these
interpretations are governed by a notion of the ordered whole that comes
out of code commentaries that fill in the details of the code. The civilian
lawyer works in a structured environment in which the law is conceived
as a complete normative system with all legal answers to be found in the
code. It is puzzling why an academic lawyer working in such a tradition
would be supportive of the law merchant, except perhaps to argue that it
comes from the traditional professional role that academics play in
civilian legal systems, of propounding the law through commentaries. In
civilian legal systems, legal academics have historically had the more
important role in producing and elucidating the law than the judges.168
The English and American common law lawyers who are
arbitrators, on the other hand, tend to deny the existence of the law
164. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 8, at 185-212.
165. Berger characterizes the views not as contradiction but as an antimony of
viewpoints. BERGER, THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, supra note 30, at 32.
166. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 17, at 20-23.
167. There have been many expositions of these points throughout the years. See,
e.g,, Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60 MODERN L. REV. 44 (1997).
168. See also Garth and Dezalay, supra note 17, at 41-42.
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merchant.169 They tend to be practitioners in the large Anglo-American
law firms populating European capitals.170 They tend to see the law
merchant as a way for “academics to avoid the rigorous analysis of the
facts, the formal law, and even the terms of the contract.”171 One of
Bryant Garth’s and Yves Dezalay’s interviews for their book, Dealing in
Virtue, was of a “well-known English QC from the commercial bar.”172
That QC said: “These people are just deciding by the seat of their pants.
There’s no such thing as the lex mercatoria.”173 As Lord Diplock said in
Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Insurance Co.:
The purpose of entering into a contract being to create legal rights
and obligations between the parties to it, interpretation of the contract
involves determining what are the legal rights and obligations to
which the words use in it give rise. This is not possible except by
reference to the system of law by which the legal consequences that
follow from the use of those words is to be ascertained.174

Lord Diplock also said in that case:
Contracts are incapable of existing in a legal vacuum. They are mere
pieces of paper devoid of all legal effect unless they were made by
reference to some system of private law which the obligations
assumed by the parties to the contract by their use of particular forms
of words and prescribes the remedies enforceable in a court of justice
for failure to perform any of those obligations.175

This rejection of the law merchant is puzzling, because common law
lawyers would seem to be in a better position to understand legal
evolution, and have greater tolerance for defects in the law in the forms
of incompleteness, incoherence, lack of systematization, and so on.
Counterarguments may be posed against any of these claims about
differences between the civil and the common law traditions. As Garth
and Dezalay explain:
[E]ach side seeks to promote the value of the know-how or the
competence that it has mastered the best. Academics—with a
169. For expositions of the English view, see Dalhuisen, Legal Orders and their
Manifestation, supra note 17; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator’s
View, 6 ARB. INT’L 133 (1990); L. Yves Fortier, The New, New Lex Mercatoria, or, Back
to the Future, 17 ARB. INT’L 121 (2001).
170. Garth & Dezalay, supra note 17, at 43.
171. Id. at 41.
172. Id.
173. Id. at n. 19.
174. Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Ins. Co., [1984] A.C. 50, 60 (H.L.
1983) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (opinion of Diplock, L.).
175. Id. at 65. I will not comment on the question begging features of Lord Diplock’s
conclusions.
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competitive advantage in theory—emphasize the lex mercatoria
elaborated in countless academic books and articles. Practitioners
promote the virtues of solid case law and thorough analysis of the
facts.176

Perhaps this is true, but if one has ever read a decision of a French court,
with its emphasis on the syllogism, on only the essentials, and on brevity,
one may see the point coming from sources deeper than that of the
distinction between the academic and the practitioner. The differences
likely come from differences in legal culture, not from professional roles
played in a legal system.
We still have not gotten to the point of what the law merchant is.
With some exceptions, the literature is written at a high level of
abstraction and is vague on identifying law merchant norms.177 The
differences between European and Anglo-American arbitrators may be
partly dissolved by clarifying what the law merchant is comprised of.
The above disagreement seems mainly to be about the classification of
general principles of law or uncodified custom as law merchant. The
differences in the continental and Anglo-American approaches to
arbitration may rather be evidence of different approaches to
adjudication in the civilian and common law traditions. Regardless of
the nature of the disagreement about the role of the law merchant in
arbitration, there is likely a good bit of uncontroversial territory, on say,
the role and status of INCOTERMS or the UCP, rules created by nonstate actors, as law merchant. Acceptance of rules as “law merchant” or
something else requires a good bit of work in clarifying terminology.
And that is what this section purports to do.
The approach to ordering the law merchant here is drawn largely
from the settled categories of the law found in state-created legal
systems. I use concepts like legislation, case law, and general principles
to order the law merchant. The language of state law reflects forms of
normative practices that are well accepted by both the creators and the
users of the practices. Schmitthoff offers a similar distinction between
“international legislation” and “international commercial custom,” but
his international legislation includes norms that even states produce, such
as conventions, domestic legislation, and model laws.178 He calls it

176. Garth & Dezalay, supra note 17, at 41-42.
177. There are counterexamples. Berger and Dalhuisen identify norms. BERGER,
CREEPING CODIFICATION, supra note 146; DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL AND TRADE LAW, supra note 72, at 142-68, 20916, 219-37.
178. Schmitthoff, The Unification of the Law of International Trade, supra note 109,
at 210.
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“formulated custom.”179 It is true that these “formulations” reflect the
evolved practices of merchants and banks throughout the years. The
organizations that make the law merchant he calls “international
formulating agencies,” but these go far into state dominated IGO
territory, and the norm sets these organizations produce are not the law
merchant in my conception, but rather are state-created law.180
2.

Legislated Law Merchant

Legislated law merchant is sets of rules of a legislative or regulatory
character, promulgated by non-state actors such as the International
Chamber of Commerce in a legislative or regulatory setting. They are
usually produced as a single document in the form or an enactment or
publication. They are usually intended to be codifications of customary
practices.181 They can include but are not limited to standard form
contracts. They can be transnational or domestic. INCOTERMS and the
Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits are
transnational examples.182 Others are the Uniform Rules for Demand
Guarantees and the Uniform Rules for Contract Bonds.183 I will focus on
INCOTERMS and the UCP as standard examples familiar to most
international commercial lawyers which are codifications of practices
accepted for transborder transactions. Lisa Bernstein provides a number
of domestic trade association examples in her work.184 Her merchant
communities are tight-knit professionals in trade associations but
179. Id.
180. Id., at 212-18; Klaus Peter Berger, The New Law Merchant and the Global
Market Place—A 21st Century View of Transnational Commercial Law, in THE PRACTICE
OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 7 (Klaus Peter Berger ed. 2001).
181. Telephone Conversation with Emily O’Conner, ICC Commission on
Commercial Law and Practice (Sept. 29, 2008).
182. The abbreviation for the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary
Credits is “UCP.” INCOTERMS stands for “International Commercial Terms,” but the
abbreviation is so widely used that the full name has fallen out of use.
There are many other examples of legislated law merchant not explored above.
Another prominent example is the rules and recommendations of the International Capital
Markets Association, which “constitute the self-regulatory framework which ensures that
tens of thousands of trades each day in international securities proceed smoothly to
settlement.” http://www.icma-group.org/market_practice.aspx (last visited November 17,
2008).
183. ROY GOODE, HERBERT KRONKE, & EWAN MCKENDRICK, TRANSNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL LAW 351 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007).
184. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Lisa
Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A
Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a
Merchant Court; Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
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merchant communities could be understood broadly, as, for example, all
non-consumer buyers and sellers of goods, which is the traditional
coverage of International Chamber of Commerce instruments such as
INCOTERMS.
The nationalist would not classify these types of instruments as
possible sources of law. They would, rather, say that these instruments
are standard contract terms and conditions that become part of the law of
the contract when they are incorporated by reference into a contract and
are then governed by whatever national law applies to the contract,
including conventions that the country whose law applied has adopted.185
They have such universally accepted status, however, that they reflect a
normative practice independent from contractual incorporation. That is,
if you ask a banker if they comply with the UCP, the answer will very
likely be “yes,” and not qualified by “only when incorporated into a
contract.”186
INCOTERMS are standard terms and conditions for allocating
delivery obligations between buyers and sellers in sale of goods contracts
that cross international borders. They cover questions of who, as
between buyer and seller, is to arrange for carriage, import and export
regulatory matters, who buys insurance, and who has the risk of loss at
different points in the transportation process. They are frequently used
because they provide uniformity, certainty, and predictability to buyers
and sellers in different countries. The “official” laws of nations have
been notoriously deficient and lacking in uniformity on the issues that
INCOTERMS covers.187 In 1936, the ICC stepped in to solve the

185. Jiménez explains:
With regard to the legal effect around the world of the ICC’s rules for letters of
credit, the basic rule is that the UCP rules are creatures of contract, and thus
apply principally when they have been voluntarily incorporated by the parties.
After more than 60 years of existence, the UCP has achieved such universal
effect that in some countries, the UCP is recognised as having the force of law,
or at least that of a strong trade custom. However, in other countries, such as
the UK, the UCP does not have formal legislative status.
Jiminéz, supra note 116, at 292. Regrettably, Jiménez identifies no sources for the
treatment by a state body of the UCP as the law of a state.
186. Jiménez, supra note 116,quoted in GOODE, KRONKE, & MCKENDRICK, supra note
116, at 356-58.
187. The 2002 revision of UCC Article 2 eliminated references to delivery and
payment obligations in the UCC. “The rationale for these changes is that the shipping
terms as codified are out of date with commercial practice and any attempted codification
of these terms would not keep in step with both domestic and international practice.”
Linda J. Rusch, Is the Saga of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Revisions Over?
A Brief Look at What NCCUSL Finally Approved, 6 DEL. L. REV. 41 (2003). The
Comments to revised Article 2 recommend reference to INCOTERMS. John E. Murray,
Jr. & Harry M. Flechtner, The Summer, 1999 Draft of Revised Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: What Hath NCCUSL Rejected?, 19 J. L. & COM. 1, 44 (1999). The
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problem through the promulgation of INCOTERMS.188 Merchant buyers
and sellers of goods now rely on the 2000 version of INCOTERMS.189
The UCP is the codification of banking practices for the issuance
and use of documentary letters of credit, which are commonly used as
the primary means of trade financing in international sale of goods
transactions. As Guillermo Jiménez explains, the UCP:
is frequently cited as the foremost example of how international
business self-regulation can be more efficient than treaties,
government regulation or case law. Indeed, legal commentators have
called the UCP the most successful act of commercial harmonisation
in the history of world trade, with the UCP 500 currently observed by
banks in approximately 180 countries.190

Jiménez continues:
Near-universal adoption of the UCP in international trade and their
incorporation into all relevant contracts . . . has had the result of
producing, through a series of bilateral contracts, a multilateral
network of contractual arrangements all based on a set of uniform
rules by which the parties make their own law, which is largely
independent of national legal systems.191

The International Chamber of Commerce published the first UCP in
1933, and has revised it regularly.192 The current version is known as
UCP 600, which the ICC Commission on Banking Technique and
Practice approved in October 2006, taking effect as of July 1, 2007.193
The UCP is widely accepted by bankers and contract parties. It is widely
accepted as one of the most successful codifications of commercial
practice.194 They, like INCOTERMS, are standard terms and conditions
for incorporation by reference into letters of credit, but they also serve as
standard practice regardless of incorporation. To understand the practice
of using the UCP, consider what Barclays Bank says about the UCP on
its website:

drafters are thus interested in promoting uniformity in domestic and international
practices.
188. Murray & Fletchner, supra note 131, at 44.
189. The latest version is INCOTERMS 2000 (Geneva: ICC 2000).
190. Jiménez, quoted in GOODE, KRONKE, & MCKENDRICK, supra note 116, at 357.
191. Id. at 358.
192. Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up Lawmaking Through a Pluralist Lens: The ICC
Banking Commission and the Transnational Regulation of Letters of Credit, 57 EMORY
L.J. 1147, 1170-71 (2008).
193. Id.
194. GOODE, KRONKE, & MCKENDRICK, supra note 116, at 350-51.
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The majority of Documentary Letters of Credit are subject to a
standardised code of practice formulated, and revised from time to
time, by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and known
as “Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits.” UCP
is therefore made a part of the contract between the Importer and the
Issuing Bank, between the various banks concerned in the Credit and
between the banks and the Exporter.
Letters of Credit conforming to the current code should bear the
clause “subject to Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
195
Credits (latest version).”

The ICC produces INCOTERMS, the UCP, and other norms using
established procedures. The procedures are unwritten, at least in a public
document, but they are well-established. The ICC seeks consensus from
the various domestic chambers of commerce and other interested parties
on rule changes. The revisions themselves reflect actual practices of
relevant merchants and professionals and are worked into INCOTERMS
and UCP revisions. The revisions are approved by a consensus
procedure. Notably, they are valid only if produced according to these
procedures.196
A less obvious yet still important source of legislated law merchant
is the International Federation of Consulting Engineers, or FIDIC,
standard terms and conditions for construction and related contracts.
Some commentators call these the lex constructionis.197 International
construction is a significant part of the global economy and the projects
undertaken are complex. Construction poses tremendous risks for the
contract participants and for also for communities who finance public
projects and ultimately use the completed works. The World Trade
Organization (WTO) Council for Trade in Services explains:
Construction is one of the oldest of all industries, retaining its role as
a core economic activity from the early days of human civilization to
this day. It not only provides the infrastructure for all other

195. Barclays Business Banking: Uniform Customs & Practice for Documentary
Letters of Credit, http://www.business.barclays.co.uk/BRC1/jsp/brccontrol?task=article
group&value=3448&target=_blank&site=bbb (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
196. Emily O’Connor, supra note 181.
197. Gunther Teubner & Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Regime-Collisions: The Vain
Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 999
(2004); Oren Perez, Using Private-Public Linkages to Regulate Environmental Conflicts:
The Case of International Construction Contracts, 29 J.L. SOC’Y. 77 (2002); Charles
Molineaux, Moving Toward a Construction Lex Mercatoria: A Lex Constructionis, 14 J.
INT’L. ARB. 55 (1997).
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industries, but also constitutes one of the largest single sectors in the
economy on its own.198

Philip Bruner describes the risks involved in international construction as
follows:
International construction presents the greatest business risks (and
presumably rewards) in the world. In undertaking to construct
massive monuments to mankind’s ingenuity in distant cities, jungles,
deserts, mountains, and seas, international contractors confront a
multitude of risks: (1) management of many multinational parties;
(2) language barriers to communication; (3) variations in the
availability, productivity, and skill of labor; (4) foreign customs and
practices; (5) potential political and economic instability;
(6) uncertainties of weather; (7) unexpected geologic conditions;
(8) extended lines of communications and supply; (9) differing
quality and suitability of building materials; (10) currency
fluctuations and restrictions; (11) unfamiliar forms of disease, plant,
insect and animal life; (12) different civil and criminal laws;
(13) possible arbitrary government regulation; (14) difficulties in
obtaining adjudication of claims and enforcement of contract rights;
and (15) abnormal duration, size, and technical complexity of
199
international construction projects.

I have used “international construction” because that is the
terminology the industry uses. But the use of the word “international” is
imprecise in the construction context. The projects involve the use of
standard form contracts written by a trade association with international
membership but also rely on domestic law for gap fillers and recognition
and enforcement of arbitral awards. Moreover, the projects are usually
undertaken on the soil of a particular country, and sometimes the owner
is a government or a public enterprise. Substantial domestic regulation is
often the case. It is the nationality of the contractors based on their
headquarters being outside of the country where the work is performed,
and the multinationality of the projects, including the financing, that
gives the project its international character. The kinds of projects for
which FIDIC contracts are intended tend to be large-scale, such as the

198. WTO Council on Trade in Services, Construction and Related Engineering
Services, Background Note by the Secretariat, June 8, 1998, S/C/W/38. The WTO is
interested in construction because it is a possible area of future expansion for the General
Agreement on Trade in Services Agreement (GATS). See World Trade Organization:
Proposals for the new negotiations, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/
s_propnewnegs_e.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
199. Philip L. Bruner, Allocation of Risks in International Construction: Revisting
Murphy’s Law, The F.I.D.C. Conditions and the Doctrine of Force Majeure, 3 INT’L.
CONST. L. REV. 259, 259-60 (1986).
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construction of major roads, airports, harbors, power generating
facilities, waste disposal and sanitation facilities, and petrochemical
plants.200
Any unification that has occurred in construction law has been
through the widespread use of FIDIC standard form contracts. As
Thomas Stipanowich explains in the context of U.S. law and the U.S.
domestic construction industry:
The transactional law of building design and construction stands in
sharp contrast to the UCC approach to commercial transactions
within its scope. In the private arena, there is no overarching
codification or synthesis of public law defining and limiting the
spectrum of transactions. Nor, until recently, was there significant
professional or academic emphasis on construction law.201

Transnational construction norms come from “standardized contracts,
technical guidelines and arbitration awards,” with standardized contracts
forming “the most important element in this discursive universe.”202
These standardized contracts profoundly effect “the formation of
normative expectations” in international construction.203
Founded in 1913, FIDIC is the International Federation of
Consulting Engineers.204 The acronym “FIDIC” is based on the French
version of the name of the organization, “Fédération Internationale des
Ingénieurs-Conseils.” The folklore about FIDIC is that it chose to make
its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, and to use the French name
because it wanted to show that it was a truly international body not
dominated by British engineers.
As one commentator explains,
“Although FIDIC is headquartered in Switzerland, the Red Book itself is
firmly rooted in British law, both in the sense that it is fashioned for
implementation in a common law system and that it incorporates
peculiarly British notions of civil engineering construction
contracting.”205 Its historically most influential set of standard terms and

200. Perez, supra note 197, at 83.
201. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law: Reality and Reform
in a Transactional System, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 463, 467-48 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
202. Perez, supra note 197, at 84.
203. Id.
204. International Federation of Consulting Engineers, http://www1 fidic.org/
federation/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
205. M. Beth Lyon, The Role of the Consulting Engineer in Developing Country
Construction Under the FIDIC Form Contract, 26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 273 (1994).
FIDIC’s Statute specifies “FIDIC” as its acronym regardless of the language used
for its full name. Fédération Internationale des Ingénieurs-Conseils. Statutes and ByLaws, International Federation of Consulting Engineers, Art. 1 (October 2005),
http://www1 fidic.org/about/statutes.asp (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
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conditions, the so-called Red Book, is based on the domestic standard
form contract of the British Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE).206 ICE,
moreover, was instrumental in starting FIDIC. British engineers have
traditionally dominated as consulting engineers on international
construction projects starting in the nineteenth century and continuing
well into the twentieth century.
FIDIC membership is comprised of national associations of
consulting engineers. As the FIDIC website explains:
FIDIC . . . represents the international business interests of firms
belonging to national Member Associations of engineering-based
consulting companies. As such, the Federation represents the

As Hani Sarie-Eldin explains in the context of using the FIDC contracts in the
Middle East:
FIDIC conditions are inspired by the Institute for Civil Engineers (ICE) form,
which, in turn, was based on English law concepts and construction industry
practice in the United Kingdom. Thus, FIDIC conditions are based on U.K.
domestic contract law. The changes made to transform the domestic form
(ICE) to an international form (FIDIC) were, except for a few, insubstantial.
Professor [Ian Duncan] Wallace has clearly pointed out this problem in his
comment on FIDIC conditions, stating that: “There has . . . been far too little
internationalization of the contract in this sense, which remains far too
domestically English in character and language.”
In addition, the general practice in some Arab countries (for example, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates-Abu Dhabi) is to use the Arabic
language for the language of the contract and its documents, including the
FIDIC conditions. According to such practice, the contract is constructed and
interpreted in accordance with Arabic, not English, which is the origin
language of the document. On this point Professor Wallace notes that “the
contract is so unremittingly and peculiarly English in its language and concepts
at a number of points, that the task of any translator becomes impossible
without a profound knowledge of English law and industrial practices.”
Therefore, it is not surprising to find a considerable number of disputes due to
the contradiction between the English version and an inaccurate Arabic
translation.
To sum up, on many occasions the intended aims of the FIDIC clauses
supported by the English legal system and U.K. construction industry practice
may lead to a different result for the same FIDIC clauses governed by Egyptian
law or any other Arab country’s laws.
Hani Serie-Eldin, Operation of FIDIC Civil Engineering Conditions in Egypt and Other
Arab Middle Eastern Countries, 28 INT’L LAW 951 (1994) (footnotes omitted). In
response to these worries, FIDIC has promulgated contract documents based on the civil
law and in different languages. For a discussion of FIDIC and the civil law, see Hubert
Andre-Dumont, The F.I.D.I.C. Conditions and Civil Law, 5 INT’L. CONST. L. REV. 43
(1988).
206. NAEL G. BUNNI, THE FIDIC FORM OF CONTRACT: THE FIFTH EDITION OF THE RED
BOOK 3-4 (2nd ed. 2005).
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business interest of firms supplying technology-based intellectual
services for the built and natural environment.207

Member associations must require that their individual members
meet quality and ethical requirements set forth in the FIDIC Statute.208
Current FIDIC membership is comprised of 64 member associations,
which in turn are comprised of about 56,000 professional engineers.209
Firms and other organizations may join FIDIC as affiliate members if
their country has no national association or they do not qualify to belong
to the national association.210 Individuals are not FIDIC members but
can be correspondents in countries that do not have member
associations.211
FIDIC established a Contracts Committee in its year of inception,
1913.212 From 1913 until 1993, FIDIC limited its contract drafting to
three sets of contracts: the Red Book, the Yellow Book and the White
Book.213 FIDIC standard form contracts are known in shorthand by the
colors of their covers. FIDIC’s most used standard form contract is the
“Red Book,” the official name of which is “Works of Civil Engineering
Construction.”214 The Red Book has been used mainly for large
traditional construction projects. It is in its fourth edition, which was
first published in 1987 and then amended in 1988 and 1992.215 In 1999,
FIDIC published another set of contract conditions to replace the Red
Book.216 The replacement is labeled as a first edition, so the fourth
edition Red Book remains available. The Yellow Book, “Electrical and
Mechanical Works,” is in its third edition, dating from 1987, and was
first published in 1963.217 Its primary use is in the construction of
industrial sites.218 The White Book, “Client/Consultant Agreement,” is
207. International Federation of Consulting Engineers, http://www1 fidic.org/
federation/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
208. International Federation of Consulting Engineers, Statutes and By-Laws art. 3
(Oct. 2004)
209. International Federation of Consulting Engineers, http://www1 fidic.org/
federation/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
210. International Federation of Consulting Engineers, Statutes and By-Laws art. 4
(Oct. 2004).
211. Id. at art. 17.
212. BUNNI, supra note 205, at 441.
213. Id.
214. FIDIC Forums: Contracts, http://www1 fidic.org/resources/contracts/default.asp?
back=/resources/default.asp (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
215. http://www1 fidic.org/bookshop/prod_page.asp?productcode=FC-RB-A-AA-10
(last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
216. http://www1 fidic.org/bookshop/prod_page.asp?productcode=FC-RA-A-AA-09
(last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
217. BUNNI, supra note 205, at 441; http://www1 fidic.org/bookshop/prod_page.asp?
productcode=FG-AV-B-AA-10 (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
218. Perez, supra note 197, at 88.
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in its third edition, dating from 1998, and was first published in 1990.219
There are now many other standard contracts, including the Orange
Book, “Design Build and Turnkey,” the Silver Book, “EPC and Turnkey
Projects,” and various other standard form contracts that may not be
known by the color of their covers.220 The newer contracts, particularly
the Orange and Silver Books, reflect new thinking by FIDIC. The
Orange Book reflects a trend towards classifying construction contracts
based on allocation of responsibilities rather than on project type. The
Silver Book is based on a completely new model. It is a two-party
contract (employer-contractor) in which the engineer has no role.221 The
Silver Book is designed for BOT and BOO projects, which reflect
different roles for the parties and introduces the concessionaire as the
party who takes responsibility for financing, construction and operation
until the financing is paid off.222 FIDIC publishes its popular contracts in
many languages, depending on need. The Red Book, for example, is
published in English, Arabic, Chinese, Croatian, French, Hungarian,
Laotian, Polish, Russian, Spanish, Thai and Turkish.223
These books are frequently used globally. As Nael Bunni explains,
the Red Book “has . . . been used continuously more than any other form
in the international scene for over 30 years.”224 The World Bank and
other international development institutions require the use of the Red
Book, and other FIDIC books, modified to meet their particular needs, as
standard terms and conditions in construction contracts that they fund.225
FIDIC dominates in the production of norms for international
construction.
FIDIC has a sophisticated governance structure. One of the tasks
undertaken in this structure is the care and maintenance of FIDIC
contracts. The FIDIC By-Laws provide for a system of Standing or
Liaisons Committees, answerable to the Executive Committee. FIDIC
has created the Contracts Committee, a standing committee whose

219. http://www1 fidic.org/bookshop/prod_page.asp?productcode=FG-AV-B-AA-10
(last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
220. International
Federation
of
Consulting
Engineers
Bookshop,
http://www1 fidic.org/bookshop/default_contracts.asp#collection (last visited Aug. 15.
2008). “EPC” means “engineering, procurement, construction.”
221. Perez, supra note 197, at 91.
222. Id. at 92. “BOT” stands for “build operate transfer” and “BOO” stands for build
operate own.” For more on these kinds of arrangements, see John Linarelli, Private
Participation in Public Projects: Some Strategic Issues, in, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT:
GLOBAL REVOLUTION 259 (Sue Arrowsmith & Arwel Davies eds. 1998).
223. Perez, supra note 197, at 92.
224. BUNNI, supra note 205, at 108.
225. See World Bank, Standard Bidding Documents, Procurement of Works and
User’s Guide (World Bank May 2005).
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purpose is to draft and update FIDIC contracts.226 The Executive
Committee is elected by the FIDIC General Assembly.227
In addition to the legislative functions within FIDIC itself, FIDIC
contracts themselves have historically given the consulting engineer
considerable power, in both contract management and in the system of
resolving disputes in projects in which the contracts are used. FIDIC
contracts are generally designed around the idea of what a “trusted civil
engineer” would expect to see in the document, and how a trusted civil
engineer would interpret it.228 Historically, the British-trained engineer
“provided an efficient alternative to the use of the judicial system.”229
Though in revisions of the Red Book, the powers of the engineer have
changed towards making the engineer less an impartial dispute resolver
and more an agent of the employer,230 the following description is
reflective of the traditional role of the engineer in FIDIC contracts, and
in particular in the fourth edition of the Red Book, which still is available
for use in construction projects:
The engineer must also resolve most of the day-to-day differences of
opinion which frequently occur in multi-million or multi-billion
dollar projects involving years of work by multiple subcontractors. It
is this broad spectrum of decisional powers, binding both the
contractor and the employer, which makes the FIDIC engineer
226.

The terms of reference for the Contracts Committee are as follows:
(1) To identify Conditions of Contract and other documents which, subject to
the concurrence of the Executive Committee, should be prepared or updated by FIDIC.
(2) To establish task forces to draft each document and to guide them as
required and to carry out a final review of the documents for submission to
the EC.
(3) To liaise, in conjunction with the Secretariat, organizations interested in
FIDIC’s Conditions of Contract.
(4) To coordinate the handling of queries on the interpretation of the
documents.
(5) To promote interest in seminars and workshops and to suggest topics and
speakers as appropriate.
(6) To coordinate the handling of queries on the interpretation of the
documents.
(7) To promote interest in seminars and workshops and to suggest topics and
speakers, as appropriate.
(8) To liaise closely with the Assessment Panel for Adjudicators, a training
operation for adjudicators.
See FIDIC, Contract Comm., http://217.197.210.21/about/comm/cc/.
227. See FIDIC, Statutes & Bylaws, http://217.197.210.21/resources/statutes/
statutes_en_2007.pdf
228. BUNNI, supra note 205, at 73.
229. Lyon, supra note 205, at 291.
230. David Bateson, FIDIC—New 1999 Edition of the Red Book Impartiality of the
Engineer, http://www1.fidic.org/resources/contracts/bateson_aug00.asp (last visited Aug.
15, 2008).
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“uniquely strong and independent.” One engineer has commented
that except under one clause, the Red Book merely authorizes the
engineer to “express an opinion,” not to make a decision. It seems
that in many clauses of the Red Book, however, the engineer’s
opinion seriously affects the rights and duties of the contractor and
the employer.
Additionally, under Clause 67, to which the commentator referred,
the engineer is the authority by whom disagreements must be decided
before they can be referred to arbitration. This second-stage of more
231
formalized decision-making occurs infrequently. . . .

Under clause 67, if a dispute arises, one of the parties, the owner or
the contractor, must first refer the dispute to the engineer. The engineer
has a fixed number of days after receipt of written notice of the dispute to
give notice of his decision. The engineer’s decision is final unless one of
the parties refers the matter to arbitration. A disappointed party has a
fixed number of days from the date of notice of the engineer’s decision
to give notice of intent to arbitrate. Before actually commencing
arbitration, the parties must try to settle their dispute amicably.232 The
Red Book reflects a clear FIDIC preference for the engineer as the
adjudicator of disputes, despite the engineer’s hiring by the employer.
The World Bank mandates that its borrowers use its standard
bidding documents for works projects the Bank funds. The Bank
incorporates the FIDIC Red Book as standard terms and conditions into
its bidding documents, with exceptions.233
FIDIC is not the only possible source of lex constructionis. Other
private associations, such as the Engineering Advancement Association
of Japan (ENAA), have produced important standard form contracts, yet
none are as influential or as widely used as FIDIC contracts.234
Finally, another candidate for classification as legislated law
merchant is the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts.235 It is a contract code of sorts, prepared by a group of
country representatives and observers in a working group under the
authority of an IGO.
UNIDROIT has substantial government
representation, yet the Principles are not a convention, but one of their
intended purposes is to serve as a “model for national and international
231. Lyon, supra note 205, at 276-77.
232. Red Book, Clause 67.
233. Standard Bidding Documents, Procurement of Works and User’s Guide (World
Bank May 2005), available at http://go.worldbank.org/IP4T44BOA0.
234. Perez, supra note 197, at 89.
235. Yet another candidate is the Principles of European Contract Law,
http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission_on_european_contract_law/ (last visited Oct. 10,
2008).
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legislators.”236 They are wonderfully drafted and an excellent source of
principles of contract law for anyone interested in the comparative study
of contract law. But they are unlikely sources of commercial law. They
are the product of mainly legal scholars working under the auspices of an
IGO. As Dalhuisen explains:
They are no more than products of a UNIDROIT committee and as
such have at best persuasive power in terms of a restatement or as
soft law. Their authority is hardly in their academic pedigree and
content, and their legitimacy if any can only derive from their
reflection of international fundamental principles or from the ability
of the international legal practice to recognise itself in them and to
accept their guidance. . . . To put it more crudely, short of them
reflecting fundamental legal principle and mandatory international
practice, only the market place can decide their ultimate fate.
Ordinarily therefore, international trade and commerce have
237
themselves here the last word.

At most, the UNIDROIT Contract Principles can serve to inform the
content of the law merchant and other commercial law sources. Their
Preamble is ambitious in specifying that they “may be applied when the
parties have agreed that their contract be governed by general principles
of law, the lex mercatoria, or the like,” or when the parties have failed to
include a choice of law clause in their contract, or “interpret or
supplement” either domestic law or “uniform law instruments.”238 Their
inclusion in the law merchant ultimately may depend on whether one
takes a wide or narrow view of the law merchant. Ole Lando, who takes
a wide view, would classify the Principles as law merchant;239 Goldman,
who takes a narrow view, might not, and perhaps Michael Joachim
Bonell, the Chairperson of the Working Group that drafted the
Principles, has the right view when he classifies them as a “hybrid.”240
Bonell continues:
Whether the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts are part of transnational law depends of course on the
meaning one intends to give to this latter notion. If one adopts a
236. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Preamble,
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main htm (last visited Oct. 10,
2008).
237. DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL
AND TRADE LAW, supra note 72, at 306.
238. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Preamble, supra
note 236.
239. Lando, supra note 109.
240. Michael Joachim Bonell, UNIDROIT Principles and the Lex Mercatoria, in LEX
MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT 240
(Thomas Carbonneau ed., rev. ed.1998) (1990).
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narrow definition whereby transnational law basically consists of
generally recognised principles of law and trade usages, it may be
difficult to consider the UNIDROIT Principles as a whole as failing
in one category or the other. On the contrary, on the basis of a
broader definition whereby transnational law includes virtually all
principles and rules other than those established by a particular
domestic law, the UNIDROIT Principles, like other “private”
instruments such as INCOTERMS or the UCP, are definitely part of
it. Yet regardless of the position taken on this point, it can hardly be
disputed that, also with respect to the UNIDROIT Principles, what
really matters is not so much their definition in theoretical terms but
rather whether, and the extent to which, they may be applied in
241
practice in lieu of or in addition to domestic law.

Under my scheme of classification, the Principles are not rules
produced by non-state actors, such as INCOTERMS and the UCP,
because they do not come from a non-state source, nor are they a product
of a merchant community. Bonell and Dalhuisen agree that what matters
for the status of the Principles as law merchant is their use and eventual
acceptance by normative communities as law.
3.

Interpretations of Legislated Law Merchant by Judges and
Arbitrators

Judges sometimes find themselves in a position of having to apply
and interpret legislated law merchant. Two U.S. examples of such
interpretations are BP Oil International, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal
Petroleos de Ecuador242 and St. Paul Guardian Insurance Co. v.
Neuromed Medical Systems Support.243 In these cases, the courts held
that when contract parties use terms found in INCOTERMS, but they
have neither defined the terms in their contract nor expressly
incorporated INCOTERMS into the contract by reference, INCOTERMS
apply nonetheless. Arbitral panels have similarly so held.244 These cases
are based on CISG Article 9(2), which provides:

241. Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles and Transnational Law, in
BERGER, THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, supra note 30, at 23-24.
242. BP Oil International, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.2d 333
(5th Cir. 2003), reh’g denied, No. 02-20166, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13595 (5th Cir. Jan.
16, 2003), appeal after remand, No. 04-20911, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 914 (5th Cir. Jan.
16, 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 105 (2008).
243. St. Paul Guardian Insurance Co. v. Neuromed Medical Systems Support, No. 00
CIV. 9344(SHS), 2002 WL 465312 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002).
244. ICC Arbitration Case No. 7645 of March 1995, available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/957645i1 html); Russian Arbitration June 6, 2000
Arbitration Proceeding 406/1998, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
000606r1 html. These sources are from Clayton P. Gillette, The Law Merchant in the
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The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have
impliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of
which the parties knew or ought to have known and which in
international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by,
parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade
concerned.245

Incorporation is not restricted to the CISG context. Even without
such prompting by a state-produced source, courts will incorporate the
law merchant. In Harlow and Jones Ltd. v. American Express Bank Ltd.,
the Queen’s Bench held that the Uniform Customs and Practices (UCP)
of the International Chamber of Commerce governs banking
relationships even if not expressly incorporated by contract.246 Based on
comprehensive surveys of commercial practices, a team of European
legal scholars headed by Klaus Peter Berger has compiled a set of “truus
lex” principles of the contemporary law merchant. Principle I.2.2 is as
follows:
The parties are bound by any usages to which they have agreed and
by any practice which they have established between themselves.
Unless agreed otherwise, they are considered to have impliedly made
applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the
parties knew or ought to have known and which in international trade
is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of
the type involved in the particular trade concerned.247

This principle does not distinguish between legislated and evolved law
merchant. There are many other examples involving express contractual
incorporation as well.248
To a lawyer bound to national traditions, this discussion is about
incorporation of the law merchant into state law. The notion of
incorporation has a long history. An early influential American decision
on incorporation is Swift v. Tyson.249 Suppressing the questions of
federalism the case is widely known for in American law, in Swift,
Justice Joseph Story relied on a law merchant customary rule found in
Modern Age: Institutional Design and International Usages Under the CISG, 5 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 157 (2004).
245. CISG art. 9(2), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/treaty.html
(last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
246. Harlow and Jones Ltd. v. American Express Bank Ltd., 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 343
(QBD 1990).
247. CENTRAL List of Lex Mercatoria Principles, Rules and Standards, Principle
I.2.2, available at http://www.Trans-Lex.org/903000.
248. Three possible forms of incorporation have presented themselves in the history
of commercial law. These are covered in Part III below. See infra notes 297-316, 338-45
and accompanying text.
249. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
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English cases, which upheld the principle of negotiability by permitting
past consideration to serve as meeting the value element for holder in due
course status. In so holding, he refused to rely on New York state court
decisions, even though he was sitting in diversity. Well before the UCC
came into existence, American sales and contract law incorporated
custom. The comment to UCC § 1-205 cites to the pre-UCC Uniform
Sales Act §§ 9(1), 15(5), 18(2), and 71 as relevant prior incorporation
provisions.250 The First American Restatement of the Law of Contracts,
well-accepted as reflecting the “classical” view of contract law, permits
incorporation.251
Of course, the UCC is well-known for its “incorporation
strategy.”252 The UCC provides a hierarchy for course of dealing, course
of performance and usages of trade, the three forms of custom the UCC
explicitly recognizes.253 Contract terms are to be construed whenever
reasonable as consistent with each other, but in the event that is not
possible, express terms prevail over everything else, followed by course
of performance, then course of dealing, then usage of trade, then UCC
gap fillers themselves. But the UCC goes farther than simply
recognizing these forms of custom as aids in interpretation of contracts.
Llewellyn’s plan was for the entire Code to reflect “good” custom
facilitating exchange consistently with maxims of good faith.254
In Luke v. Lyde, Lord Mansfield said that the law of negotiable
instruments was not the law of one country.255 His view was common in
the eighteenth century, before commercial law became a national
enterprise. At the time, commercial law was the law merchant and part
of the law of nations.256 But Lord Mansfield’s approach has been
understood to work in the other direction, that he undertook to
250. UCC § 1-205 Comment.
251. Restatement (First) Contracts §§ 247, 248 (1932). Section 247, entitled, “when
usage is operative upon parties,” provides:
A usage is operative upon parties to a transaction where and only where
(a) they manifest to each other an assent that the usage shall be operative, or
(b) either party intends the effect of his words of other acts to be governed by
the usage, and the other party knows or has reason to know this intention, or
(c) the usage exists in such transactions and each party knows of the usage or it
is generally known by persons under similar circumstances, unless either party
knows or has reason to know that the other party has an intention inconsistent
with the usage.
252. To my knowledge, this is Lisa Bernstein’s phrase. See Bernstein, supra note
184.
253. UCC § 1-303.
254. Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory, in KRAUS &
WALT, supra note 27, at 42.
255. Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. R. 883, 887 (1759), quoted in Dalhuisen, Legal Orders and
Their Manifestation, supra note 17, at 11, n. 15.
256. MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 143-44 (1978).

180

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 114:1

incorporate commercial law into English law. English cases plainly
advise that commercial law becomes an unfeasible concept without
incorporation. Consider Goodwin v. Robarts, a nineteenth century case
in which the issue was whether certain Russian and Hungarian
government scrip was negotiable.257 Goodwin allowed his broker to
retain possession of scrip belonging to him. The scrip promised to give
bonds to the bearer after all installments had been paid with interest.
Goodwin’s broker pledged the scrip to a bank as security for a loan. The
broker went bankrupt and the bankers sold the scrip. Goodwin sued the
bankers. He argued that the scrip was not negotiable because it was not
recognized as such by the law merchant. The Exchequer Chamber held
otherwise on the content of the law merchant, and the House of Lords
affirmed. Cockburn, C.J., said:
Having given the fullest consideration to this argument, we are of the
opinion that it cannot prevail. It is founded on the view that the law
merchant thus referred to is fixed and stereotyped, and incapable of
being expanded and enlarged so as to meet the wants and
requirements of trade in the varying circumstances of commerce. It
is true that the law merchant is sometimes spoken of as a fixed body
of law, forming part of the common law, as and it were coequal with
it. But as a matter of legal history, this view is altogether incorrect.
The law merchant . . . is neither more nor less than the usages of
merchants and traders in the different departments of trade, ratified
by the decisions of Courts of law, which, upon such usages being
proved before them, have adopted them as settled law with a view to
the interests of trade and the public convenience, the Court
proceeding herein on the well-known principle of law that, with
reference to transactions in the different departments of trade, Courts
of law, in giving effect to the contracts and dealings of the parties,
will assume that the latter have dealt with one another on the footing
of any custom or usage prevailing generally in the particular
department.
By this process, what before was usage only,
unsanctioned by legal decision, has become engrafted upon, or
incorporated into, the common law, and may thus be said to form part
of it. “When a general usage has been judicially ascertained and
established,” says Lord Campbell, in Brandao v. Barnett . . ., “it
becomes a part of the law merchant, which Courts of justice are
258
bound to know and recognise.

257. Goodwin v. Robarts, LR 10 Exch. 337 (1875), aff’d, 1 App. Cas. 476 (1876).
Much of what follows is influenced substantially by L.S. SEALY & R.J.A. HOOLEY,
COMMERCIAL LAW 22-24, 471-73 (4th ed. 2008).
258. Goodwin, LR 10 Exch. at 346.
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In a 1932 article in the Law Quarterly Review, Robert Chorley said that
Cockburn’s statements of incorporation “should be inscribed in letters of
gold in every Court handling commercial litigation.”259 Contemporary
British commercial legislation generally accepts incorporation.260
Incorporation is so well-accepted that courts no longer cite authority to
support it.261 Roy Goode explains, in words sounding like Cockburn’s:
Of great importance as a source of obligation in commercial contracts
are the unwritten customs and usages of merchants. The impact of
these on the content and interpretation of contract terms cannot be
overstated. It is, perhaps, this feature above all which distinguishes
commercial from other contracts, a distinction not formally adopted
by the law. The fertility of the business mind and the fact that a
practice which begins life by having no legal force acquires over time
the sanctity of law are key factors to which the commercial lawyer
must continually be responsive. Is a particular document a document
of title? The House of Lords may have said no, possibly more than
once. But how long ago was the ruling given? Cannot it not now be
said, in another time, that the acceptance of this document as a
document of title in mercantile usage is so entrenched as to justify
according it legal recognition as such? Is a payment instrument
outside the Bills of Exchange Act negotiable? In principle yes, if so
accepted by the mercantile community, which may happen
262
immediately or only over time.

From English and American law we can extend our search for
incorporation to other countries, and also to international instruments as
evidence of the trend. Civil law countries have tended to be hostile to
incorporation.263
Judges are state officials and courts are state organs, so it might
seem that this category deviates from the condition that the law merchant
must derive only from non-state sources. But this category is needed
because it reflects actual practice. It illustrates why conceptual
restrictions on legal authority as only “public,” as relating only to state
officials, fails to account for the interaction of state and non-state actors.

259. Robert S.T. Chorley, Conflict of Law and Commerce, 48 L. Q. REV. 51, 55
(1932).
260. Sealy & Hooley, supra note 257, at 23.
261. See, e.g., Harlow and Jones, supra note 246.
262. GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 89, at 14.
263. DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL
AND TRADE LAW, supra note 72, at 149. A detailed examination of the reasons for this
hostility is beyond the scope of this article. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying
text on the strong national identity sentiments associated with codification in the civilian
countries.
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We have to account for the interaction else our categorization will be
incomplete.
4.

Evolved Law Merchant and General Principles

Is there any law merchant that is entirely customary? I use the term
“customary” to refer to norms that are wholly uncodified, in other words,
not codified even by non-state actors such as the ICC. The distinction
between evolved and legislated merchant may not be as stark as my
categorization suggests, as legislated merchant may be nothing more than
codification of custom.264
Jan Dalhuisen provides a recent attempt to organize the law
merchant around categories. I will basis my discussion on his work
because I think it is a rigorous attempt to exhaustively identify the law
merchant categories. Dalhuisen identifies three categories of relevance
to the category of evolved law merchant: fundamental principles of law,
general principles of law, and custom.265
Dalhuisen’s fundamental principles include pact sunt servanda,
detrimental reliance, apparent authority, select ownership principles,
unjust enrichment liability, and good faith.266 He contends that these
principles are “the essence and basis of the law of contract, agency,
property, tort, and restitution.”267 He also includes basic fiduciary duties
as fundamental principles of law. Dalhuisen justifies fundamental
principles of law as natural law.268 My approach, however, is positivist,
which means that I rely on the claim that law draws entirely or mainly
from social practices. Positivism also requires acceptance of the claim
that law’s validity or existence does not necessarily depend on something
other than social practices associated with the law itself. A positivist
cannot claim that Dalhuisen’s fundamental principles are law, though she
might claim, if she is an inclusive legal positivist, that in some cases
fundamental principles not coming from a social source might identify
valid legal rules.269 Dalhuisen, however, does not make the validation
claim. This inquiry treads into Part III territory only to make the point
264. Emily O’Conner, supra note 181.
265. Left unaddressed is his argument for a hierarchy of norms, in which he argues
against conflicts approaches to transnational commercial law because it leads to use of
ill-suited domestic law rules. It is unnecessary to the analysis in this article.
266. See Tom Carbonneau, A Definition of and Perspective Upon the Lex Mercatoria
Debate, in CARBONNEAU, supra note 240, at 11, 17 (how ICC arbitrators use good faith
and others general principles of law).
267. DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL
AND TRADE LAW, supra note 72, at 149.
268. Id. at 60, 102-03.
269. This is not the place to discuss inclusive versus exclusive legal positivism. For
discussion, see the authorities cited in note 9, supra.
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that it is unlikely that Dalhuisen’s fundamental principles can be
customary law merchant unless they come from a social source. While
these fundamental principles might operate as overarching principles
when one does reflective equilibrium270 to provide normative
justification for the content of more fine-grained legal rules, it seems
implausible that they form an independent basis for a set of customary
law merchant rules.
Dalhuisen also identifies lower order “general principles of law”
which he says are “often deduced from comparative research; that is,
from similarities in national law.”271 As explained above,272 such a
classification is a mistake. Looking for content convergence adds
nothing to determining whether independent norms exist. It simply tells
us that legal rules in different national systems are similar in content.
Dalhuisen is not alone in making this mistake. It is a mistake common to
many comparatively minded commercial lawyers.
Finally, Dalhuisen identifies custom as a law merchant category.
He defines custom as:
a practice which is universal in the trade or a relevant segment
thereof and can as such not be unilaterally withdrawn or changed
except if it is in its nature, but would require an industry shift or even
the other party’s consent to be set aside in an individual case.273

Dalhuisen makes the right distinction between customary rules and
habit.274 The above definition, however, includes what I classify as
legislated law merchant. Dalhuisen does not offer purely uncodified
examples. Is there such a thing as pure uncodified custom that does not
amount to some sort of overarching fundamental or general principles
shared by state law? I do not make the claim that evolved law merchant
exists or that it is law, but only that it is possible that it exists and that it
should be evaluated for determining its status. There is likely plenty of
uncodified specific industry custom out there that has raised to the level
of rules and is not merely statistical irregularity or habit. We get
puzzling facts in cases like A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, in which
farmers sold grain to an insolvent grain elevator on credit.275 Was this
poor planning or reflective of an industry custom of not requiring
advance payment or other financing? Empirical inquiry on specific
270. See supra note 47 for an explanation of reflective equilibrium.
271. DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL
AND TRADE LAW, supra note 72, at 149.
272. See infra notes 161-79 and accompanying text.
273. DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL
AND TRADE LAW, supra note 72, at 151.
274. Id. at 150.
275. A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, 309 N.W. 2d 285 (Minn. 1988).
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industries might provide some answers here, though longstanding trades
tend to rely on standard form contracts, which are in the nature of
codified custom, or what I classify as legislated law merchant.
One final question that the above initial classification of possible
sources raises: can arbitrators create custom? It seems plausible to
conclude that arbitrators usually find themselves in the position of at
most having the authority to identify and interpret pre-existing custom in
accordance with the intent of the parties. Custom arises from merchant
practices. Absent a clear choice of the law merchant as the law of the
contract, a very rare occurrence, arbitral panels risk having their decision
found to be void as against public policy or ordre public in actions either
to set aside or enforce the award.276 The only way around this problem
seems to be if a state court accepts a content convergence argument, as in
Pabalk Ticaret v. Norsolor, in which both the Austrian Supreme Court in
the set aside action and the French Court of Cassation in the enforcement
action held that the principle of good faith the arbitrators used, and which
they said came from the law merchant and not from a conflict of laws
analysis, was sufficiently similar to state law as to not violate ordre
public.277 The arbitrators in the case did not have the power under the
arbitration agreement to rule as amiable compositeurs or in equity.278
III. THE CONCEPT OF COMMERCIAL LAW
Using the above sources as background understandings of the state
of commercial law, we can now go back to the question asked at the
beginning of this article: can the case be made in the tradition of
analytical jurisprudence for a system of transnational commercial law?
So far, I have only described the plausible sources of commercial law.
An attempt to understand commercial law as a transnational legal order
requires an identification of what might get included in the concept of
transnational commercial law, which is the subject of Part III. If we
think of law only as state-centric, we might find the question of what gets
included to be banal. But the identification of the above plausible
sources casts doubt on the strength of state-centric positivist claims,
though some parts of the above discussion also seem to confirm the

276. If the views of most common law judges are anything like those of Lords
Diplock and Mustill, two prominent members of the British judiciary, one would not
want to take before them for recognition and enforcement any arbitral award saying
anything about the law merchant that the parties do not expressly incorporate into the
contract. See Mustill, supra note 19; Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Insurance
Co., [1983] 3 W.L.R. 241, discussed supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
277. Pabalk Ticaret v. Norsolor, 24 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 360 (1985)
(commentary by Emmanuel Gaillard).
278. Id.
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dominance of state law and institutions. Simply identifying the plausible
sources, however, cannot serve as justification for conceptualizing
commercial law as a transnational system. Identification of sources by
itself informs us that we should not ignore these sources from the
standpoints of usefulness, function, or relevance to clients lawyers might
represent, but these instrumental features of the sources alone do not
support the conclusion that a unified system of transnational commercial
law exists. Identification of sources can just as well support the claim
that commercial law exists across distinct normative systems dominated
by state institutions.
The question to be addressed is whether a system of transnational
commercial law exists, in the form of what Joseph Raz calls an
institutionalized normative system, or what Neil MacCormick calls an
institutional normative order.279 If so, how do the above-identified
sources work in such a system? If the answer to the first question is yes,
then we can claim that the “wide view” law merchant theorists, such as
Ole Lando and Clive Schmitthoff, are right. We will discover, however,
that they reach the conclusion in the wrong way, through comparative
law methods, which answers questions only about legal content and not
about legal validity.280 I am not convinced, however, that the answer to
the first question is in the affirmative. Remember, the aim of this article
is description. The limits of legal positivism are tested here, to see if it
can account for transnational orders or tell us that we are on the wrong
path of conceptualizing such orders.
I make the tentative case for a concept of transnational commercial
law, but concede that my account is in tension with established legal
positivist tenets. Given that tension, legal positivism runs the risk of
becoming a provincial and outdated theory about municipal law in an era
of pervasive globalization of the law. Institutionalized normative orders
supporting the practical authority of almost all of the above sources can
be found, but it does not follow that these orders form a legal system.
Legal positivism gets it right in giving municipal legal systems an
essential role in producing, applying, and enforcing commercial law.
But legal positivism may need servicing to deal with the relationship of
municipal legal systems to each other and to the multiple normative
orders out there that do not rely on the state for their validity.
My account is in tension with two different accounts, legal
pluralism and legal positivism. Though the state-centricity of legal

279. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 12, at 128-48; MACCORMICK,
INSTITUTIONS OF LAW, supra note 33, at 21-37; see also NEIL MACCORMICK,
QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY 1-15 (1999).
280. See supra notes 162-80 and accompanying text.
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positivism is not explicit in positivist teachings, legal pluralists have
criticized legal positivism for being an incomplete account only of state
law.281 Legal positivists have used conceptual analysis to describe the
logical features of municipal legal systems. Hart’s central case of a legal
system is that of a municipal legal system.282 As explained below, Raz’s
uniqueness conditions for a legal system all but in name qualify only
municipal systems for inclusion.283 Opposing positivist accounts of the
law are pluralist accounts, which do not locate within analytical
jurisprudence, but are mainly sociological or anthropological.284 My
account differs from the legal pluralist account in that I write in the
tradition of analytical jurisprudence. I try to elucidate a cosmopolitan
version of legal positivism that can account for the distributed and
transnational features of commercial law. Analytical jurisprudence is in
desperate need of a conceptual analysis that can account for law’s
globalization.
To develop a transnational concept of commercial law requires that
we try to split positivism into two versions or conceptions. The first is
the traditional or political conception of legal positivism, which seems to
be the way positivism is understood in its mainstream. The other is a
new or cosmopolitan conception of legal positivism, which no
philosopher or legal scholar has attempted.285 The account to follow
must do two things, revise positivism and apply the revised version to
commercial law norms.286
A.

The Political Conception of Positivism and National Commercial
Law

I divide the inquiry here into two sections. The first section
sketches out the political conception of positivism. It is only a sketch
and I cannot provide here any comprehensive survey. The second
section uses that political conception to conceptualize commercial law as
a predominantly national, sovereignty-driven project.

281. See, e.g., Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 13, at 10; Tamanaha, supra
note 24, at 42. Although Berman does not critique positivism, his is an important recent
account that throws doubt on legal positivism as being able to offer an adequate
descriptive account of globalized law. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 24.
282. See supra notes 291-311 and accompanying text.
283. See infra notes 299-314 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
285. As explained above, I adapt Nagel’s distinction on approaches to understanding
justice. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
286. The norm-giver and norm-user terminology is from MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS
OF LAW, supra note 33, at 20-22.
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The Political Conception of Legal Positivism

We can first easily dispense with any notion that force is the source
of the authority of law. From the repudiation of force it is an easy step to
repudiate command as the source of authority for a legal system. It is
important to dispense with force or command as justification for a norm
to be law because states have a monopoly on the permissible use of force
and the declaration and enforcement of commands. In a transnational
approach, non-state norm givers and norm users lack the means to force
or command, nor do they have a moral right to use force to enforce their
norms. No one takes seriously anymore the Austinian idea of law’s
authority coming from sovereign power and followed by subjects out of
a habit of obedience of the sovereign. To Austin, the threat of sanction is
what made law. In his words, “every law properly so called is set by a
superior to an inferior or inferiors: it is set by a party armed with might,
to a party or parties to whom that might can reach.”287 Austin was the
last of the prominent legal positivists to make explicit the need for a
sovereign for a law to exist. The idea can be traced to Hobbes. A
distinct break occurred between the “ancestral” positivists, Hobbes, to
Bentham,288 and then on to Austin, who all endorsed the role of force in
supporting law’s authority, and “contemporary” positivists, who find
law’s authority in social practices, and ultimately even in custom.289 The
delinking of positive law from force or command is a crucial step in
finding positive law outside of the state.
What are the conditions analytical jurisprudence now requires for a
legal system? It depends who you ask, but Hart’s is certainly a canonical
account.290 We should also examine elements of Raz’s account because
he specifies uniqueness conditions for a legal system that effectively
claim that a legal system cannot be anything other than a municipal legal
system. I will attempt to summarize relevant parts of Hart and Raz in
several paragraphs, which undoubtedly will do both their accounts
disservice, but I want to identify the basic contours so we are clear on the
obstacles before us.
Hart saw a legal system as a system of social rules, owing its
existence entirely to human social practices, governing humans in
societies.291 Legal systems have what Neil MacCormick calls a
287. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1995).
288. JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970).
289. See Waldron, supra note 1, at 93.
290. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 8.
291. NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART, supra note 11 (“The legal theory . . .
presented [in the Concept of Law] is if a legal system of social rules, social in a double
sense: both in that they govern the conduct of human beings in societies and in that they
owe their origin and existence to human social practices.”).
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“systemic quality” because they are comprised of the union of primary
rules of obligation and secondary rules of adjudication, change, and
recognition.292 The systemic quality comes from the fact that primary
and secondary rules relate to one another. Primary rules are rules that
apply directly to human conduct, which specify crimes, torts, obligations,
rights, duties, and so on. Secondary rules of adjudication give certain
officials (the archetype is the judge) power to determine whether persons
have violated primary rules. Included within rules of adjudication are
rules of enforcement. Secondary rules of change are rules used to
change primary rules. Examples of rules of change are the rules
governing legislation. Rules of change include lower order power
conferring rules that give persons that ability to change their legal
relationships with one another, such as the power to contract, create
trusts, and so on. Rules of recognition set forth the criteria for the
validity of all other rules in the legal system. They are essential to the
existence of the legal system because they tell officials and citizens
which rules are valid in the legal system. For example, rules of
recognition tell judges about the body of rules they can apply to decide a
case. A legal system has to be “in force,” which means that most persons
subject to it obey primary rules most of the time. It does not matter why
they obey. The officials themselves, however, must accept the rules of
recognition from an internal point of view, which means that they have
to accept them as binding on them and to take a critical view if another
official fails to adhere to them. Social rules that are not legal rules might
share content similar to legal rules. International law is an example. A
minimum content of natural law is necessary for collective survival, and
that minimum content is reflected in legal systems. Law and morality
may overlap in content but lack a necessary connection. Gaps in the
rules are filled by judicial discretion.
Hart did not say that his account only specified the conditions for a
legal system. His claim seems to be that a legal system is an
institutionalized normative system with the features he specified. A legal
system of a state with a defined geographic territory could be seen as a
central case for Hart.293 Raz accepts Hart’s two-part description of law
as the union of primary and social rules, and further specifies what
makes a legal system unique.294 Raz’s legal philosophy is much more
than what is to follow, which covers only what is directly relevant to the
task at hand.

292. Raz writes of “systemic validity.” RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra
note 12, at 127.
293. MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART, supra note 11, at 33.
294. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 12, at 126-27.
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Raz specifies three unique features of a legal system. First, legal
systems are comprehensive.295 They claim authority to regulate any and
all behavior within their jurisdictional competence.
Other
institutionalized normative systems, according to Raz, do not make this
claim. Second, legal systems claim to be supreme, to regulate even other
institutionalized normative systems.296 Despite the claim of supremacy,
Raz concedes that two or more legal systems can co-exist in a single
community, depending on their compatibility. Third, legal systems are
open systems, which means that they contain norms the purpose of which
is to supply authority to norms from outside of the system.297 Legal
systems thus “maintain and support other forms of social grouping.”298
They meet the open system requirement “by upholding and enforcing
contracts, agreements, rules and customs of individuals and associations,
and by enforcing through their rules on conflict of laws the laws of other
countries, and so on.”299 Raz further claims that legal systems are the
most important institutionalized normative system to which people are
subject.300
In Raz’s account of incorporation, or to use Raz’s more general
term, “adoption” is not of normative significance. Law sometimes
supports other social arrangements. Raz specifies two tests, either of
which a legal system must meet for adoption: (i) when the norms in
force in another normative system are to be accepted by the legal system
–an example is how conflict of laws rules recognize the laws of other
countries; and (ii) when power-conferring rules in a legal system accept
norms made by or with the consent of persons. The second test applies
to “contracts, the regulation of commercial companies, and the like.”301
In other words, the second test applies to the law merchant. Only if a
norm meets either of these two tests can it be recognized in a legal
system, but they do not become part of it. Raz advises that it would be
imprecise to conceptualize legal systems around spheres of activity, but
he does not say why.302 He also claims that we should not be concerned
with rules for particular groups, unless the grouping is “normatively
relevant.”303
A final point that confirms Raz’s political conception of legal
positivism is his claim that the most important institution in an
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id. at 152-55.
Id. at 153-54.
Id. at 154-56.
Id. at 153.
RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 12, at 153.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 107.
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institutionalized normative system is “systematic and institutionalized”
methods of norm-applying, in the form of norm-applying organs that
have the power to determine the “normative situation” of persons, and
issue binding “authoritative evaluations” or “authoritative applicative
determinations,” binding regardless of whether they are correct.304 These
organs have “momentous importance” in any normative system.305 They
resolve disputes, particularly in a system that has power-conferring rules
recognizing voluntary obligations. They are a “defining characteristic of
an important class of normative systems.”306 Raz argues that the rules of
primary norm applying organs are “not a simple addition to a normative
system. Their introduction radically transforms the system adding to it a
whole new dimension, that of authoritative evaluation of behavior.”307
In Raz’s account of a legal system, rules permitting arbitration do
not result in the production of norm applying organs. These rules are
simply power conferring rules supporting social groupings. Arbitral
institutions are not “primary” norm applying organs because they get
their power through power conferring rules.308
Other legal positivists may disagree, but Raz provides a
“conservative” account that gets as close as possible to specifying the
requirement of a municipal legal system in all but name. In his book
Practical Reason and Norms, published in 1990, Raz specified the above
conditions for the law’s uniqueness, but curiously, he provided a similar
account in the Modern Law Review in 1975, which he included in his
book, The Authority of Law, published in 1983, which explicitly limited
his account of the uniqueness of law to a description of the features of a
municipal legal system.309 Raz included no such limitation in Practical
Reason and Norms.310
2.

The Concept of Commercial Law in the Political Conception

The concept of commercial law in the political conception of legal
positivism is well understood. In the political conception, commercial
law is a discrete category of state law in a municipal legal system. We

304. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 12, at 134-37.
305. Id. at 137.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 142.
308. Id. at 136.
309. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 43, at 103; Joseph Raz, The
Institutional Nature of Law, 38 MOD. L. REV. (1975).
310. Brian Tamanaha has already shown Raz’s restrictive conditions for a legal
system to be problematic generally. TAMANAHA, supra note 24 at 139-42. I show below
why Raz is wrong in the context of commercial law.
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can identify here the secondary rules associated with the primary rules
identified in Part II.
The rules of recognition for municipal legislation are the rules that
legislatures and executives use to enact legislation, usually rules
associated with the passage of legislation by a legislature and signature
by a chief executive, though these institutional details vary across
countries. The rules of recognition for case law in legal systems that
accept precedent are those relating to the practices of courts in producing
and following precedent.
The rules of recognition for international conventions are easy to
understand if one looks at the law from a state-based perspective.
Governments use municipal rules of recognition to ratify or accede to a
convention.311 Upon ratification or accession by the state’s government,
the convention becomes municipal law. Ratification or accession
typically involves a state’s executive in some form being involved with
other state executives in the production of the convention text, and then
state legislatures and executive departments act to ratify or accede to the
convention so that it becomes valid legal rules in the municipal legal
system. In American terminology, if the convention is not self
executing, then ratification and accession binds the United States to the
convention but the additional step of municipal implementing legislation
is necessary to produce valid legal rules to be used in municipal courts
by private parties. If the convention is, in American terminology, selfexecuting, then upon ratification or accession, the convention
immediately becomes valid municipal law. In a political conception of
positivism, no recognizing acts for these conventions exist to extend the
legal validity of the convention beyond the state. There are no
transnational acts of recognition for any legal system beyond the state.
International law scholars postulate a customary rule of recognition such
as pact sunt servanda to bind states to conventions, but not private
persons. The state-based limitation is reflected in the fact that
conventions are law only for states that ratify or accede to them, as Hart
famously pointed out in chapter X of The Concept of Law.312
In the political conception of legal positivism, similar state-based
limitations restrict a transnational conception of model laws. The rules
of recognition for model laws are municipally based. They are the rules
of legislative enactment of the model law.
Without legislative
enactment, model laws are simply persuasive theoretical authority on

311. Ratification and accession are commonly accepted terms in most municipal legal
systems. I use them here to avoid unneeded abstraction. A more general term might be
“acceptance.”
312. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 8, at 213-237.
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what good rules in the particular area should be.313 They have no
practical authority over persons’ actions. Model laws coming from
UNCITRAL would be no different in terms of legal status than a UCC
Article or uniform act that no state enacts.
In the political conception of legal positivism, the above categories
of state-recognized law are the main sources of primary rules. In the
political conception, the law merchant never becomes the law of the
state. In the political conception, the law merchant is no more than
contract terms. Incorporation does not convert non-state norms into state
law. Incorporation is not an act of recognition. Rather, it is an act of
adoption in Raz’s terminology, a way the supreme but open legal system
of the state supports other subordinate social groupings. Just as a state
may support religious communities within its borders, so to it may
support commercial communities.
Legal rules permitting citizens of the state to enter into legally
significant arrangements even though they rely on non-state norms such
as the law merchant are power-conferring rules. Power-conferring rules
are rules of change, not rules of recognition. They are means by which
the state confers power on citizens to alter relationships among
themselves in the form of voluntary obligations. Power-conferring rules
include contract formation rules, trust formation rules, and property
transfer rules. That they are rules of change and not rules of recognition
is normatively significant. They are not an act of recognition converting
non-state law into state law. They are, rather, permission to deviate from
default rules in the municipal legal system.
The reason states have power-conferring rules of change is that
states often have an interest in supporting the private activities of their
citizens. But municipal legal systems maintain claims of supremacy and
comprehensiveness as well as openness, and limits are thus imposed on
such private activities. These limits are seen in ways the state legal
system asserts supremacy when necessary for reasons of public policy or
ordre public. Public policy sometimes justifies overriding support for
social groupings. Public policy reasons for rejecting rules that are not
the state’s rules are often found in legislation or in case law.314 Public
policy reasons for refusing to support social groupings is a way for a
state to assert that the state’s interest must predominate, that the state’s
interest is too important to permit the social grouping to do something
that fails to further that interest.

313. See supra note 10 on the difference between theoretical and practical authority.
314. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 96-98 (2004).
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In a political conception of legal positivism, the laws of other states
are treated similarly to the law merchant but with important differences.
If parties to commercial arrangements do not use power-conferring rules
to choose the law merchant or foreign law to govern, then the relevant
rules are supplied either by an international convention or by a conflict of
laws analysis. In a political conception of legal positivism, conflict of
laws analysis is important. And the law merchant has no place in that
analysis.315 The only laws recognized in a conflict of laws analysis are
the laws of other states. The reason why conflict approaches are seen as
so strongly nationalistic and hence firmly within the political conception
of legal positivism is because the animating principle underlying conflict
of laws is the supremacy and comprehensiveness of state law. Conflict
of laws is about selecting the law of a state when a commercial event
crosses a political border and the law of more than one state arguably
applies.316 It is a competition between competing state orders. The
logical conclusion of any conflicts approach is that all legal vacuums
must be filled with state law. A contract or commercial transaction
simply cannot exist without state law. A cosmopolitan conception of the
law, as we shall see below, moves the questions of supremacy and
comprehensiveness out and beyond the state. An approach that
recognizes overarching norms valid beyond state borders presents
conflicts lawyers with a fundamental contradiction.
Finally, in the political conception of legal positivism, normapplying organs, in Raz’s words, “radically transform” a normative
system.317 In Raz’s account, Hart’s rules of adjudication take on special
significance. In a political conception of legal positivism, courts
dominate the task of adjudication. Legal order simply cannot exist
without institutions to provide authoritativeness in the form of
evaluations of the conduct of persons subject to the law.
Moreover, the political conception facilitates a distinction between
courts and “alternative” dispute resolution, ignoring the obvious fact that
courts are alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in many
commercial relationships that cross state borders.318 Arbitration is the

315. BERGER, supra note 146, at 78; Ralf Michaels, The Re-state-ment of Non-State
Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51
WAYNE L. REV. 1209 (2005); Michaels & Jansen, supra note 30.
316. See Frederick Juenger, Some Random Remarks from Overseas, in BERGER, THE
PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, supra note 30 at 81.
317. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
318. I use the concept of alternative dispute resolution loosely here, as alternative
dispute resolution specialists might not classify arbitration as alternative dispute
resolution, since arbitration results in a legally enforceable award. GOODE, KRONKE, &
MCKENDRICK, supra note 116, at 627.
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preferred method of dispute resolution in commercial transactions that
cross state borders.
Let’s try to understand how to describe the role of courts and other
norm-applying organs in the political conception when transactions cross
state borders. In the political conception, arbitral panels conduct
arbitrations within the territory of a state and are subject to the arbitration
law of that state. Parties to the arbitration may seek assistance from
municipal courts to enforce the arbitration agreement and the policies of
the state on arbitration. This judicial action is generically referred to as
supervision of arbitration by national courts.319 In the political
conception, supervision is uncontroversial, indeed necessary. The idea
of delocalization—the detachment of international arbitration from the
law of the site where it is held—has no place, even if the parties so
provide in their arbitration agreement.320 And the detachment of the
arbitral award from the substantive law any state is impossible.321
Without state law no contract can exist between the parties, either for the
underlying contract or for the arbitration. Arbitrators are bound to apply
contractual choice of law provisions or conflict of law principles in
making awards. Once the arbitrators issue an award, it may be
recognized and enforced in any state that will recognize and enforce it.
The 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Arbitral Awards, ratified by 137 states, facilitates recognition and
enforcement by states.322 Convention Article V provides that states are
not required to recognize and enforce arbitral awards in certain
circumstances related to public policy. In the political conception of
legal positivism, “public policy” means that the public interests of the
state trump the private interests of the parties. Article V is an agreement
between states on the form of permissible exceptions to recognition and
enforcement. In these state-driven normative practices of supervision,
recognition and enforcement, states claim their supremacy over the
arbitral process.

319. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 314, at 13, quoted in id. at 628. Supervision
is not the actual doctrine found in the law. The terms refers to several legal doctrines.
320. For an explanation of delocalization, see id. at 649-63.
321. Jan Paulsson, Declocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When
and Why it Matters, 32 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 53, at 54-57 (1983), quoted in GOODE,
KRONKE, & MCKENDRICK, supra note 116, at 659. Paulsson quotes the English arbitrator
that has been influential in stating the case rejecting the notion of delocalization as well
as the notion of a contemporary law merchant. F.A. Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LIBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE (1967).
322. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention html (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
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Cosmopolitan Legal Positivism and Transnational Commercial Law

This section puts the political conception under scrutiny. The
account to follow suggests that the political conception of legal
positivism is too restrictive and produces an incomplete and inaccurate
description of a legal system. If positivism is truly independent of the
existence of the state, then it should be able to describe a legal system
independent of any requirement of a state. To be more precise, the
question is whether a unified conception of a transnational legal system
is possible. The political conception of legal positivism can already
describe valid legal rules operating internationally but owing their
validity to distinct municipal legal systems. We can see from the
presence of important non-state rules, however, why such a description
might be inadequate. As explained below, a positivist description that
does not require a state is possible, but whether commercial law complies
with that description is a separate question, the answer to which may be
no.
1.

The Cosmopolitan Conception of Legal Positivism

The cosmopolitan and political conceptions of legal positivism are
in agreement that force or command is not the source of the practical
authority of the law. Both approaches accept that a legal system can
originate in what is essentially custom, or in Waldron’s terminology,
“custom like practices”323 in the form of secondary rules that the norm
users of the given normative community accept. The rejection of force
or command opens up the possibilities for revising positivism into a
cosmopolitan account.
A cosmopolitan conception of legal positivism, one which removes
the state as an enabling condition for a legal system, would require that
five conditions be met: (1) acceptance by the participants in the legal
system of the rules of the system as valid, binding, and authoritative;
(2) systemic qualities of normative consequence within the putative legal
system that make the normative order the system represents intelligible
or comprehensible to the participants; (3) secondary rules and secondary
rule officials, though they can be distributed across different state and
non-state hierarchies; (4) shared agency between secondary rule officials
demonstrating sufficient mutual responsiveness and joint commitment to
a legal system; and (5) primary rules dealing with issues that legal
systems usually deal with, such as property, contract, and dispute
resolution. I will explain why each of these conditions is required for

323.

Waldron, supra note 1, at 93.
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any state-less legal system, or a legal system in which state rules are
included but do not comprise the entire legal system.
As to the first condition, acceptance by the participants in the legal
system of the rules of the system, this would seem not to be an important
requirement in the political conception of legal positivism. The political
conception places minor significance on the reasons why subjects in a
community governed by common norms, which would be citizens of a
state in the political conception, obey primary rules. Citizens of a state
could have any number of reasons for obedience. What matters most for
purposes of understanding the concept of a legal system deriving solely
from the state is the internal reflective attitude of the officials who
produce valid law. Though Hart and other legal positivists might deplore
obedience based on habit as “sheeplike,”324 that persons have a number
of reasons for obedience does not matter very much in the political
conception. The hermeneutics of the political conception focuses on the
norm givers, the officials who produce the rules and make them valid in
the legal system. The beliefs and attitudes of norm users have more
significance, however, when the normative community is not a state,
because states maintain a longstanding arbitrary and involuntary
association of persons who happen to find themselves within their
political and geographical borders. In communities that are not formed
by political borders, membership in the community is often voluntary
and by design, if we accept some level of autonomy in life choices. For
example, the reason why the UCP has practical authority to bankers is
because bankers have accepted the UCP as law. Members of the banking
community have an internal reflective attitude about the primary rules
known as the UCP. It is not only the members of the ICC Banking
Technique and Practice Commission that have a critical reflective
attitude about secondary rules associated with the UCP. In a normative
community that is not determined by state boundaries, the internal
reflective attitude exists in both norm givers and norm users, towards
both secondary and primary rules. In this sense, the concept of “in
force” has a more stringent meaning than what one applies to a municipal
legal system.325
Why is this so? Role or identity seems to be key in understanding
the practical authority of rules in normative communities not formed by
political borders. For example, if a person accepts a role or identity of a
merchant, then the law merchant rules relevant to that merchant grouping
apply to her.

324. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 8, at 117.
325. Bhala, supra note 22, at 203-04 makes a similar point about the importance or
acceptance of the law merchant by merchants, but his discussion differs from mine.
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What about the case where a merchant decides not to follow these
rules? After all, they are default rules. The answer is that opting out is
equivalent to a breach of the rules. It is a deviation from an established
practice about which the norm users have a critical reflective attitude.
Opting out of the rules will evoke a critical negative attitude from other
merchants in the same grouping. For example, if a confirming bank on a
letter of credit advises the issuing bank that it will not adhere to the UCP,
that is essentially a breach of binding and authoritative rules that banks
are supposed to follow. The idea of default rules has less relevance in
such contexts.
As to the second condition, legal systems have systemic qualities of
normative consequence that make them identifiable to both norm givers
and norm users. Hart found these systemic qualities in the relationship
between primary and secondary rules. Norm givers use secondary rules
to identify valid legal rules for norm users. Norm users use rules of
recognition to identify valid legal rules that norm givers create.
Secondary rules of change work in a similar way. Secondary rules of
adjudication give law-applying organs the authority to apply primary
rules to resolve disputes for participants in the legal system. The bottom
line is that in a legal system, secondary and primary rules relate to one
another in a way that is readily identifiable to the participants in the legal
system, and the participants have beliefs and attitudes about an
identifiable legal system in which these primary and secondary rules
operate.
States usually provide these systemic qualities. Other groupings do
as well, but it is not just any grouping that counts. The grouping has to
have normative consequences to the order being described. These
systemic qualities give the system order and qualify it to be called a
normative system. We need these systemic qualities for comprehension
and identification of the normative order. We cannot understand a set of
norms as a normative order without it. There has to be a reason for
grouping the rules together as a legal system, such as in the need for a
complete order regulating an area of importance to norm users.
As to the third condition, secondary rules and secondary rule
officials may be distributed across different state and non-state
hierarchies. The idea of a distributed environment comes from computer
science, to refer to the spread of computer functions across different
computers. The Internet is an example of a distributed normative
environment, in which no comprehensive hierarchies claim supremacy
over the entirety of the Internet, not even ICAAN.326 The Internet is
326. See generally Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of
Laws: Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819
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governed not in a hierarchical structure of “top-down” formal authority,
but through the coordinative actions of governments and private
networks maintained by operators globally. No one entity regulates all
of it. States are substantially involved in Internet governance, but so are
non-state actors. I do not mean to suggest that the cosmopolitan
conception of positivism or transnational commercial law neatly
analogizes to Internet governance. The basic point here is that of
distribution of functions in a decentralized way across various
government and other hierarchically driven institutional structures, over
a unified field of activity.
The cosmopolitan version of legal positivism acknowledges
multiple rules of recognition, change, and adjudication in this distributed
normative space. Even in a political conception of positivism, rules of
recognition are multiple to reflect the fact that primary rules come with
different content, form different categories of the law, come in different
legal forms such as constitutional text and principle, legislation, and
common law, and may reflect various levels of decentralization within a
state or other community. For example, a local ordinance will be
produced from rules of recognition differing from a constitutional
principle. Matthew Adler supports his account of citizen groups as
forming recognitional communities in U.S. constitutional law partly from
Raz’s claim that judges may have divergent rules of recognition yet still
work within the same municipal legal system.327
As for the fourth condition, shared agency between secondary rule
officials, law can be understood from the standpoint of planning. Some
of the new thinking in analytical jurisprudence is in trying to understand
the law as, in Scott Shapiro’s phrase, “massively shared agency.”328 I
can only introduce here the way the philosophical materials on plans and
intentions could be employed to conceptualize a system of transnational
commercial law. This approach might yield the most fruitful results in
any future work on the concept of transnational commercial law. Legal
philosophers have based most of their shared agency inquiry on the work
of Michael Bratman. I do the same.
Suppose you and I are law students and we agree to form a study
group with two other law students. Our aim is to produce an outline for
(2005); Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 312
(2002); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); David Post, Governing Cyberspace, 43
WAYNE L. REV. 155 (1996).
327. Adler, supra note 304, at 746.
328. Scott J. Shapiro, Legal Practice and Massively Shared Agency, available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/yclp/papers/shapiro_paper.doc (last visited October 12, 2008).
This work is based on MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS OF
INTENTION AND AGENCY 94 (1999).
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our Corporations course. It is an accurate description of the action of our
group that we produced the outline.329 It would not be accurate to say
that I produced the outline, and so did you and the other two students.
We did it together. It is not a simple aggregation of parts of an outline.
It cannot be, because we planned. There may be cases in which we do
not plan ahead of time and simply share or aggregate parts of our own
individual outlines, but that is a different situation. Shared agency
accounts for the cases not involving only an aggregation of individual
actions. An example of aggregation of individual agency is if all of us in
the study group all happen to come from Los Angeles and we all
individually decide to fly back to Los Angeles for the Thanksgiving
holiday. It is true here to say that you are flying to Los Angeles, and I
am flying to Los Angeles, and so are our two colleagues, but we are not
flying together.
Bratman has argued that shared agency arises in two ways, either as
a shared intentional activity or as a shared cooperative activity. A shared
intentional activity meets the following two conditions:
(1) Mutual responsiveness: In SCA each participating agent attempts
to be responsive to the intentions and actions of the other, knowing
that the other is attempting to be similarly responsive. Each seeks to
guide his behavior with an eye to the behavior of the other, knowing
that the other seeks to do likewise.330
(2) Commitment to the joint activity: In SCA the participants each
have an appropriate commitment (though perhaps for different
reasons) to the joint activity, and their mutual responsiveness is in the
pursuit of this commitment.331

So, we can all agree on how to divide up our outline coverage, with me
taking fiduciary duty of care, you taking insider trading, and so on.
These actions involve cooperation in the forms of mutual responsiveness
and joint commitment, but an even stronger form of commitment exists
in some forms of shared agency. To reflect the stronger form of
cooperation, Bratman adds a third condition to describe the concept of a
shared cooperative activity:

329. Shapiro, supra note 328 provides a good summary of Bratman’s work.
330. Bratman cites to Chapter 4 of the classic game theoretic text of THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960), in support of the first condition.
BRATMAN, supra note 328, at 94-95. The citation to Schelling is revealing, in that the
support for the first condition might be in a coordination game, in the nature of a Nash
equilibrium.
331. BRATMAN, supra note 304, at 94-95.
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(3) Commitment to mutual support. In SCA each agent is committed
to supporting the efforts of the other to play her role in the joint
activity. If I believe that you need my help to find your note (or your
paint brush) I am prepared to provide such help; and you are similarly
prepared to support me in my role. These commitments to support
each other put us in a position to perform the joint activity
successfully even if we each need help in certain ways.332

In the law school outline example, if you are prepared to help me with
my fiduciary duty material and I to help you with your insider trading
material, our outline preparing is a shared cooperative activity.
Some who work within the political conception of legal positivism
have argued that all or some of these conditions describe legal practices.
They do not explicitly limit their accounts to municipal legal systems,
but what they actually refer to are the practices of municipal legal
systems.333 A cosmopolitan conception of legal order can also employ
Bratman’s conditions to argue for a transnational legal order. The focus
here is on the work of officials who make and apply the law.
Finally, the fifth condition, primary rules dealing with social
problems that legal systems usually deal with, such as property, contract,
and dispute resolution, is necessary to tell the difference between
secondary rules in a legal system from those in other institutionalized
normative systems. To my knowledge, no one has tried to answer that
question. In his account of institutional normative order, MacCormick
seems to assume that a municipal legal system is but one kind of
institutional normative order but does not go beyond that conclusion.334
It just might be that looking for secondary rules unique to a legal system
is the wrong way to go. The features of norm creation, application, and
enforcement are common to our everyday language of normative
practices and also of institutionalized systems we ordinarily do not think
of as law. Churches, universities, sporting organizations, business
entities, and civic clubs all have secondary rules of recognition,
adjudication, and change.335 This is simply how life forms around
institutionalized normative orders. Law makes no special claim on these
features, just as it makes no claim to any special form of reasoning
unique to it.
To conclude, we can describe a cosmopolitan version of legal
positivism and find a legal system that does not require the state as an
enabling condition if systemic qualities exist between primary rules and
332. Id.
333. Adler, supra note 304, at 729-45 summarizes this work.
334. See generally MACCORMICK INSTITUTIONS OF LAW, supra note
MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 279, at 1.
335. See, e.g.,RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 12 at 150.

33;
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secondary rules in groupings with normative consequences, in which the
primary and secondary rules have practical authority, which means they
are binding and authoritative on norm users and norm givers
respectively, and which govern social problems that the law typically
deals with. The secondary rules can be used by institutional actors
within different hierarchies, with some coming from states and others
not.
2.

The Concept of Commercial Law in the Cosmopolitan
Conception

Is there a commercial law order that meets the above five features of
a legal system? Possibly so, but objections arise. I will go through each
of the above five conditions for a transnational legal order and apply
them to commercial norms.
As for the first condition, the above discussion elucidated the notion
of the critical reflective attitude of the merchant or professional about
commercial law rules not limited to source. In the political conception,
the law merchant becomes reasons for action as law when incorporated
into the state’s legal system. In the political conception, merchants use
state legal systems to give binding force to their social rules. Raz
described incorporation as support by a legal system of social groupings
other than those of the state. Incorporation can be accomplished
legislatively, judicially, or contractually. By legislative incorporation I
refer to legislation, like the UCC, supporting the notion that rules made
by non-state actors, such as the law merchant, may apply to a given
transaction. Legislative incorporation is simply a means to describe one
way in which incorporation is accomplished. These same considerations
apply to the other forms of incorporation, contractual and judicial.
Courts may engage in a form of judicial incorporation, as we see in
Harlow and Jones,336 BP Oil International,337 and St. Paul Guardian
Insurance,338 although the latter two American cases may be seen as a
form of “legislative” incorporation prompted by CISG Article 9.339
These courts hold that incorporation is required because of widespread
merchant acceptance.

336. Harlow and Jones LTD. v. American Express Bank LTD., [1990] 2 Lloyd’s L.
Rep. 343.
337. BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333 (5th
Cir. 2003).
338. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Medical Sys. & Support, 2002 WL
465312 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002).
339. CISG Article 9, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/treaty.html
(last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
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The political conception fails to account for the way commercial
actors, judges, and legislators understand the normative force of law
merchant rules. In the cosmopolitan conception, the law merchant does
not become reasons for action through incorporation into a state’s legal
system. The social rules of merchants do not acquire practical authority
through and in the municipal legal system alone. Incorporation, or
incorporation alone, is not what makes the law merchant valid legal rules
in a cosmopolitan normative order. Rather, participants in the relevant
normative community accept the law merchant before any contract is
entered and regardless of whether any form of incorporation into a
contract or municipal legal system has occurred. Acceptance in the
relevant merchant community comes well before any incorporation.
Incorporation is evidence of acceptance and authoritativeness. For
example, the UCP acquires its authority because the ICC Commission on
Banking Technique and Practice produces it. Banks are bound to the
UCP not because it is incorporated, but because they accept it as law. To
banks, the UCP is in many instances more important even than municipal
banking law. The UCP is not accepted in this way as municipal law, but
rather as transnational law unhinged from the state as an enabling
condition for its existence.
The second condition, systemic qualities among primary and
secondary rules, seems to have significant relevance to commercial law.
Here we see what has become known as a governance gap, in which
states do not regulate for whatever reason, either inability, unwillingness,
or lack of interest to do so.340 State interests are determined by the
political order in which they are situated, and commercial activity
sometimes falls outside of this political order, or it is at least not apparent
that it is the proper subject of the political order. Governments may not
care about law relevant only to merchants who freely accept it, and
which does not have the potential to harm non-merchant citizens.
Moreover, it is sometimes the case that state-produced commercial law is
inadequate without the law merchant. States claim a more significant or
decisive role in regulating areas they have historically or traditionally
deemed closely connected to their sovereignty or to the protection of
their citizens. In other areas, non-state actors who represent the most
cohesive and significant of normative communities tend to step into
provide norms. For example, the UCP regulates a number of banking
practices relating to documentary letters of credit. The UCP is
authoritative on the strict compliance and independence principles in
letter of credit law. States play an important role, however, in regulating
340. I borrow the “governance gap” terminology very loosely from the development
studies literature. See, e.g., M.S. GOGAN, THE GOVERNANCE GAP (2009).
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fraud on financial institutions and their customers in letters of credit.341
Here we see substantial coordination and mutual support. If we are to
accept an American conception of commercial law, which includes
consumer transactions, the role of the state becomes much more
significant in consumer transactions, as the state and the political order it
represents remains the primary source and justification for duties of
justice, which have an important place in consumer transactions.
The same sort of systemic qualities of normative consequence
among primary and secondary rules exist in transnational adjudication of
commercial disputes. Unless state-run courts develop special expertise
in areas of transnational commercial law, their main task is to recognize
and enforce arbitral awards. Of course, for many wholly domestic
commercial disputes, courts tend to be the primary rule-applying organs,
but this may be changing as arbitration and alternative dispute resolution
become preferred methods to avoid congested and under-funded courts
that are too busy with criminal and other matters in which states have a
substantial interest. At the transnational level, courts must be involved in
enforcement because enforcement is about transferring assets to satisfy a
decision by an authoritative person or body, usually by an arbitrator or
arbitral panel. Asset identification and transfer is about property rights,
and states maintain a dominant role in allocating these rights. But the
authoritative evaluations themselves in commercial contexts—Raz’s
important norm applying organs—are often arbitral and not judicial in
character. Each institution, judicial and arbitral, needs the other to
perform coordinating and supporting functions.
Raz’s political conception of legal positivism reaches the wrong
conclusion from these examples. Raz claims that a legal system is open,
that it supports other social groupings, but that it also claims supremacy
over other social groups. He also says that legal systems claim to be a
comprehensive normative order, which seems to contradict the openness
condition. But Raz’s claim fails for reasons other than this contradiction.
Raz’s legal positivism is an extreme version of the political conception.
Its focus is almost entirely on the state’s perspective. It is not that state
support for other social groups is the relevant normative consequence
associated with state acceptance of the law merchant. It is, rather, that
the state needs the law merchant to support commercial law as a system.
The supporting features of the relationship go both ways and reflect
coordination between complementary normative domains and not
support of a superior normative system for an inferior one. Legislated
law merchant in particular supports state-based commercial law in areas
in which the latter is deficient.
341. See JOHN DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT 55-56 (4th ed. 2007).
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The third condition, distributed secondary rules across different
community hierarchies, deals with the work that secondary rules do and
on the practices that effectively function as secondary rules. When we
look at commercial law with the understanding of the functions of the
secondary rules at hand, we find two related kinds of problems with the
political conception of commercial law. First, the political conception
offers an incomplete description of secondary rules that match up to
primary rules. Second, the political conception offers an inaccurate
description of the secondary rules of commercial law. Going through
each of the main sets of primary rules makes these points.
It is true that municipal legislation requires the enactment of
legislation by a state-based procedure. Those rules of recognition are
included in the cosmopolitan version of legal positivism, but they are not
the only rules of recognition, and some rules of recognition come from
outside of formal state-run institutions. The state often does not work
alone in creating valid legislation. Consider model laws and uniform
acts. No legislature of any state, together or alone, can enact the UCC or
its official revisions or any legislative product known as a uniform act or
their official revision. Rather, the American Law Institute and the
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws must
jointly agree on what is to receive their imprimatur through collaborative
effort.342 Several institutions jointly hold and apply the rules of
recognition for uniform acts in the United States. It is an incomplete
characterization of how rules of recognition actually operate to claim that
uniform acts do not become law until enacted by a state legislature. To
get an accurate description, we have to add the role of a non-state
institution, the ALI, and a quasi-state institution, the NCCUSL.343 No
uniform acts exist to ratify without their production by two non-state
institutions. A similar analysis applies to model laws at the international
level. No one can provide revisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency, for example, except UNCITRAL, an IGO.
So far, we have considered only state or state sponsored secondary
rule officials. Going further, municipal legislatures depend on non-state
actors to produce valid rules that they do not produce. States may forego
legislation in a particular area because non-state actors fill the gap. For
example, in the latest UCC Article 2 revision, the UCC drafters decided
not to regulate delivery terms in sale of goods contracts, knowing that the
ICC has produced superior terms in the form of INCOTERMS, and the
preference of the drafters is for uniformity between transnational and

342. See Introduction—About NCCUSL, http://www nccusl.org/update/ (last visited
May 27, 2009).
343. Id.; About ALI, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm (last visited May 27, 2009).
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national practices.344 It is not that the state accepts primary rules of other
institutionalized normative systems to support the norm users in that
other system. Rather, it is the combination of recognizing acts by state
and non-state actors that bring transnational validity to these forms of the
law merchant. That municipal law permits incorporation does not mean
that municipal law maintains supremacy, but that it coordinates with
merchant acceptance of rules in distributed normative space to support
the transnational validation merchant rules through multiple acts of
recognition.
A perhaps unusual practice is the use of FIDIC books as standard
terms and conditions, often by developing country governments. Major
construction almost always involves substantial sets of contract terms
and conditions to fill gaps left by contract default rules. While FIDIC
presents a troublesome example of the legislated law merchant because
its substantial terms and conditions must be expressly agreed to as part of
any construction contract, which makes them seem descriptively more
like standard terms and conditions in a political conception, they must be
understood also for their coordinating and supporting functions. States
forego the production of their own valid rules for their own private and
public contracts—their own standard contract terms and conditions—and
instead rely of the production of valid rules by a non-state actor. It is
true that FIDIC terms and conditions do not have normative force
without contractual incorporation, but it is also true that they have no
normative force without FIDIC promulgation. Multiple recognizing acts
across different normative communities are required for FIDIC terms and
conditions to be valid.
It is normatively significant that governments, particularly
developing country governments, mandate the use of FIDIC terms and
conditions in their public contracting. The development banks, in
particular the World Bank and the regional development banks, mandate
their use in their loans.345 They also require INCOTERMS. Here we see
the distributed features of the secondary rules in action—governments,

344. UCC Sections 2-319 through 2-324 were “eliminated because they are
inconsistent with modern commercial practices.” U.C.C. § 2-324 leg. note (2003).
Delivery terms “must be interpreted in light of any applicable usage of trade and any
course of performance or course of dealing between the parties.” U.C.C. § 2-319 leg.
note (2003).
345. Development banks so mandate by making it a loan condition that the borrower
use the bank’s standard bidding documents in projects funded by the loan. The standard
bidding documents require the use of FIDIC terms or conditions. Indeed, the terms and
conditions usually are incorporated directly into the text of the documents. See World
Bank Standard Bidding Documents Procurement of Works (May 2006, rev. March &
April 2007), http://web.worldbank.org/Wbsite/external/projects/procurement/ (last visited
May 27, 2009).
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IGOs, and a non-state actor perform different acts of recognition. Each
of these validating acts is necessary for FIDIC to be law in the
transnational commercial law order.
Next consider international conventions. In the political conception,
international conventions are creatures of state law. No international
legal system exists to provide rules of recognition to validate their
existence in that system. Rather, in the political conception, the rules of
recognition serve to validate conventions for the municipal legal system.
When we apply the cosmopolitan conception, we search for a set of
mutually coordinating rules of recognition that validate conventions as
transnational law.
Though states have the power to negotiate
conventions directly without the involvement of IGOs, this has not been
state practice for commercial law conventions. Commercial law
conventions almost always do not come into existence without
substantial IGO involvement. They are produced by IGOs. Without
IGO involvement there is nothing for a municipal government to ratify.
The IGO’s procedures are rules of recognition as well. As explained
above, IGOs are government constituted, and so their actions may be
seen as a delegation of state authority and thus supporting the political
conception.
But when we reconceptualize conventions in the
cosmopolitan conception, we see conventions as part of the distributed
normative space, in which IGOs, municipal governments, and merchant
associations mutually support one another. The content of commercial
law conventions coordinates just as municipal legislation does around the
gaps left by the law merchant, and vice versa—the content of the law
merchant coordinates around the two essentially state produced
normative products of legislation and convention. Reflecting a high
degree of coordination, the ICC has special consultative status with
UNCITRAL.346
What to make of Honnold’s “homeward trend” in the interpretation
of commercial conventions? A political conception of legal positivism
would reject autonomous interpretations of conventions while the
cosmopolitan conception would accept them, and perhaps even require
them. We can distinguish two cases. First, there will be cases in the
zone of reasonable interpretation, in which judges in good faith fill gaps
with competing reasonable but differing interpretations.
These
differences in the exercise of judicial discretion are inevitable. They do
not defeat the cosmopolitan conception. But judges who refuse to apply
a convention, as in Beijing Metals, or who refuse to examine the judicial
decisions of other states when interpreting conventions, may be said to
346. Coordination of Work on International Trade Law, http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/tac/coordination html (last visited May 27, 2009).
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support the political conception as an adequate descriptive account. If
officials are not committed to the cosmopolitan conception, then it will
be a difficult case to make.
As for model laws mainly produced by UNCITRAL and
UNIDROIT, these organizations provide a partial set of rules of
recognition, but not enough to place the primary rules of these products
“in force” in either the cosmopolitan or the political conception of legal
positivism. They do, however, have persuasive authority and serve in an
advisory capacity, and are thus more in the nature of theoretical
authority. From these model laws we have reason to believe good law
has the content these model laws have.347 A similar characterization
applies to the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts, but since they are not legislative in nature, or at least not
primarily so,348 they do not become law until they are in force as a result
of frequent use by contract parties and arbitrators. The major difference
the political versus the cosmopolitan conception makes for the
UNIDROIT Principles is that the cosmopolitan conception accepts in
principle that recognizing acts can occur outside of formal state
enactment as law. Model Laws cannot claim such abilities. The
UNIDROIT Principles are not law merchant unless commercial parties
use them on a consistent and ongoing basis. They are in this sense like
the UCP and INCOTERMS, but those clearly legislatively modeled
products go through a formal and rigorous process of recognition by a
normative community, which the UNIDROIT Principles do not.
Finally, within the discussion of the third condition, we should
address secondary rules of adjudication. Raz has claimed that lawapplying institutions are “of momentous importance” and “radically
transform” a normative system because they supply authoritative
evaluations of actions by persons governed by the normative system.349
If this claim is meant to support the broader claim that legal systems are
only state-based, it fails. It is in secondary rules of adjudication where
we find that the cosmopolitan conception of a transnational commercial
law makes its central case. With rules of adjudication we have a number
of legal rules supporting a distributed normative space in which state and
non-state actors coordinate and are mutually dependent on each other for
authoritative evaluations. The cosmopolitan conception leads to a more
347. But see supra notes 112 and accompanying text (the political economy literature
on “private” legislatures finds otherwise).
348. The drafters commend them as a possible model or guide for contract legislation.
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Preamble (“They may
serve as a model for national and international legislation.”), http://www.unidroit.org/
english/principles/contracts/main html (last visited May 27, 2009).
349. See supra notes 307 and accompanying text.
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neutral and descriptively accurate form of the Razian openness feature of
a legal system when it comes to rules of adjudication. Here we see a
horizontal and not a hierarchically based conception of how all of the
parts of commercial dispute resolution cohere.
An example is the FIDIC norm applying organs. FIDIC specifies an
extensive array of norm-applying organs to make authoritative
evaluations of the conduct of parties to their contracts. In some of the
more widely used books, the consulting engineer serves as the front-line
norm applying organ, issuing authoritative evaluations that the parties to
the contract are bound to follow, to continue work, and to pursue
arbitration.350 If the dispute makes it to an arbitral award, that arbitral
award may be recognized and enforced in state courts under the New
York Convention.351 With FIDIC we have a substantial set of rules of
adjudication, with norm applying organs all the way down to routine
contract operations.
In the political conception of legal positivism, states claim
supremacy over international commercial arbitration.
In the
cosmopolitan conception, courts and arbitrators coordinate and are
mutually supportive in a normative space that distributes over numerous
state-based and other normative communities. Arbitral proceedings may
be delocalized and detached from the law of the state in which the
arbitral proceedings are being held if that is what the parties to the
arbitration agreement intend.352 Parties to international commercial
arbitration are almost invariably professionals or merchants, so state
interests in consumer protection tend to be lessened. Since only states
control territories, the arbitral site must necessarily be in a state, but
geography or territory alone should have no normative consequences.
Ironically, though English lawyers tend to stridently support the
political conception of legal positivism,353 their own courts provide an
example of coordination and mutual support of rules of adjudication in
the cosmopolitan conception. The United Kingdom has designated its
Queens Bench Division of the High Court as the “Commercial Court.”354
The Commercial Court is partly intended to serve as a forum for the
resolution of international commercial disputes, even where the parties to
the dispute have no connection to the United Kingdom. The Court has
350. See supra notes 200-232 and accompanying text.
351. New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention html (last visited May 27, 2009).
352. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
353. See, e.g., Mustill, supra note 19; Mann, supra note 172; Lord Kerr, Modern
Trends in Commercial Law and Practice, 41 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1978).
354. HM
Courts
Service,
http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/infoabout/
admiralcomm/ (last visited May 27, 2009).
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existed for over 100 years.355 The Court’s work focuses significantly on
litigation relating to carriage of goods and charter parties, insurance and
reinsurance, commodity transactions, and litigation of issues relating to
arbitral proceedings.356 It essentially serves as an international tribunal
for these matters. The Court and the profession generally have been
accommodating to foreign parties. In Lord Denning’s words in The
Atlantic Star:
No one who comes to these courts asking for justice should come in
vain. . . . This right to come here is not confined to Englishmen. It
extends to any friendly foreigner. He can seek the aid of our courts if
he desires to do so. You may call this “forum-shopping” if you
please, but if the forum is England, it is a good place to shop in, both
for the quality of the goods and the speed of service.357

On appeal, the House of Lords disavowed Lord Denning’s dictum,358 but
the dictum does reflect a tradition in English law. In Amin Rasheed
v.Kuwait Insurance Corp., Lord Diplock noted that the Commercial
Court was the preferred forum for nationals from a wide range of
countries.359 An influential English conflict of laws treatise asserts that
“there is a public interest in favour of trial in England in that when
foreigners litigate in England, this forms a valuable invisible export and
confirms judicial pride in the English legal system.”360 In Miliangos v.
George Frank (Textiles) Ltd., the House of Lords held that English
courts could render judgments in money damages in foreign currency, in
order to maintain the institutional advantages of English courts in
resolving international disputes.361 As Lord Kerr explained in an article
discussing the Miliangos case:
Foreigners have confidence in our legal system. But they no longer
have confidence in sterling. They can now continue to contract in
stabler currencies, but continue to come here for the resolution of

355. GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 89, at 1170.
356. Id.
357. The Atlantic Star, [1973] 1 Q.B. 364, 381-82, quoted in Friedrich K. Juenger,
Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 565 (1989).
358. The Atlantic Star, [1974] A.C. 436, 454 (per Lord Reid).
359. Amin Rasheed v.Kuwait Insurance Corp., [1984] A.C. 50.
360. JAMES FAWCETT & JANEEN M. CARRUTHERS, CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 440 (14th ed. 2008) (citation omitted); see also J.J.
Fawcett, Forum Shopping: Some Questions Answered, 35 NR. IR. LEGAL Q. 141, 146
(1984), cited in Juenger, supra note 357, at 565-66.
361. 1976 A.C. 443.
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disputes, without the danger of having to accept payment in sterling
at a devalued rate.362

These policies are cosmopolitan. They serve to maximize choice
for parties in dispute resolution, who may choose either the Commercial
Court or arbitration. They support the notion that multiple rules of
adjudication operate in a distributed fashion across multiple normative
communities to promote a transnational commercial legal order.
As for the fourth condition, shared agency among secondary rule
officials, a transnational commercial legal order is plausibly a shared
intentional activity. Mutual responsiveness and joint commitment seem
to exist with groups of officials who operate both within and outside of
states. Those officials are municipal legislators, municipal judges, IGO
representatives and IGO bureaucratic personnel, non-state institutions
and their officials involved in the making of the legislated law merchant,
international commercial arbitrators, and non-state institutions involved
in managing international commercial arbitration. These officials who
have the task of using secondary rules, though they are in different
normative communities, do seem to be engaged in a shared intentional
activity, at least when a commercial matter crosses a state border. They
are mutually responsive and engage joint commitment. We at least have
shared intentional activity. They respond to each other’s actions, either
in law making or in adjudication. As we have seen above, they regulate
normative spaces in a complementary way. Also, these state and nonstate actors exhibit a joint commitment to regulating commercial activity,
but for different reasons, and those reasons do not defeat the fact of joint
commitment. They have different reasons to support the transnational
commercial law order because they work for different principals. State
officials work for citizens of the state.
Business association
representatives work for industry. IGO officials work for the community
of states. But their commitment to the transnational normative order is
joint.
A transnational commercial legal order is unlikely a shared
cooperative activity. It is doubtful that secondary rule officials working
in different normative communities support each other’s activities in the
strong sense of helping each other do their jobs. An argument can be
made that an arbitral panel, for example, might avoid certain rulings on
antitrust law so that the arbitral award will be enforced. As another
example, FIDIC might avoid regulating workplace safety so as to give
the state an opportunity to do so. These actions or inactions are not
mutual support. One norm applier or norm giver is simply avoiding
362. Quoted in Lord Kerr, Modern Trends in Commercial Law and Practice, 41 MOD.
L. REV. 1, 10 (1978) and Forte, supra note 64, at 59.
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conflict and their complementary positions coincide or coordinate, but
they do not cooperate in the strong form of cooperation that the SCA
condition requires. There is no mutual support. FIDIC is not helping a
state regulate workplace safety. The arbitrators are not helping the state
restrict anti-competitive practices.
That it is unlikely that a transnational commercial legal order is a
shared cooperative activity does not mean that it is not a legal order.
Even municipal legal orders are unlikely to be shared cooperative
activities.363 A shared cooperative activity is unnecessary to finding a
legal order. It would be, at best, nice to have that condition fulfilled, but
the necessity condition is some lesser form of shared agency, perhaps a
shared intentional activity. What actually is necessary in a legal system
is a large question which is the subject of ongoing debate, and whose
resolution is beyond our scope here.364
The fifth condition, the presence of primary rules regulating social
problems that legal systems usually regulate, is easily met in the
description of the transnational commercial law order. The rules in
question have mainly to do with contract, property, and dispute
resolution.
3.

Objections

A number of objections may be raised against the cosmopolitan
conception and against my use of it to attempt to conceptualize a
transnational system of commercial law. I identify and address two:
(a) the incompleteness or limited domain objection, that specifying a
legal order around one legal category—commercial law—is untenable;
and (b) the unity objection, arguing that it seems more plausible to claim
that transnational commercial law is comprised of rules of distinct and
multiple normative communities, which are interdependent and which
coordinate, but to claim that they form a unified legal system may go too
far.
a.

The Limited Domain Objection

Law, like other social rules, is group relative.365 For example, social
norms governing manner of dress, eating and sexual behavior are group
relative, that is, they vary with groups and over time.366 Law does not
address many aspects of life. Moral philosophers spend most of their

363. Shapiro, supra note 328.
364. Adler, supra note 304, at 750-64 discusses the literature.
365. Id.
366. Adler, supra note 304.
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effort understanding a normative sphere outside of the law. Morality
does not threaten law’s existence. Group relativity is not a feature of a
rule that makes it something other than law. It is not a necessary
condition for law’s validity that it not be group relative. In fact many
norms that no one would disagree are official state law are group
relative. Constitutional law on freedom of religion applies only to people
who practice religion. Commercial law applicable to merchants applies
only to merchants.367 UCC Article 2 applies only to the sale of goods.
Law certainly is group relative, but we cannot describe a legal
system around one of the groups identified by such group relativity. We
might not be able to describe a transnational legal system around
commercial law alone. Law is not comprehensive in the Razian sense, in
that law does not purport to regulate (or be able to regulate) all aspects of
our lives, but it does not purport to cover a single field or limited fields
of human action. How can we have a legal system that addresses only
one area of life, commerce?
There are two replies to the limited domain objection. First, it
might be possible to describe a legal system around a group in which
such a description has the right sort of normative consequences. The
systemic unity and shared intentionality features of the transnational
commercial law order suggest a relationship between commercial law
norms to justify the classification as a legal system. Some groups are not
normatively relevant. For example, it would be implausible to describe a
legal system around all left handed people because the feature of lefthandedness has no or perhaps insufficient normative importance. Some
groupings would indeed be repugnant, such as groupings in separate
apartheid-like legal systems for different citizens of a state. But that
some groups are not normatively relevant or normatively repugnant does
not condemn all groups from being able to form legal systems around the
pervasive and important social practices that regulate their action beyond
state borders.
The second reply is that commercial law itself may be incomplete as
a concept without a transnational conception. This reply runs the risk of
being circular. The point here is only that when we examine how
367. Harold J. Burman & Felix J. Dresser, The “New” Law Merchant and the “Old”:
Sources, Content, and Legitimacy, in CARBONNEAU, supra note 57, at 53 (The law
merchant is not a complete legal system; it was never meant to be, even in medieval
times); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator’s View, in CARBONNEAU,
supra note 238, at 71 (The law merchant “supplies the solution to a particular issue,
without necessarily governing all aspects of the transaction.” The law merchant is an
alternative to conflict of laws analysis, which is often “artificial and inconclusive,” and a
way out of applying rules ill-suited to international transactions.); BERGER, CREEPING
CODIFICATION, supra note 146 at 93 (law merchant not a “self contained” system, but
domestic commercial law is incomplete).
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commercial law operates in the world, we need an account to capture its
essential cosmopolitan features.
b.

The Unity Objection

The unity objection might seem difficult to overcome. It is actually,
however, just an old “law is politics” claim. A way to dissolve the unity
objection might be to try to remove politics from the analysis. Is there
something unique about a legal system apart from its place in a political
order? Scholars of analytical jurisprudence have been asking similar
sorts of questions for a long time. When we get precise about our claims
and remove from the discussion the political allegiances that lawyers,
legislators, and judges might naturally associate with their municipal
legal system, we can attempt a description of a transnational legal order
in which the unity objection becomes a political fact with some, but not
decisive or fatal, force over the legal order we purport to describe.
CONCLUSION
In this article I have tried to use conceptual analysis to articulate a
cosmopolitan conception of legal positivism and to develop it into a
concept of commercial law as a transnational normative order. This
article is only a start of such an account and no doubt it will benefit from
scrutiny and counterargument. And the account of a stateless or
cosmopolitan conception of legal positivism has relevance beyond
commercial law.
This article offers no prescriptions. It does not ask whether a
transnational commercial legal order is just. Analytical jurisprudence is
a search for the existence conditions for a legal system and the validity
conditions for legal rules. It is not about the evaluation of a legal system
using principles of justice or other substantive moral values. The focus
is on what is a legal system not what is a just legal system.368 These are
important limitations. This article offers no evaluation of the content of
the principles of justice that may or may not be reflected in the law
merchant or the transnational commercial law order. It might just help
us expose the considerable concerns we might have when consumers
transact in a normative order in which the state has limited power to
protect them. Concerns about the justice of such an order resonate across
a diverse assemblage of scholars working in divergent traditions. The
first quote by Hal Scott to start off the article was from an article about

368. For an explanation of the differences in the analysis, see RAZ, PRACTICAL
REASON AND NORMS, supra note 12, at 10-13.
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how banks use the law merchant to shift risk to customers.369 Thomas
Carbonneau and François Janson, who write on international commercial
arbitration, explain:
Law will be generated within the confines of a fully privatized
system that is unaccountable to any public organization or process.
Arbitrators, lawyers, arbitral institutions and law firms will become
the de facto government and the courts of international trade and
commerce.370

Seyla Benhabib explains:
To be distinguished from the influence of cosmopolitan human rights
norms is the undermining of state sovereignty through the demands
of global capitalism. Global capitalism is indeed creating its own
form of “global law without a state” (Gunther Teubner), as well as
sabotaging the efforts of legislators to conduct open and public
deliberations on legislation impacting the movements of capital and
other resources. . . . My thesis is that whereas cosmopolitan norms
lead to the emergence of generalizable human interests and the
articulation of public standards of norm justification, global
capitalism leads to the privatization and segmentation of interest
communities and the weakening of standards of public justification
through the rise of private logics of norm generation. This results in
the deterioration of the capacity of states to protect and provide for
371
their citizens.

Law and economics scholars like Bruce Benson argue to the contrary,
because, they claim, governments do not make good commercial law
because of rent seeking and other pathologies of the political process.372
But the focus of law and economics scholars is on efficiency, not justice.
Questions of justice are beyond our scope here. But once we get
clear on what is going on, we can more effectively focus on questions of
justice because we have improved our understanding of the norms that
we want to investigate. The normative order I have tried to identify in
this article certainly should be subjected to normative evaluation.

369. Scott, supra note 2.
370. Thomas E. Carbonneau & François Janson, Cartesian Logic and Frontier
Politics: French and American Concepts of Arbitrability, 2 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 193,
221-22 (1994), quoted in Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An
Empirical Look at the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 525 (2005).
371. Seyla Benhabib, Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan
Norms? Rethinking Citizenship in Volatile Times, CITIZENSHIP STUDIES, Feb. 2007, at
19-36 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
372. Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J.
644, 644 (1989). See also supra note 110 for the political economy literature on
unification, supporting Benson’s argument.
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One question that seems to follow from this article is whether we
can have a cosmopolitan account of the law and a political account of
justice. It might just be that states are the primary spaces for justice.
Thomas Nagel certainly has it right when he says that “the need for
workable ideas about the global or international case [for justice]
presents political theory with its most important current task. . . .”373
While this article fills one gap in the literature, others remain open, and
one that certainly needs critical attention is the critique, from the
standpoint of justice, of any transnational commercial law order we may
find.

373. Nagel, supra note 14, at 113.

